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Francesco Nappo: ‘The Most Beautiful of All Bonds’: Analogy in Scientific Inquiry 
(Under the direction of Marc Lange) 
 
Combining philosophical analysis with historical perspective, my dissertation aims to dispel 
what is, in my view, a harmful prejudice about the work accomplished by analogies in empirical 
investigations. This prejudice has drawn philosophers and scientists alike to a picture of 
scientific rationality that is not only unfaithful to the methods by which empirical knowledge is 
produced, but also isolates the scientific endeavor from all other human endeavors of knowledge-
production employing analogy and comparison. Against the idea that analogies can only serve as 
‘food for thought’, I defend the claim that there exists an inductive use of analogy in science: i.e., 
that analogies can sometimes be sources of defeasible support for hypotheses about the yet 
unknown. I propose to vindicate the inductive use of analogy in science by appeal to an 
expectation (which can be more or less reasonable depending on the context of investigation) of 
simplicity in the description of natural and social reality: i.e., with the idea that the same 
explanatory patterns employed in the analogy’s source are ‘on the right track’ to providing us 









Rationality consists just in the continuous adaptation of our language to our 
continually expanding world, and metaphor is one of the chief means by 
which this is accomplished – Mary Hesse 
 
Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic 
hypostatization of relations; that is the sole method of valuable thought. 
Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this is something to be avoided – 
Charles Sanders Peirce 
 
As rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by 
understanding them (homo intelligendo fit omnia), this imaginative 
metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them 
(homo non intelligendo fit omnia); and perhaps the latter proposition is truer 
than the former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in 
the things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of 
himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them – 
Giambattista Vico 
 






Much philosophy of science of the past century has been driven by the conviction that the 
processes by which a community of scientists arrives at the formulation of a novel theory are not 
rationally evaluable. The work of philosophical analysis and reconstruction can thus only begin 
when that of discovery has come to an end; what happens before that is left for historians to find 
out. While the recent advancements in our understanding of the scientific enterprise have 
considerably reduced the appeal of this doctrine, which draws a neat distinction between the 
‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’, the old division of labor between the 
historian and the philosopher sustained by its means has persisted. The result is that there is a lot 
of important work, in physics as well as in other disciplines, that regularly and systematically 
goes on at the early stages of theory formation, the significance of which has escaped the 
attention of many epistemologists and philosophers of science. It is in the spirit of summarizing 
and advancing our understanding of the methods employed in actual contexts of scientific 
investigation that I submit this work on the role of analogy in science to your attention.  
The situation with which I will be mostly concerned with should be familiar to the practicing 
scientist. One may have collected experimental laws pertaining to various sub-domains of a 
subject under investigation, but struggle to find a unified theory that ties them altogether. Or a 
theory may be available but scientists know it to suffer from various defects, and are in search 
for a better one that shares the successes of its predecessor without sharing its failures. 
Depending on the context, there might be several ways of overcoming the impasse. The most 
obvious one is to perform experiments in the hope of collecting more evidence. Often, however, 
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the practical and theoretical difficulties associated with carrying out more experiments make this 
route inconvenient or unappealing. In effect, a close analysis of the history of the various 
branches of scientific investigation reveals that efforts at collecting more data are accompanied, 
if not entirely replaced, by theoretical work, aiming not so much at increasing the extent of the 
available observations but rather at improving their interpretation. 
The basic datum from which this dissertation takes off is simple. When faced with a difficult 
theoretical problem or with limited information, many scientists resort to analogies in order to 
advance our understanding of the phenomena. They do so with caution, but frequently. This fact 
has not escaped the attention of the historians, who are acquainted with the propaedeutic work 
scientists undertake to pave the way for novel insight. The ubiquity of analogies also emerges 
clearly from studies in the psychology of scientific reasoning. Dunbar and Blanchette (2001) 
followed the work of three medical laboratories in the United States, Italy and Canada for 
extended periods of time, finding that during 16 meetings a staggering total of 99 analogies were 
used, and that in each meeting the number of analogies employed ranged between 2 and 14; 
moreover, the study showed that the laboratory in which the least number of analogies was used 
was also the least successful in terms of scientific output. Despite all of this, the role of analogy 
in science remains an underdeveloped theme in contemporary philosophy. The present work 
aims to partly remedy this situation, by articulating a series of problems that I believe are 
deserving of more philosophical attention and controversy. I hope in this way that fellow readers 
will be drawn to this topic of central importance for understanding scientific practice.  
I use the word ‘drawn’ because it best suits my experience researching and writing on this 
topic. As an area of investigation that is at the same time rich in historical precursors and 
underdeveloped in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, I have thoroughly 
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enjoyed my steady walk through philosophical landscapes off the beaten path. In my search for 
insights from philosophers and scientists from Plato to Kant, from Galileo to Einstein, from 
Keynes to Hesse, in the past few years I have learned so much more about the history of 
philosophy and science than I ever had before. The notes that I have collected through this 
journey contain a vast array of bits of delicious historical information and philosophical insight; 
and it is almost sad that so many of these did not make it to the actual corpus of the dissertation.  
There is, of course, no denying that writing this dissertation has also been the hardest work I 
have ever had to complete. A serious problem for anyone who undertakes work in the history of 
scientific discovery is that it is difficult to master at the same time all the philosophical, historical 
and scientific competences that would be required to approach to work of, say, Newton or Clerk 
Maxwell. Hence there is a constant risk, due to lack of sensibility to one or another aspect of the 
historical situation under investigation, that one misunderstands the actual practice and indulges 
in ungrounded rationalizations. Although I cannot say that the arguments in the following 
chapters are immune from this criticism, my approach has been to practice honesty and humility 
throughout. When some topic was beyond my competences, I have either asked for the help of 
experts or refrained from discussing it at all. It is only when I could be sure, from an attentive 
study of various sources, that my interpretation was a plausible one that I have allowed myself to 
criticize the accounts of others who claim expertise on these subjects.  
There is, however, one aspect of this work that I am willing to defend to the last bit of my 
energy, which is its humanistic perspective. One of the principal aims of this dissertation is to 
offer a synthesis of a varied body of work from philosophers, historians and science practitioners 
on the theme of analogy in science. The authors that I will draw from, despite addressing roughly 
the same issues, have often communicated poorly with one another. My aim is to bring their 
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diverse contributions together into a single and coherent mold, one whose shape can be described 
and articulated in a fairly precise way. The hope is that, even when this description is somewhat 
deficient in detail, it still manages to offer a plausible and unitary overall picture of the use of 
analogy in science. “In the same way”, Machiavelli writes to Lorenzo de’ Medici introducing the 
Prince, “landscape painters station themselves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or 
elevated ground, and ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains” (1513, 1). 
Importantly, I do not pretend that the perspective that this works takes is in any way privileged. 
What I ask is no more than for my approach to be included as one among the many 
methodologically acceptable ways of treating of a subject so complex and various. 
This work could not have been completed without the help of some amazing people. The first 
one I should thank is my advisor Marc Lange, who has been the kindest and most generous and 
most patient in these years. He gave me confidence in pursuing a project in the philosophy of 
science and guided me through the research and writing process. His philosophical work and our 
conversations have taught me immensely and have been a tremendous inspiration for me. In 
addition to his incredible feedback and generosity with time, I am also indebted to him for taking 
great care of me as a person and for being supportive in moments of difficulty. Although I was 
really scared of him at the beginning, I feel especially lucky to have gotten to know him not only 
for the superlative philosopher that he is, but also on a more personal level. For his extensive 
knowledge, insight, diligence, kindness and sense of humor, I find that Marc truly embodies the 
archetype of the Ph.D advisor. Overall, it has been a superb time working with him. 
I am also indebted to Matt Kotzen for his kindness and his excellent feedback. Every time I 
went to his office he offered plenty of very insightful points and suggestions while also being 
encouraging and cheerful in his way. With his wit and personality, he is a pleasure to talk 
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philosophy with and I will miss those times with him. I also feel very grateful to Alan Nelson, 
who has always been supportive during the entirety of my graduate school experience and has 
followed my dissertation project at every major step. The classes in the history of philosophy 
have also been a great source of inspiration. My discussion of J. Clerk Maxwell’s work in 
chapter four is heavily influenced by the historical methodology that I learned from Alan. 
Ram Neta and Jerry Postema have also contributed greatly to the shaping and completion of 
this project. Ram’s class on rule-following in Spring 2016 has been extremely helpful 
background when approaching the topic of analogy; I am also grateful for the extensive feedback 
he has provided on various chapters of this dissertation. I will also remember dearly my 
conversations with Jerry, whose article “A similibus ad similia” on analogy in the law is one of 
my favorite pieces in philosophy and has been a large influence on my work. I owe a special 
thank also to Brian Copenhaver for making me think more deeply about the role of magic in 
human thinking and for his encouragement in pursuing studies in Italian philosophy. For their 
feedback and suggestions at various stages of my writing, I am also grateful to: Alexander Bird, 
Simon Blackburn, Luc Bovens, Thomas Hofweber, Markus Kohl, Mariska Leunissen, Carla 
Merino-Rajme, C.D.C. Reeve, John Roberts, Gillian Russell, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Sarah 
Stroud, Samantha Wakil, Alex Worsnip, the audiences at my UNC research presentations in 
2017-2018 and 2018-2019, and the participants to the 2018 ‘Kinds of Reasoning’ conference in 
Vercelli, Italy, to the 2019 UNC-KCL ‘Modality and Probability’ Workshop in London, UK, and 
to the 2019 ‘Epistemology of Analogue Simulations’ conference in Geneva, Switzerland. 
This dissertation comes at the end of a long journey and I would like to thank some of those 
professors who have believed in me and supported me along the way. I am first of all grateful to 
my undergraduate advisor Pierluigi Minari and my master’s advisor Katherine Hawley for all 
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their kindness and generosity during supervision. Many thanks are also owed to: Silvana Borutti 
at Pavia; Tim Crane and Nick Treanor for their help while at Cambridge; Philip Ebert, Aaron 
Cotnoir, Walter Pedriali, Patrick Greenough and Sarah Broadie at St Andrews; Daniel Nolan and 
Alan Hájek at the Australian National University. I am also grateful to the Collegio Ghislieri for 
providing accommodation while studying in Pavia and to the amazing staff members Rebecca 
Farris and Sandy Staley at UNC Philosophy Department for being so helpful and kind.  
A special thanks also goes to all those colleagues and friends who have been so supportive of 
me and have contributed so much to my well-being and happiness over these years. I feel 
especially indebted to: Jessi Addison, Aliosha Barranco, Lindsay Brainard, Alex Campbell, 
Sophia Catalano, Giovanni Cocco, Sara Copic, Maxim Demin, Kori Hensell, Katelin Kaiser, 
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1. Analogy and Analogical Reasoning 
The official portrait of Isaac Newton that is preserved at the National Portrait Gallery in London 
(fig. 1) depicts the British scientist with two books on his desk. The closed one on the far right is 
a copy of Newton’s Opticks, first published in 1704. The open one is his Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica, whose first edition goes back to 1687.  
 
Fig. 1: Portrait of Newton at the National Portrait Gallery in London, UK. 
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At a closer look, it turns out that the Principia in the portrait is open onto the section of Book III 
which deals with the ‘Attractive Forces of Spherical Bodies’. We recognize, in particular, the 
illustration accompanying Proposition LXX (fig. 2): 
                 
Fig. 2: Illustration accompanying Proposition LXX of the Principia 
Even though we have no certainty that Newton himself chose this specific section of the book for 
the portrait, it is not difficult to guess why it was picked. Propositions LXX and LXXI helped 
sanction the analogy between the motion of terrestrial bodies (the famous apple falling from the 
tree) and that of celestial bodies that had driven Newton’s early inquiries. It follows from those 
two Propositions that a spherical body S exerts gravitational attraction on an outside point E as if 
all of S’s mass was concentrated at its center. Before he realized that this fact could be proven by 
calculus, Newton had used it as a working assumption for deriving the attraction exerted by the 
Earth on a falling terrestrial body as well as on the Moon, finding the two values (when divided 
by the square of the distance from the Earth’s center) nearly equal. In the logic of the portrait, the 
Principia open on the section on spherical bodies therefore stand for Newton’s greatest 
accomplishment: the discovery that Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion and Kepler’s laws of 
celestial motion can be subsumed under a unified theory of physical reality. 
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The story of Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitation brings out two senses of ‘analogy’ 
that are relevant to scientific research. The first is analogy as a mode of reasoning. Even before 
he was able to prove or even justify his working assumptions, Newton took the similarity in the 
numerical values obtained from the astronomical calculations and the observation of falling 
terrestrial bodies as evidence that a single, inverse square law of gravitation was obeyed by all 
material bodies in the universe. In taking one similarity between two objects or domains (in this 
case, the observed coincidence of numerical values) to be indicative of a further, yet unknown 
similarity between them (in this case, the fact that both sublunary and superlunary bodies obey 
the same inverse square gravitation law), Newton engaged in reasoning from analogy. 
The second sense in which analogy figures in Newton’s story is not as a mode of reasoning 
but as an end result. In this sense, ‘analogy’ refers to the bond that links various domains of 
scientific investigation; it is synonymous with ‘unification’. In Newton’s example, it is the bond 
between the sublunary to the superlunary realm sanctioned by Newton’s laws of motion. 
This dissertation aims to demonstrate the interdependence of analogy-as-a-reasoning-process 
and analogy-as-an-end in scientific practice. In order to illustrate the picture that I will develop in 
the following chapters, it is helpful to briefly compare it to its dual, the ‘heuristic view’. For 
defenders of this view, analogy-as-a-reasoning-process can be a helpful, though often 
misleading, aid to scientific discovery. Comparing an unfamiliar domain with a more familiar 
one often enables scientists to formulate new conjectures to be put to empirical test. Sometimes, 
these conjectures turn out to be correct, revealing elements of ‘similarity’ or ‘sameness’ among 
disparate domains of scientific inquiry. But even though analogy-as-an-end is a possible outcome 
of scientific discovery, it is certainly not indispensable. The heuristic view is thus also ‘eclectic’: 
it welcomes unification just as much as disunity in science (cf. Duprè 1993). It follows that, 
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besides being useful aids to scientific discovery, analogies have no business providing any 
degree of confirmation, let alone justifying inferences to, empirical hypotheses about the yet 
unknown. A scientist might, of course, decide to present some conclusion that she is already 
justified in believing in the form of an argument from analogy. In that case, although the 
argument may be a strong one, it would not warrant assigning additional credence to its 
conclusion (over and above what the background evidence already does). Alternatively, a 
scientist might decide to present some genuinely new evidence while elaborating an analogy. In 
that case, however, it would be the new evidence to be doing the confirmatory work, not the fact 
that there is a significant analogy with a well-established domain of scientific investigation.   
The picture that I will defend competes with the heuristic view as the right epistemology of 
scientific practice. On this ‘inductive view’, analogy-as-an-end assumes a more prominent, 
guiding role in scientific inquiry. In many contexts of empirical investigation, scientists proceed 
under the working assumption, often justified by past experience, that the natural and social 
reality they study is in some sense simple or unitary: it consists of a few, recurring and stable 
patterns. In conditions of sparse and insufficient evidence, the analogical unity observed in the 
various branches of science thus functions as a kind of voucher, warranting the presumption that 
the hypotheses being formulated by means of new analogies – those at least that undergo and 
pass the initial scrutiny of the scientific community – are ‘on the right track’ to truth. Analogy-
as-a-reasoning-process comes in at a second stage (logically speaking), as a way of checking 
those initial presumptions by means of the available evidence. When a newly proposed analogy 
passes the scrutiny of the interested scientific community, it is regarded not only as a heuristic 
device but also as capable of providing some additional degree of defeasible support to 
hypotheses about the yet unknown. This conclusion simply falls out of an epistemological 
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picture that takes analogy-as-an-end to be both the indispensable beginning and the indispensable 
end of scientific inquiry; for without it, one might dare say, there can be opinion but not science. 
I should immediately clarify that, by defending the inductive view, I do not mean to deny that 
analogies are sometimes used merely heuristically, as an aid to investigation, nor that they can be 
helpful illustration, useful for teaching science. My claim is only that, sometimes, analogical 
arguments play a more robust, ‘inductive’ role in scientific inquiry. This is not to say that, on my 
view, conclusions supported by strong analogical arguments in evidentially impoverished 
conditions deserve a very high degree of credence, nor that we ought to trust empirical 
predictions based solely on such arguments. My claim is the more limited one that analogical 
arguments can justify assigning some amount, possibly small but still non-negligible, of 
additional credence to a yet untested hypothesis. In my view, to neglect the specifically inductive 
function that analogies play in scientific inquiry, and to only zero in on their heuristic uses, is to 
misunderstand the entirety of their role in science’s network of knowledge and inferences. 
The picture of the inductive view that I have just offered must, of course, be understood as no 
more than a sketch; it will require further work to articulate and specify its content. An important 
part of the task that I will undertake in the next chapters is not only to defend the inductive view 
over its heuristic alternative, but also to defend a specific version of the inductive view over rival 
versions. My aim will be to show that the version of the inductive view that I advocate offers an 
interesting middle ground between versions of the inductive view that I consider too cautious or 
timid and versions of the inductive view that I find too daring or adventurous. Thus, for instance, 
I will argue that analogies can fulfill an inductive function not only when they identify 
resemblances in causal features between a model and a target, as some defenders of the inductive 
view (e.g., Hesse 1963) have contended, but also when they identify certain kinds of similarities 
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of the mathematical variety – though not all such kinds. I will also argue that the confirmatory 
role of analogy cannot be accounted for merely by appeal to some general rule for updating one’s 
credences upon new evidence, but will resist attempts to show that some a priori constraint on 
the rational shape of one’s distribution of credences must be in place in order to capture that role; 
as we will see, the principle of simplicity that I will advance as a working posit for the scientific 
activity is intended to be sanctioned on a posteriori grounds. When this work will be completed, 
what I hope will stand out is mainly the coherence of the resulting picture of scientific practice. 
Given that a complete defense of the inductive view that I aim to establish is intimately 
linked with the defense of simplicity or ‘unity’ in the natural and social forms, there is an 
obvious question as to how one would go about arguing for that view. As James Clerk Maxwell 
(1890) reminds us, we can have no guarantee of such simplicity or unity in nature:  
Perhaps the ‘book’, as it has been called, of nature is regularly paged; if so, no doubt the 
introductory parts will explain those that follow, and the methods taught in the first chapters 
will be taken for granted and used as illustration in the more advanced parts of the course; but 
if it is not a ‘book’ at all, but a magazine, nothing is more foolish than to suppose that one 
part can throw light on another. (1890, II, 382)  
In what follows, I will not try to establish the inductive view by deducing it from some principle 
of simplicity. The approach that I will take is instead ‘bottom-up’. That is to say, I will point to 
various facts about scientific practice that the heuristic view has trouble accounting for but are 
naturally explained by the inductive view, with the aim of making plausible that a principle of 
simplicity (of a kind that I will specify in due course) may function as a working posit for 
scientific practice. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter (five), my ultimate aim is to 
establish the inductive view as a serious contender when reconstructing instances of analogical 
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inferences in the specific contexts in which they arise, together with the considered responses 
those inferences tend to generate in the surrounding scientific community. 
This long argument for my version of the inductive view from what the ‘microstructure’ of 
scientific inference begins in the next section, where I will offer four considerations for thinking 
that analogical arguments in science sometimes possess an inductive function. It will continue in 
chapters two to four, where some of the main aspects of my inductive view will be articulated 
and defended. To assist the reader in the passage from the more bird’s eye level discussion 
adopted here to the denser and more technical parts of the dissertation, in sections three and four 
of this chapter I will provide a brief historical introduction to the issues that will be addressed in 
the rest of the dissertation and summaries of each of the following chapters. In chapter five, I 
will return to a bird’s eye perspective of this introduction for a final look at the picture of 
analogical reasoning defended in this work and for a brief inventory of those other questions in 
the philosophy of science and epistemology that are raised by this discussion. I hope you enjoy! 
 
2. Four Arguments for the Inductive Function of Analogies 
Why think that arguments from analogies in science possess an inductive function in addition to 
a merely heuristic one? One reason is that we can often feel the cogency of an analogy. We can 
call this the argument from appearances. Admittedly, sometimes the pull of analogies is so 
strong, that some critical thinking textbooks warn against being lured by them: “there is no way 
in which we can really assure ourselves that we are arguing safely by analogy”, we read in 
Jevons’ (1879) time-honored Logic book. This and similar calls for caution are, I believe, sound 
advice. However, it does not follow from this that we should place even the most plausible 
analogies in the same heuristic category as taking a walk, dreaming, or drinking coffee, which 
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are other examples of aids to scientific discovery. The inductive view offers a cautious middle 
ground: unlike dreams and walks, arguments from analogy can sometimes justify assigning some 
additional credence to an empirical hypothesis. To give just one example where the argument 
from appearances seems plausible, let me briefly mention an episode from the history of 
electromagnetism which features two of its most notable early pioneers.  
In 1766, Benjamin Franklin reported to Joseph Priestley an observation he had made while 
investigating electricity. It was simply that, if you take a wide cylinder or a sphere made of metal 
sitting on an insulator and charge it, and then place a cork near it on the outside, the cork is 
subject to electrostatic attraction; however, if you take the same cork and place it inside the 
charged shell, it is subject to none. Seeking to explain Franklin’s observation, Priestley recalled 
precisely that section of the Principia that is depicted in Newton’s official portrait. Specifically, 
Proposition LXX states that, if gravity obeys an inverse square law, the attraction on any point P 
inside a hollow sphere S of uniform density must be null.1 Recalling Newton’s proof, Priestley 
came up with a brilliant argument to explain the electrostatic ‘null effect’ Franklin had reported: 
May we not infer from this experiment, that the attraction of electricity is subject to the same 
laws with that of gravitation, and is therefore according to the square of the distances; since it 
is easily demonstrated, that were the earth in the form of a shell, a body in the inside of it 
would not be attracted to one side more than another? (1767, 732) 
                                                          
1 Newton’s proof of the theorem goes as follows. Considering a hollow sphere S of uniform density and an 
arbitrary point P inside of it, he first shows that two arbitrarily small conic sections of the sphere, with edges 
PK and PH respectively, built around the axis JM passing through their common vertex P, have masses that are 
proportional to the square of their respective edges PK and PH (fig. 2). At this point, Newton appeals to the 
fact that gravitational attraction is also proportional (inversely) to the square of the distance between two 
points, from which it follows that the attraction exerted on P by the masses of the two conic sections must 
cancel each other out as a result. Hence P is subject to no gravitational acceleration. Since P is an arbitrary 
point, it follows that any point inside S must be subject to no gravitational attraction. 
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This example offers a neat illustration of an argument from analogy employed in support 
of a novel empirical hypothesis. Priestley made the case for the inverse square electrostatic 
law when little was known about electricity – much before, e.g., Alessandro Volta and 
Michael Faraday had even begun their investigations. According to his argument, just as 
Newton had demonstrated that the absence of gravitational attraction inside a hollow sphere 
of uniform density is due to the force of gravity’s obeying an inverse square law, so the 
cork’s remaining at rest inside a closed conducting shell indicated that electrostatic forces 
obey a similar inverse square law. Placed in the concluding parts of an influential work on 
electricity, Priestley’s argument inclined many scientists to expect an inverse square law of 
electrostatics. Indeed, as historians of science have pointed out, when twenty years later 
Coulomb presented the results of his torsion balance experiments (reason for which the 
electrostatic law is named after him) he simply gave further confirmation to a hypothesis 
that was widely expected to be correct among experts in the scientific community.2 
Although Priestley’s argument has all of the appearances of a cogent argument from 
analogy in science, defenders of the heuristic view might point out that the plausibility 
afforded to the inverse square electrostatic law by Priestley’s argument does not rely on the 
analogy with Newton’s law of gravity at all, but rather on the observation of an electrostatic 
null effect. According to this reconstruction, the null effect observed by Franklin is plausibly 
entailed by the inverse square electrostatic law; since entailment is sufficient for 
confirmation (in the sense that if some live hypothesis H entails evidence E, then E confirms 
                                                          
2 Heering (1993) goes so far as to claim that, as a matter of fact: “Coulomb did not find the inverse square law 
by doubtful measurements from his torsion balance experiments but by theoretical considerations” (993), 
mentioning the analogy with Newton’s law of gravity as one of Coulomb’s main theoretical reasons. This is 
possibly an overstatement, but I agree about the role of analogy as a plausibility consideration. 
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H by default), defenders of the heuristic view can grant that there can be confirmation in 
Priestley’s example while still maintaining that the analogy with gravity is inductively inert.  
For defenders of the inductive view, however, this reconstruction is insufficient to 
account for the case-study. After all, the same electrostatic null effect is made likely by 
other live hypotheses: e.g., the hypothesis that the electrostatic law is a linear one, but the 
null-effect is observed as the result of some confounding factor in the experimental setup.3 
For defenders of the inductive view, we have no complete account of Priestley’s reasoning 
until we identify what made the inverse square law especially plausible vis-à-vis those 
rivals. Plausibly, among the qualities of the inverse square electrostatic law is the fact that, 
to use Salmon’s (1990) expression, it ‘fits inductively’ with the rest of what we know, a 
quality that not all of the rival electrostatic hypotheses compatible with Franklin’s null effect 
share. The analogy with the inverse square law of gravity is therefore an indispensable 
element of plausibility for Priestley’s conclusions. For it does more than just making 
Priestley’s hypothesis psychologically salient: rather, it justifies an additional boost in 
credence in that hypothesis vis-à-vis rival explanations of Franklin’s null effect. 
Apart from doing more justice to the cogency of some arguments from analogy in science, 
the inductive view also accords with the testimony of notable scientists. We can call this the 
argument from testimony. For instance, Priestley endorsed the inductive view quite explicitly: 
Analogy is our best guide in our philosophical investigations; and all discoveries, which 
were not made by accident, have been made by the help of it. (1767, 19)  
                                                          
3  It does not follow deductively from Franklin’s experiment that electrostatic forces obey an inverse-square 
law. Newton’s proof of theorem LXX assumes that gravity obeys an inverse-square law. Without further 
assumptions, a null-effect does not entail an inverse-square law; cf. Falconer (2016). 
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By contrasting discoveries made by the help of analogy with those made merely by accident, 
Priestley indicated a commitment to the idea that an analogy is not merely a device of discovery 
among others, but rather a distinctive form of scientific inference. Another example is Charles 
Darwin, who frequently claimed support for his hypothesis of evolution by natural selection 
“from the analogy with domestic productions” (Letter to Henslow 100, 1903), i.e., from the 
analogy with the artificial selection exercised by human breeders on desirable traits of other 
living beings. In a response to T. H. Huxley, who had found the argument in the Origin 
unpersuasive, Darwin blames Huxley for a form of ‘inductive blindness’: 
this makes me feel a little disappointed that you are not inclined to think the general view in 
some slight degree more probable than you did at first. This I consider rather ominous.  
(1896, 2, 147)  
Once again, Darwin’s testimony suggests that the analogy with domestic productions is some 
motivation to take seriously the hypothesis of evolution by natural selection.  
Yet another argument in favor of the inductive view appeals not to what scientists say but to 
what they do. We can call this the argument from practice. The main point here is that there 
appears to be a normative structure to the practice of offering and evaluating arguments from 
analogy in science, which is difficult to explain if we adopt the heuristic view. Shelley (2002) 
proposes an argument of this kind by documenting the aftermath of Louis Alvarez’s (1980) 
striking assertion of an extraterrestrial cause to dinosaur extinction. In proposing that a large 
asteroid crash was responsible for the extinction of dinosaurs, Alvarez had compared the 
hypothetical asteroid crash to the explosion of the volcano Krakatoa in Indonesia in 1883, whose 
debris had reached London. Alvarez’s idea that the dust generated by the asteroid crash could 
have enveloped the Earth’s atmosphere, leading to the death of the dinosaurs, was followed by a 
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heated discussion over the plausibility of the Krakatoa-asteroid analogy. As Shelley (2002) 
writes, commenting on some of the most notable contributions: 
The scientists involved in the debate clearly thought that the counterarguments were relevant 
to the acceptability of the asteroid impact hypothesis (2002, 493) 
In response to the last two arguments (from testimony and from practice), defenders of the 
heuristic view are often ready to come up with some surrogate of the inductive function that 
satisfy their austere views in scientific methodology. One recent suggestion by Nyrup (2019) is 
that arguments from analogy often aim to establish the ‘pursuit-worthiness’ of a novel 
hypothesis, where pursuit-worthiness is meant to be detached from truth. However, apart from 
making the dubious assumption that there is a single, coherent notion of, e.g., pursuit-worthiness 
that can take the role of confirmation, proposals such as Nyrup’s are characteristically hard to 
assess with respect to the issue of interest, which is whether they are capable of explaining 
scientific practice. For instance, Shelley (2002) notes that Alvarez and his colleagues took 
considerable care responding to the objections raised against their asteroid analogy, but that: 
Had they taken their analogy to be merely a heuristic device, Alvarez et al. could well have 
left [the problems] unanswered. (2002, 484) 
Invoking pursuit-worthiness is hardly a solution to this interpretative problem: when we are not 
projecting into this notion some distinctive epistemic component, pursuit-worthiness simply 
places the bar too low for understanding what makes some seriously proposed analogies in the 
course of inquiry worth the detailed scrutiny of the scientific community.  
Moving up to more controversial arguments for the inductive view, there is what we might 
call the argument from past success. The history of science is replete with examples of analogies 
leading to novel and profound scientific discoveries. I have already mentioned some success 
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stories in passing: Newton’s reasoning to the universal law of gravitation from the numerical 
coincidence between the calculations of terrestrial and celestial motion; Priestley’s reasoning to 
the inverse square law of electrostatics from the analogy with the gravitational null-effect; 
Darwin’s reasoning to the hypothesis of evolution by natural selection from the analogy with 
artificial selection (as well as with Malthus’ studies on human populations). But the examples 
easily multiply. To offers a few more examples from the history of physics, it is well-known that 
James Clerk Maxwell arrived at the formulation of the electromagnetic equations for which he is 
most famous by developing an analogy between electric currents and an incompressible fluid 
moving through tubes of variable section; that, following his example and method, Oliver 
Heaviside (1893) was led to formulate the hypothesis of gravitational waves (later endorsed by 
Einstein and recently confirmed by the LIGO experiments) by developing an analogy with 
electromagnetic waves; today, many working physicists place their bets on finding evidence that 
would sanction another analogy, first noted by Bekenstein (1972) and Hawking (1976), between 
the laws of black hole physics and those of thermodynamics (cf. Wallace 2017).  
In advancing (with some hesitation, admittedly) the argument from past success, I am of 
course aware that someone might regard it as something of a philosophical fraud (cf. Simons 
2001). One might concede that, in conditions of sparse and insufficient evidence, scientists might 
make use of any possible lead, including analogies, to form novel conjectures. But past success is 
no argument for the inductive function unless one could show that it has a significant tendency to 
succeed (in, e.g., generating hypotheses that make correct predictions). The problem for the 
argument from past success is not just that we do not know the number of hypotheses generated 
by means of analogy that turned out to be false, so as to establish whether the proportion of 
successful ones is significant; rather, the problem is that we can easily imagine the number of 
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false hypotheses generated by means of analogies to be extremely large, and so the proportion to 
be a negligible one. This is why, according to this objection, isolated stories of success in the 
history of science are insufficient to generate any presumption for the inductive view. To think 
that there is more to be said about the role of analogy because of some isolated success stories is 
no less a fallacy, on this rival view, than to think that there is more to be said about human 
powers of predicting future events based on the lucky experience of a few lottery winners.  
That the above response is not the final word on the subject, however, is shown by the fact 
that scientific discovery differs from lottery winning in one crucial respect: while it is certain that 
the right combination of numbers must be found in one or another of the lottery tickets, it is not 
obvious at all that the correct hypothesis in scientific inquiry must be found among the 
hypotheses that we can conceive. This is precisely the point that Charles Sanders Peirce once 
raised against the invocation of “the doctrine of chances” in the epistemological arena: 
It is idle to say that the doctrine of chances would account for man’s ultimately guessing right. 
For if there were only a limited number n of hypotheses that man could form, so that 1/n 
would be the chance of the first hypothesis being right, still it would be a remarkable fact that 
man only could form n hypotheses, including... the hypothesis that future experimentation 
would confirm. Why should man’s n hypotheses include the right one? (1958, 7.680) 
If the fact that human beings were able to formulate some approximately correct hypotheses by 
analogy is already striking, it is legitimate to use past success as evidence for the inductive view. 
Other arguments for the inductive view rest on even more controversial premises, but are 
interesting nonetheless. For instance, I read Margaret Masterman’s (1970) essay on Kuhn as 
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offering an argument from materialism about confirmation.4 On Masterman’s view, confirmation 
is not some abstract relation between evidence and theory, but is rather the habit-forming process 
whereby some material artefact, originally conceived as a model of one domain, becomes a way 
of seeing some other domain, thereby establishing itself as a “research vehicle” (1970, 78). On 
this view, then, models and analogies are necessary for confirmation. Because the assessment of 
Masterman’s version of materialism would take us too far away from the central topic of this 
work, I will set her argument aside in what follows. My hope is that the four arguments offered 
above have already, if not persuaded of the correctness of the inductive view, at least given some 
plausibility to the idea that, when it comes to seriously entertained analogies in the course of 
scientific inquiry, there is no question as to whether they provide defeasible support to empirical 
hypotheses; for they simply do. The next section discusses some historical precedents of 
philosophers and historians of science who have come to similar conclusions to mine. 
 
3. Some Historical Background 
The chapters that follow are intended primarily as a contribution to the contemporary (Western) 
philosophical literature on reasoning from analogy in science. While I will sometimes refer to the 
position that various past philosophers have taken on the issues that I address, I will not attempt 
to offer an exhaustive historical introduction to the subject. As a way of offering some 
background to my discussion, however, let me offer now a brief recap of the recent history of 
philosophical reflection on analogy in science. Although the topic of analogy traces back to the 
pre-Socratics and continues in Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Galileo, Hume, Kant and Mill, 
                                                          
4 The first part of this essay is often referenced for Masterman’s discussion of the 21 different senses in which 
Kuhn (1962) uses ‘paradigm’. The second part of her essay has instead received very little attention. 
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among others, the period that I will cover in this section– the second half of the twentieth-
century – in many ways encapsulates and dramatizes philosophical disagreements that had 
already appeared at previous stages in the history of philosophy and continue to divide theorists 
today. I want to begin, in particular, with the year 1962, when two of the most influential works 
in twentieth-century philosophy of science saw their publication: Rudolf Carnap’s Logical 
Foundations of Probability and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
In the Logical Foundations of Probability, Carnap made a proposal for solving the problems 
relating to induction. His aim was to show that all inductive reasoning reduces to the theory of 
probability. According to Carnap’s argument, inductive logic requires for its justification no 
appeal to any principle of uniformity of nature, since it can be entirely interpreted in terms of 
axioms that are (when a given language is fixed) analytic and so also a priori. And because 
analogical reasoning is a form of inductive reasoning, Carnap embraced the view that analogical 
reasoning can, too, be reduced to the theory of probability. Carnap was following in the steps of 
Mill, who had explicitly connected discoveries of similarities with increases in probability: 
There can be no doubt that every resemblance [not known to be irrelevant] affords some 
degree of probability, beyond what would otherwise exist, in favor of a conclusion [and] 
every dissimilarity which can be proved between them, furnishes a counter-probability of 
the same nature on the other side (1843, 333) 
Although in 1962 Carnap gave very little detail about how to reduce analogy to probability, the 
task was partially taken up in later works and then, in 1970, as the result of the criticisms 
received over the years, left to the followers of his philosophical program to complete. 
While Carnap and his disciples were caught up in their formal studies, Kuhn’s Structure had 
already started making his (asteroid-like) impact on the philosophical landscape. According to 
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Kuhn’s picture of science, ‘scientific activity’ properly so-called begins with the establishment in 
the scientific community of a common paradigm of empirical research: typically, a text or series 
of texts that had been particularly successful in their problem-solving capacity to be elevated to 
the status of an ‘exemplar’. A considerable part of scientific activity then consists in extending 
(by analogy) the problem-solving patterns identified by the paradigm to some novel cases (one of 
those still left to explore by the paradigm). Among the most important pieces of evidence that 
Kuhn brought in favor of this picture, which in many ways places analogy closer to the core of 
science, was the behavior of the scientific community in the face of ‘anomalies’, among which 
cases where the predictions borne out of a well-established theory turn out to be incorrect. 
According to Kuhn, the behavior adopted by the scientific community is a conservative one, 
aiming primarily at preserving the paradigm underlying the theory rather than at refuting it. It is 
only in periods of revolution, when existing paradigms are called into question and new ones 
begin to emerge, that experts consider abandoning the existing paradigms to embrace new ones. 
Even though Carnap’s and Kuhn’s approaches to the philosophy of science were in many 
ways antithetic, some similarities between the two can be noted. Kuhn’s idea of a ‘paradigm 
shift’, in particular, was not far away from Carnap’s idea that changes in language would 
determine changes in the shape of the inductive relations of evidence to theory; and the same 
holds for Kuhn’s idea of the incommensurability of theories under different paradigms, a version 
of which was endorsed by Carnap. But the differences between the two authors are the most 
relevant here. One of Carnap’s central tenets was that changes in language were dictated 
primarily by pragmatic considerations; Kuhn, on the other hand, believed that something more 
than mere pragmatics was at stake in the choice between different paradigms – something to do 
with the success of various problem-solving patterns and their different ways of satisfying some 
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vague but persisting criteria of theory-choice in science (cf. Kuhn 1972). It is in this way that (at 
least on one way of reading the Structure) Kuhn attempted to rationalize the scientific attitude of 
taking adherence to an existing paradigm as a criterion of plausibility for the conclusions reached 
by means of empirical investigation. In taking analogy with a well-established paradigm to be a 
source of justification for hypotheses advanced in the course of scientific inquiry, Kuhn therefore 
came much closer to embracing a version of the inductive view of analogy than Carnap ever did. 
Although the influence of Carnap is much clearer in her work than that of Kuhn, it was Mary 
Hesse’s 1963 Models and Analogies in Science that first offered a clear path towards a synthesis 
between these two philosophies. On Hesse’s account, the evaluation of an analogical argument 
from the known properties of one scientific domain to the yet unobserved properties of another 
domain occurs along two distinct dimensions. First, there is the ‘horizontal’ dimension, which 
consists in the evaluation of the known similarities and dissimilarities between the domains 
being compared, where ‘similarity’ is defined relative to a particular choice of language. This is 
in effect the dimension that Carnap and, before him, Mill were attempting to capture by means of 
a theory of probability – what we might call the ‘empirical’ side of analogical reasoning. In 
addition to that, however, Hesse also recognized a distinct dimension of evaluation of analogies 
in science, the ‘vertical’ dimension. On her picture, the success of analogical arguments depends 
on the plausibility of taking the same kinds of causal relations that obtain among the salient 
properties of the analogy’s source to be also instantiated in the target. The evaluation of an 
analogy is thus seen to depend not only on the observed similarities and dissimilarities between 
source and target, but also, as Kuhn stressed, on more general facts about the state of science at 
large: facts about the kinds of causal connections that are regarded as scientifically acceptable at 
various stages of history – what one might call the ‘theoretical’ side of analogy. 
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Having made an impressive case for the view that the strength of arguments from analogy in 
science is two-dimensional, Hesse was however at loss in trying to find a justification for linking 
the prima facie judgments of strength with the possibility of an inductive use of analogy in 
scientific practice. In chapter three of Models and Analogies, Hesse revealed some sympathy for 
a form of vindication of the inductive use of analogy in the style proposed more generally for 
inductive reasoning by Hans Reichenbach (1938). The options, as Hesse put it, are two: either we 
live in a ‘chance universe’, one in which there is no limit to the variety of possible associations 
(e.g., causal connections) among the properties of this universe, in which case the method of 
analogy, just like any other non-deductive method, is doomed to failure, or we do not live in a 
chance universe, in which case the use of the method of analogy is rational. Either way, 
according to Hesse, the inductive use of analogy is vindicated because:  
[even though] we certainly do not know of any of the domains of application of scientific 
models that they are chance universes,… it is still reasonable to act on the assumption that 
they are not, and this is the only assumption that gives any principle of selection between 
hypotheses based on inductive support. The alternative is not a different principle of 
selection, but no principle at all. (1963, 117) 
In the later The Structure of Scientific Inference, Hesse advocated a postulationist approach (of 
the kind defended by Keynes 1927), according to which a principle of ‘independent variety’ of 
the basic natural forms constitutes a postulate for the possibility of the scientific activity.  
The landscape of the philosophy of science today has changed significantly since Hesse’s 
times. Among other things, more emphasis has been put on the role of technology and what 
Galison (1997) has called ‘the material culture of science’; also, the discipline has lost its 
privilege for physics and is now more attentive to the issues raised by so-called special sciences; 
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finally, more emphasis has been put on the social dimensions of scientific activity, both in terms 
of the social positions of scientists and in their role in contributing to society (e.g., Longino 
1990, Kitcher 2001).  However, reasoning from analogy has not ceased to be a significant part of 
scientific practice. Following a period in which the issue was given only marginal attention, in 
the past five years there has been a steady surge of interest in the topic (e.g., Dardashti et al. 
2017; Crowther et al. 2019; Nyrup 2019; Fraser 2019). Many traces of the same disagreements 
that animate the dispute between Carnap, Kuhn and Hesse can be found in contemporary 
debates. As Crowther et al. (2019) note, the majority view in the literature appears to be some 
version of the heuristic view. But there are some dissenting voices as well. In his 2009 By 
Parallel Reasoning, the most comprehensive discussion of reasoning from analogy in science to 
date, Bartha has identified and defended a version of the inductive view, his so-called 
‘articulation model’ of analogy, in which several themes from Kuhn and Hesse are developed. 
The version of the inductive view defended in this dissertation takes inspiration from some of 
the same sources as Bartha’s, but develops them in a different direction. Perhaps the simplest 
way of summarizing the difference between the two approaches is to say that Bartha’s account is 
more ‘Kuhnian’ in spirit: on his articulation model, the ‘vertical’ dimension of the evaluation of 
analogical arguments takes a distinct preference over the ‘horizontal’ dimension; also, his 
attempt at fitting reasoning from analogy within a theory of confirmation consists primarily in 
showing that analogical arguments function as ‘plausibility considerations’ which influence the 
prior opinions of scientific actors before any new evidence is considered. My picture, on the 
other hand, attempts to regain the heights of the Hessian synthesis: on my account, there is a 
virtuous dynamical interaction between the vertical and the horizontal dimension of the 
evaluation of analogical arguments; as will become clear in chapter three, my way of 
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accommodating analogical reasoning within a theory of confirmation is similarly an attempt a 
reuniting a more ‘Carnapian’ approach and a more ‘Kuhnian’ one into a single account. As a 
way of anticipating some of the themes discussed in the following discussions, in the next 
section I will provide brief outlines of the arguments in each of the next four chapters. 
 
4. Overview of the Next Chapters 
The aim of the following chapters is to articulate and defend some of the core aspects of my 
inductive view of analogy. I will begin in chapter two by addressing the descriptive problem 
about analogical reasoning, i.e., the problem of spelling out what kinds of analogical arguments 
are considered plausible in science (without regard to whether some justification can be found 
for those attributions of plausibility). One leading answer to the descriptive problem in 
contemporary epistemology is the ‘causal theory’ defended by Hesse in her Models and 
Analogies in Science (1963). On this account, information obtained by studying a given model 
can be relevant to making predictions about a target only when the properties of the model that 
are known to be shared by the target are causally connected to those other properties of the 
model that are merely predicted to hold for the target. Despite its many virtues, I will argue by 
means of historical examples that the causal theory offers an inadequate answer to the descriptive 
problem. Using an example from Francis Galton’s work in population biology, I will contend 
that analogical arguments from a source to a target are considered plausible not only when there 
are resemblances in causal features, but more generally when there are resemblances in 
acceptable explanatory features, which may include both causal and non-causal features.  
In chapter three, I will move on to address the normative problem of analogy, i.e., the issue 
of what (if anything) justifies the plausibility that sometimes scientists attribute to conclusions 
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drawn from well-crafted analogies in the course of their investigations. I will consider this issue 
from the angle that has been predominant in the last century, which is to establish in what way (if 
at all) analogies play a role within a fully general theory of scientific confirmation. The two 
major families of views on the subject offer radically different answers to this problem. 
According to a tradition that goes back at least to Mill (1843) and continues in Carnap (1962) 
and much contemporary Bayesianism, the confirmatory weight of analogies is explicated in 
terms of the incremental changes in the credence assigned to some salient hypotheses upon 
learning an additional element of similarity or dissimilarity between source and target. A 
different and more recent tradition, which traces back to Salmon (1964) and continues in the 
work of Bartha (2009), aims to show that analogical arguments are plausibility considerations 
that affect a rational agent’s prior opinions before any new evidence is introduced. On the 
‘dynamical account’ that I will defend, the confirmatory profile of analogical arguments features 
both an incremental and a non-incremental aspect. The former is an uncontroversial instance of 
updating on new evidence; as for the latter, I propose to justify it on the basis of an expectation 
(which can be more or less reasonable depending on the context) of simplicity in the description 
of natural and social reality: i.e., with the idea that the same explanatory patterns employed in the 
analogy’s source are ‘on the right track’ to providing us with an understanding of the target.  
In chapter four, the discussion will take a historical turn, as the focus will be on the 
methodology and scientific practice of James Clerk Maxwell. This change in perspective has a 
two-fold purpose: first, to illustrate how the inductive view developed in the previous chapters 
can contribute to our interpretation of the work of past scientists and their major achievements; 
second, to offer further support to the answers to the descriptive and the normative problem 
offered in earlier chapters by means of some notable examples from Maxwell’s scientific 
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practice. By appealing to the inductive function of analogies, I will develop an improved version 
of the ‘materialist’ interpretation of James Clerk Maxwell’s scientific methodology tracing back 
to Hesse (1972) and, before her, to Campbell (1920). Compared with the predominant ‘formalist’ 
interpretation of Maxwell’s methodology defended by Peter Achinstein (1993, 2001) and Peter 
Harman (1998), among others, I will argue that my interpretation: i) makes sense of the 
continuity in Maxwell’s remarks on the method of physical analogy throughout his work; ii) 
explains Maxwell’s quest for a “mathematical classification of physical quantities”, whose 
importance in his scientific work has been vastly underestimated; and iii) offers a novel and 
historically more plausible interpretation of the contested episode of the introduction of the 
displacement current in Maxwell’s “On Physical Lines of Forces”. Along the way, I will note 
how Maxwell’s scientific practice confirms some of the main theses advanced in earlier chapters. 
In particular, I will argue that the physical analogies that Maxwell employ often rest on 
resemblances in broadly dimensional features, which is further evidence for the claim made in 
chapter two, which is that resemblances in specifically causal features are not the only kind of 
features capable of underwriting plausible analogical arguments in science. 
In chapter five, I will abandon both the more focused, ‘analytical’ approach followed in 
chapters two and three and the more ‘historical’ approach taken in chapter four to regain the 
bird-eye and, if you wish, ‘synthetic’ perspective of this introduction. This will be, first of all, an 
occasion to review some of the main accomplishments of the previous chapters and to emphasize 
the coherence of the resulting picture of analogical reasoning. It will also be an occasion to 
identify some of those further issues in epistemology and cognate disciplines which are still left 
to solve and that can be the object of future work. Most importantly, however, this conclusive 
chapter will be an occasion to indulge in some brassy philosophical speculation, of the kind that 
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aims to be suggestive more than to persuade. Based on the inductive view of analogical 
reasoning defended in previous chapters, I will tentatively advance a picture of scientific 
advancement that echoes Giambattista Vico’s (1725) idea of the evolution of human thinking. As 
I will argue, this picture vindicates Kuhn’s thesis of the necessity of scientific revolutions 















Defeasible arguments from the observed properties of a scientific model to yet unobserved 
properties of some real-world target are often thought to depend on analogical reasoning (Hesse 
1963, Bartha 2009, Bayler-Jones 2013): these arguments are accepted, rejected or considered 
stronger than others depending on the number and kind of relevant similarities and dissimilarities 
obtaining between model and target. We feel more confident that a drug will be effective in 
human beings after testing it on mice than after testing it on plants; and more confident that a 
new social policy will be effective in Los Angeles after obtaining positive results in San Diego 
than if it had been tested in New York or Paris. This is because mice are closer to human beings 
than plants are; San Diego resembles L.A. more than New York or Paris do. 
Under what conditions is an argument from analogy ‘inductively significant’, i.e. capable of 
providing some amount, possibly small but non-negligible, of additional credence to an empirical 
hypothesis? On what we might call a simple view, an analogical argument is inductively 
significant just in case, and to the extent that, there are more similarities and fewer dissimilarities 
between the domains being compared (henceforth referred to as the ‘model’ and the ‘target’). 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the simple view faces two serious problems. First, any a resembles 
any b in ever so many ways, and it differs in at least as many, if we allow ourselves sufficient 
liberty with the choice of predicates. As Goodman (1972) noted, if there are n things in the 
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universe, “each two things have in common exactly 2n-2 properties out of the total of 2n -1 
properties; each thing has 2n-2 properties that the other does not, and there are 2n-2 properties that 
neither has” (444). Thus, the simple view suffers from a problem of multitude: it does not specify 
a suitable range of properties the sharing of which may sustain plausible analogical arguments. 
The second problem is that, even restricting ourselves to a suitable range of properties, it is 
simply not true that every similarity increases the strength of an argument from analogy and that 
every dissimilarity decreases it. From the fact that Lucky won the lottery, and the fact that he has 
an identical twin Unlucky, one does not plausibly conclude that Unlucky will likely win the 
lottery, too, despite the many resemblances between them. Those similarities fail to strengthen 
the argument, because they are irrelevant. By contrast, even little in the way of superficial 
resemblance can sometimes underwrite a fairly strong argument from analogy: although mice 
differ from humans in many obvious respects, we can often plausibly estimate the effect of a 
drug on humans based on tests on mice.5 What this shows is that our evaluations take into 
account not only the number of similarities and dissimilarities, but also their relevance to the 
truth or falsity of the argument’s conclusion. Thus, the simple view fails to address the problem 
of relevance: it does not specify when a given similarity or dissimilarity is relevant. 
The most outstanding and systematic attempt in the past century at overcoming the problems 
faced by the simple view is the account articulated by Hesse (1963) in her Models and Analogies 
in Science. Hesse’s ‘causal theory’ imposes two conditions on inductively significant arguments 
from analogy.6 First, in order to address the problem of multitude, Hesse imposes a material 
                                                          
5 Cf. Ankeny and Leonelli (2012) for a thorough discussion of animal models in science. 
6 I say ‘inductively significant’, instead of Hesse’s ‘predictive’ analogies, to avoid the implication that the 
additional credence afforded to a hypothesis by an analogical argument must necessarily transfer to that 
hypothesis’ predictions. On failures of transitivity of confirmation, cf. Hempel (1965). 
27 
 
condition, requiring that the similarities mentioned in an analogy be observable. What makes a 
similarity ‘observable’ at time t is that it is consists in two objects sharing a description that is 
countenanced by the scientific community’s vocabulary at t. While Hesse recognizes that there 
may be disagreement among scientists about whether certain descriptions should be part of the 
community’s vocabulary, her condition purports to at least rule out putative similarities in 
gerrymandered respects, such as those of the grue/bleen variety made famous by Goodman 
(1955), on grounds that they do not belong to the vocabulary of any current or past science. 
To address the problem of relevance, Hesse imposes a causal condition, requiring that 
analogies ‘project’ onto their targets causal relations of the same kind as the model’s. More 
precisely, if a is an argument from the premise that a model has properties P, Q, R and Z, to the 
conclusion that a target, having Q, R but not P, also has Z, then a can be inductively significant 
only if (i) some justification exists for believing that causal relations obtain between P, Q, R and 
Z in the model;7 (ii) it is an open epistemic possibility, whose actual occurrence may be further 
supported by the known similarities, that causal relations of the same kind as the ones believed to 
be operative in the model obtain in the target.8 Thus, an argument that humans will respond to a 
                                                          
7  The details of the causal connection between P, Q, R and Z in the model need not be known when providing 
the argument. When scientists discover that chemical x is not toxic to mice, for instance, they may ignore the 
mechanical details of mice’s assimilation of x, and they may not be able to parse out the individual 
contributions (if any) that mice’s known properties P, Q, R make in producing the observed outcome; their 
argument that x is not toxic to humans does not require knowledge of those details. Hence, while Bartha (2009) 
is right to point out, in his critique of Hesse, that “persuasive analogical arguments may be founded upon 
strong statistical correlation in the absence of any known causal connection” (43), this is not an objection to 
Hesse’s view; she explicitly claims that “the use of analogical argument does not presuppose that the actual 
causal relation is known” (1963, 84). A counterexample to her view would be a case of an analogical argument 
where there is no reason to expect similarity in causal features between model and target. 
8 Cf. Hesse’s formulation: “The…argument rests on the presumption that if AB is connected with D in the 
[source], then there is some possibility that B is connected with D, and that this connection will tend to make D 
occur with BC in the [target]” (85). Note that Hesse allows the causal connection to run either way: i.e., AB 
may cause (or be associated with properties that cause) D, or vice versa.  
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chemical in the same way as mice can be plausible insofar as mice share with humans biological 
features that are causally connected to their observed response to that chemical, and it is not 
unlikely that causal relations of the same kind obtain in humans. By contrast, there is no causal 
relation between Lucky’s bodily features and his winning the lottery that can be projected onto 
his twin’s case to support the prediction that he will win the lottery, too.  
This chapter argues that Hesse’s theory provides an inadequate account of analogical 
reasoning in science. Granting that Hesse’s material condition solves the problem of multitude,9 I 
will argue that her account of relevance is flawed, for the causal condition, even under the broad 
interpretation of it that I will give in section two, incorrectly rules out an important class of 
inductively significant analogical arguments. An example that I will discuss in sections three and 
four is Galton’s analogy between his quincunx machine and trait distribution in population 
biology. This argument from analogy does not work by projecting causal relations of the same 
kind as the ones known to be operative in the quincunx. Instead, Galton’s argument works by 
showing that relations of mathematical consequence obtaining between the setup of the quincunx 
and the tendency of that apparatus to generate ‘statistical identity’ outcomes are also likely to 
obtain in biological populations. This is why I term his analogy ‘mathematical’ and ‘non-causal’, 
in line with discussions on non-causal explanations in science (e.g. Lange 2016). 
                                                          
9 Bartha (2009) argues that “there are compelling reasons to…drop the requirement of material analogy [i.e. the 
material condition]”, partly because “arguments based on formal analogy have…been extremely influential in 
physics” (43, my italics). This is an interesting but (by my lights) contentious claim, since by “formal analogy” 
Hesse means a case of accidental similarity in the mathematical formalism of the theories of two otherwise 
incomparable domains, as when William Thomson (1872) noted that quantities related to heat transfer can be 
put into one-to-one correspondence to electrical ones. Hesse gives an argument as to why reasoning by formal 
analogies (e.g. using the known laws of heat transfer to support conclusions about electricity) is “useless for 
prediction” (1963, 69), which is that isomorphisms without material similarities are too easy to find: “any 
sufficiently rich theory could be made isomorphic to any given accepted statement” (49). My argument against 
her account does not rely on the idea that formal analogies have fulfilled an inductive function in physics.  
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As a replacement for Hesse’s causal condition, in section five I will propose a ‘unificationist 
account’. On this view, inductively significant analogical arguments must project onto their 
targets acceptable derivation patterns, where the latter can be either causal or non-causal. I will 
argue that my account both solves the problems faced by Hesse’s theory and suggests fruitful 
avenues of philosophical inquiry. In particular, a consequence of the unificationist view is that, 
among the so-called natural kinds that (according to a widespread picture) science is in the 
business of discovering, some may be mathematical. In other words, some classes of objects may 
be set apart and used for drawing inductive inferences not by virtue of some commonality in 
causal features, but by virtue of a commonality in mathematical structure. As I will suggest in 
section six, this fact may contribute to solving the mystery, pointed out by Steiner (1998), of the 
considerable success of mathematical descriptions of reality in predicting physical phenomena at 
the subatomic level of reality. I will conclude that the unificationist account is plausible at least 
insofar as it does not make the success of particle physics of the past century a miracle. 
 
2.   The Causal Condition 
Since on her account an argument from the known properties of a model to the yet unobserved 
properties of a target possesses inductive strength only if the argument projects a model’s 
network of ‘causal relations’, one might expect Hesse to offer an account of what makes a given 
relation ‘causal’. But one looks in vain for an answer in her book: analogical arguments, she 
writes, must project “causal relations in some scientifically acceptable sense” (1963, 72). Later 
she adds that the presence of a causal relation implies a “tendency to co-occur” (78), which is 
clearly not sufficient to single out all and only causal relations. While some critics have found 
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Hesse’s elusiveness objectionable,10 it is to some extent a strength of her proposal, and for two 
reasons. First, even within a single branch of science there may be different kinds of features 
with a claim to be causal, with no way to cash out what they have in common.11 Hesse’s account 
is therefore compatible with a pluralist view of causation in science. 
Another reason, often neglected by Hesse’s critics, is that her causal condition aims not so 
much to settle, but rather to provide a framework for understanding and articulating sensible 
scientific disagreement about the inductive significance to be assigned to analogies proposed in 
the course of inquiry. When understood from this perspective, her condition provides two 
important, if contentious, pieces of information. First, when scientists disagree about an 
argument’s inductive significance, their divergence may sometimes come down to whether the 
connections between the properties of analogy’s model have a claim to be causal connections.12 
Second, disagreement may also arise from placing different amounts of credence in the 
hypothesis that causal connections of the same kind as the model’s may hold in the target, where 
what makes two relations ‘of the same kind’ may itself be subject to debate and negotiation.13  
                                                          
10 Norton (forthcoming) complains that Hesse is “vague on just what is meant by causal relations…‘causal 
relations in some acceptable scientific sense’...seems to suggest that discerning them is unproblematic” (12). 
11 An example may be in reasoning with biological classifications: a biologist may sometimes reason that two 
species are likely to share a homologous trait, knowing that they share some other such trait; in other cases, she 
may reason that two species are more likely to share a homoplasy, knowing that they live in similar 
environments. In both cases, her reasoning may be interpreted as an analogical argument projecting causal 
features (such as histories of common ancestry or similar selective pressures), but the sense of causality may 
be different. [N.B.: Despite the tendency of some biologists to conceive of homoplasies as “arbitrary”, it is 
arguable that at least some inferences from known homoplasies to hypothetical ones are justified. As zoologist 
Lorenz (1974) writes: “Recognizing analogies [i.e. homoplasies] can become an important source of 
knowledge…We can assume…that the functions of respiration, of food intake…and so forth must be 
performed by any living organism. In examining an unknown living system, we are, therefore, justified in 
searching for organs serving the functions which we know to be indispensable” (233)]. 
12 Cf. Hesse’s discussion of analogies in pre- and post-Darwinian biology on pp. 84-85. 
13 Cf. Hesse’s discussion of “attempts to draw analogies between human and divine” on pp. 86-7. 
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But is it really the case that scientists regard an analogical argument as inductively significant 
only when they believe that the properties of the model are connected to each other by causal 
relations? To illustrate, consider again the argument for the inverse square electrostatic law that 
Priestley presented in his History and Present State of Electricity (already mentioned in chapter 
one). Having noticed a resemblance between the gravitational null-effect (i.e., the absence of 
attraction inside a closed spherical shell of uniform density) predicted by Newton’s law of 
gravity and the electrostatic null-effect (the absence of electrostatic attraction inside a metal 
spherical shell) observed by Benjamin Franklin, Priestley argued that electrostatic attractions 
may well obey a similar inverse square law as gravity. Plausibly, this argument is inductively 
significant: for the fact that Newton’s theory of gravity is well-confirmed and the fact that 
electrostatic forces produce, under Franklin’s setup, an effect so similar to that which would be 
obtained in an analogous gravitational experiment plausibly constitute additional support in favor 
of Priestley’s hypothesis.14 However, the relation that obtains between Newton’s law being 
inverse-square and the gravitational null-effect in the analogy’s source is not causation, but 
deductive entailment (given the initial conditions). This would seem to suggest, contrary to the 
causal condition, that scientists may regard an analogical argument as inductively significant 
even when the connections being projected from model to target are not causal but deductive.  
However, this is not the end of the story. A defender of the causal condition might reply that 
Newton’s law of gravity, while relating to the observations by entailment relations, mediates 
causal connections between the distribution of masses and the attractive forces at play in a 
system. We appeal to this connection when explaining why a point of mass m is subject to 
                                                          
14  Bartha (2009, 297) agrees. Also worth quoting are Priestley’s remarks: “Analogy is the best guide in 
our…investigations; and all discoveries, which were not made by accident, have been made by the help of it” 
(1767, 19). Note the contrast between discoveries made by analogy and those made merely “by accident”. 
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gravitational attraction towards the center of the Earth.15 According to this response, instead of 
rejecting Hesse’s causal condition, we should interpret it more broadly, i.e., as countenancing not 
only (i) analogies where the causal relations being projected are of the same kind as the model’s 
(as in mice-to-human extrapolations), but also (ii) analogies (like Priestley’s) where no specific 
causal relations are projected, but the same kind of ‘causal law’ – a law connecting specific 
causes to their effects. On this interpretation of the causal condition, Priestley’s argument to the 
inverse square electrostatic law does not constitute a counterexample to Hesse’s account. 
Unfortunately for defenders of the causal theory, Hesse’s condition is too narrow even when 
formulated in this broader way. This is because, as I will argue in the next two sections, there are 
plausible cases of strong analogical arguments in science where no causal features are projected, 
and where the laws being projected are not causal laws. Let’s look at one example. 
 
3.   Galton and Statistical Identity 
Francis Galton’s “Typical Laws of Heredity” (1877) tackles a very puzzling phenomenon in 
population biology. According to the data collected by Adolphe Quetelet, measurements of 
height, lifting power and other traits in each generation of French, Belgian and American soldiers 
yielded a normal curve of about the same mean and deviation as that of any previous or later 
generation. The same stability was observed for trait distributions of many animals and plants as 
well as in the fossil record. Two aspects of these data are especially noteworthy. The first is that, 
for any measured trait, its distribution in a population tends to approximate normality; in 
Galton’s words, the distribution obeys the “law of deviation” (492): as the number of  
                                                          
15 Another response appeals to the spatial underpinnings of inverse-square laws; cf. Steiner (1998, 36). 
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      Fig. 3                    Fig. 4                        
Fig. 3: Simple Quincunx. Pellets fall from a funnel on the top (represented by the U-shaped lines), 
tumble upon rows of spikes (represented by the dots in the middle) and divide themselves in 
compartments at the bottom (represented by the vertical lines), forming a curve whose shape is 
represented in dark. Fig. 4: Modified Quincunx. The three curves depicted represent three stages of 
the machine. First stage: pellets are normally distributed in vertical compartments at the top. Second 
stage: pellets are made to fall through the inclined shoots (represented by the oblique lines). Third 
stage: pellets go through a series of rows of spikes as in the simple quincunx machine and 
accumulate at the bottom. The mean and deviation of the curves at stage one and three are the same.  
measurements increases, so the distribution tends to a bell-shaped form that is symmetric around 
the mean.16 The second aspect is that, “so long as the external conditions remain unaltered” 
(492), the normal curves produced by different generations of a population exhibit “statistical 
identity” (493), in that the two standard parameters of mean and deviation remain the same.  
Both aspects are perplexing. First, it is not obvious why the distribution of heritable traits in 
any generation should be normal. This issue can be illustrated through Galton’s ‘quincunx’. In 
this machine (fig. 3), a large number of pellets are poured into a funnel from its top, tumble upon 
                                                          
16 Today this “law” is known as the central limit theorem in statistics. 
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various rows of spikes, and accumulate in vertical compartments at the bottom. A heap 
approximating a normal curve tends to be generated each time. This behavior is related to the 
quincunx’s specific setup: the rows are numerous enough and arranged in such a way that, for 
any spike encountered, there is about the same chance that a pellet will fall to the right as to the 
left. With this setup, it is a mathematical consequence of the law of deviation that the final 
distribution will tend to be normal, regardless of the pellets’ precise initial positions when 
dropped. However, as Galton notes, one would not expect the “host of petty disturbing 
influences” story that we appeal to when explaining the pellets’ final distribution to apply in 
population biology:17 “the processes of heredity that limit the number of children of one class.., 
diminish their resemblance to their fathers, and kill many of them, are not petty influences” 
(512). In particular, “any selective tendency is ruin to the law of deviation” (512). 
Even more puzzling is the fact that the distribution of a trait in different generations of the 
same population exhibits the same mean and deviation. As Galton notes: “If there be any who 
are inclined to say there is no wonder in the matter, because each individual tends to leave his 
like behind him, and therefore each generation must resemble the one preceding, I can assure 
that they utterly misunderstand the case” (493). He gives the example of giants, who, because of 
various factors, including that “giants marry much more rarely than medium men” and are less 
likely to “survive hardships, [since] their circulation is apt to be languid”, leave “fewer giants 
and more medium-sized men in the next generation” (493). Hence, the observed stability in trait 
                                                          
17 Here I disagree with Ariew et al. (2017), for which the quincunx of fig.3 “provides justification for his 
statistical assumption [“that hereditary characters approximate the normal distribution”]” (70), even though, if 
they were right, they would have ascribed to Galton an inductively significant non-causal analogy – the sort of 
analogical argument that I am pointing out as a problem for Hesse’s view. On my reconstruction, it is the 
resemblance between Quetelet’s data with the rarer outcome of the machine of fig.4 (to be discussed 
momentarily, but absent from their presentation) that yields confirmation of the statistical assumption. 
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distribution across generations cannot be explained simply by appeal to individuals tending to 
leave their likes behind them. The key to the puzzle of statistical identity must lie elsewhere. 
Galton found it partly with the help of some laborious experiments in his garden. He began 
by considering a simple case of inheritance where variation is present but the effect of selection 
is limited. If statistical identity obtains under these conditions, he reasoned, it would indicate that 
the various processes of heredity need not cooperate in any specific measure to produce the 
statistical identity outcome. The trait that Galton chose to measure to confirm this is size of seeds 
in sweet peas (which do not cross-fertilize, and where it can be safely assumed that size does not 
affect fertility and is not subject to significant selective pressures.) While the measurements were 
lengthy and laborious, “the results were most satisfactory” (512). Two facts in particular stood 
out. First, despite the presence of variation, statistical identity was observed, confirming Galton’s 
suspicion that statistical identity could obtain even in the simplest case of inheritance. Second, 
and most crucially, Galton noted a curious effect in his data: the offspring of sweet peas with 
heavier-than-average seeds tended to have, on average, seeds lighter than their parents; similarly, 
the offspring of sweet peas with lighter-than-average seeds tended to have heavier seeds than 
their parents. Galton called this effect “reversion towards mediocrity”.18 
With the sweet pea data in his hands, Galton returned to his quincunx for insight. Since his 
machine could replicate distribution curves with any degree of deviation just by adding or 
subtracting rows of spikes, he devised a machine that, taking as input a large number of pellets 
arranged into a bell-shaped heap, yields another bell-shaped curve of an additional degree of 
deviation (i.e., a slightly shorter and smoother distribution curve). This is the bottom half of the 
apparatus of fig. 2, representing the effect of family variability (the departure of offspring of 
                                                          
18 Today this phenomenon is known as “regression towards the mean” in the statistical literature. 
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some family from the mean of the parent generation). On the top of that machine, he placed 
another apparatus capable of replicating the specific reversion effect found in sweet peas. For 
each compartment at the top of this new apparatus, a dedicated “inclined shoot” is present. When 
trap-doors underneath each of those compartments are removed, the pellets falling through the 
shoots ‘revert towards mediocrity’: as the result of the inclination of the shoots, pellets initially 
positioned closer to the two ends of the machine move closer towards the center of the curve. 
The resulting distribution curve is still approximately normal, but is “more contracted in width 
than it was before, and…more humped up in the middle” (513).  
What Galton noted is that if one pre-arranges a large number of pellets into a normally 
distributed heap at the top of the machine, then, by letting the pellets first ‘revert’ and then 
‘disperse’ (or vice versa, since the order is irrelevant), a heap at the bottom is generated whose 
shape “bears an exact resemblance to the heap from which we originally started” (513). In other 
words, the modified quincunx machine replicates statistical identity outcomes. Galton realized 
that this effect was, once again, a mathematical consequence of the machine’s setup. The 
conclusion he drew about population biology is quite general and is twofold: 
1) First, whenever statistical identity is observed between two adjacent generations, the 
individual processes of heredity at play in the passage from the earlier to the later 
generation (e.g., family variability, natural selection, etc.) are likely to have conformed at 
least approximately to the law of deviation.19 This is surprising but not totally 
unexpected, since an element of randomness is present in each of those processes, and 
                                                          
19 If more than one process of heredity is at play, but they all conform to the law of deviation, their combined 
result must necessarily conform to the law of deviation. Galton calls this statistical theorem (that the sum of 
independent normal variates is itself normal), the “law of the sum of two fallible measures” (533). 
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since selective pressures are not always significant under stable external conditions, 
thereby making nature mimic a quincunx in its effects. 
2) The second conclusion is that a phenomenon of “reversion towards mediocrity” must 
occur generally in the course of inheritance in order to check the dispersive effect of 
variation. More specifically, from reflecting on the relation between the angle of 
inclination of the shoots and the dispersion produced by the rows of spikes in the 
modified quincunx, Galton infers that the specific magnitude of the reversion effect must 
be, at least typically, some proportion of the magnitude of dispersion brought about by 
variation. While the proportionality between regression and variation may never be 
perfect in any particular case, Galton argues that, if regression typically behaves in the 
linear way he suggested, then in the course of generations “equilibrium must at length 
ensue” (514) between reversion and variation, thereby producing statistical identity. 
In this way, what started out as a simple mechanical illustration of the law of deviation was 
transformed by Galton into a source of new insights and inferences about population biology. 
In order to appreciate what makes Galton’s argument for 1) and 2) special, it is helpful to 
compare it to Priestley’s argument for the inverse square electrostatic law. Just like in Priestley’s 
case, Galton’s argument starts off from a similarity between two effects: statistical identity as 
observed in the modified quincunx, on one hand, and the analogous phenomenon revealed by 
Quetelet’s data, on the other. And just as Priestley noticed that a null-effect in the gravitational 
case can be deduced from an inverse-square law of gravity, from which he inferred that the 
electrostatic null-effect may well result from an analogous inverse-square law, so Galton 
recognized that the tendency of his quincunx to generate statistical identity outcomes must be a 
mathematical consequence of its setup, from which he inferred that statistical identity in 
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biological populations may well result from an analogous setup, whereby the processes of 
heredity obey the law of deviation and reversion towards mediocrity is present. As Hacking 
(1990) puts Galton’s insight: “the quincunx…led him to the remarkable thought: the 
phenomenon that puzzled him could be deduced from the fact (or assumption) that traits were 
distributed according to the standard statistical law, the law of [deviation]” (543). 
There is, however, a crucial difference between Priestley’s and Galton’s arguments. In 
Priestley’s case, I conceded that, while the relation between the inverse square law of gravity and 
the gravitational null-effect is not causation but entailment, the analogy satisfies Hesse’s causal 
condition because it projects a causal law (i.e. a law governing a causal connection between the 
distribution of certain quantities and the attractive forces present in a given system). But the 
same is not true in Galton’s case. First, as Galton himself notes, “the law of deviation is purely 
numerical; it does not regard the fact whether the objects treated of are pellets…, or shots at a 
target, or games of chance, or any other of the numerous group of occurrences to which it is or 
may be applied” (495). Furthermore, the reversion law modelled by the top half of Galton’s 
machine does not describe the behavior of any force peculiar to processes of heredity. Rather, 
reversion towards mediocrity is a purely statistical effect, resulting simply from the imperfect 
correlation between the variables being subject to measurement.20 Like the law of deviation, the 
reversion law is ‘mathematical’ and ‘non-causal’ in that it holds no matter what kinds of events 
                                                          
20 Its approximately ‘linear’ character results instead from the assumption that the distribution of the initial 
(parent) generation is bell-shaped. That the parent distribution is bell-shaped is in turn to be explained in the 
same way, that is, by appealing to the fact that the heredity processes leading to that generation’s distribution 
obeyed the law of deviation. Galton’s account is recursive: assuming one generation’s distribution is normal, a 
story can be given about what enables “successive generations to maintain statistical identity” (1877, 493). 
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the imperfectly correlated variables stand for, regardless of how specifically those events are 
causally connected, and indeed whether they are causally connected at all.21  
For these reasons, I claim that Galton’s analogy between shot-dropping and population 
biology offers a plausible example of an inductively significant non-causal argument from 
analogy in science. The argument is inductively significant because it provides some support to 
the hypothesis that statistical identity outcomes in biological populations are due to the combined 
effect of the several processes of heredity obeying the law of deviation and a reversion effect 
analogous to the one exemplified in Galton’s machine. The analogy is non-causal, moreover, not 
only because (i) the relation being projected onto population biology (that in virtue of which 
statistical identity follows with high probability from the law of deviation together with a 
reversion effect) is one of mathematical consequence (not causation), but also because (ii) the 
laws being projected (the laws of deviation and reversion) are not causal laws, but mathematical 
ones. Therefore, Hesse’s claim that her causal condition is necessary for inductive significance is 
subject to counterexamples.22 In section five, I will propose an alternative condition that avoids 




                                                          
21 See Stigler’s quote on Galton’s discovery of reversion in the data comparing the height of brothers in a 
family in fn. 24. Cf. Lange’s (2016) account of what makes an explanation by regression ‘non-causal’.   
22 The difficulty is not resolved by shifting talk from “causal laws” to “capacities”. Cartwright (2009) adopts 
the motto: “If No Capacities then No Credible Worlds” to indicate that a model can be ‘credible’, and thus 
potentially justify additional confidence in hypotheses about a target, only if it successfully ‘isolates’ some of 
the target’s ‘capacities’ – i.e., only if it identifies some causal factor occurring in the target. This account of the 
epistemology of scientific models is similarly invalidated by Galton’s example as Hesse’s (1963) is. 
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4.   Objections and Replies 
One way to resist the conclusion of the previous section is to deny that Galton’s analogy 
possesses an inductive function. Rather, according to the deductivist objection, the function of 
the analogy is purely heuristic: a mechanical model is provided to help the reader recognize that 
a system’s tendency to produce statistical identity outcomes follows from the assumption that the 
processes under consideration obey the law of deviation (via reversion towards mediocrity); but, 
on this reading, there is no implication in Galton’s discussion that we should assign appreciable 
credence to any new empirical hypothesis concerning biological populations. At most, what the 
mechanical model shows that if the processes of heredity in biological populations obey the law 
of deviation, and reversion towards mediocrity occurs, then an outcome of statistical identity 
may be expected with high probability. This conditional expresses a purely mathematical fact, 
and speaks no more about real biological populations than: “If I had a billion dollars, I’d be 
richer than the average American” speaks about the current state of my finances. 
In response, I can grant that the quincunx serves partly a heuristic function. My claim is only 
that an inductive function is present as well. In particular, it seems to me that, by comparing the 
recurring outcomes of statistical identity observed by Quetelet with those that, despite the 
obvious mechanical differences, the modified quincunx tends to produce, Galton aims to 
formulate a plausible set of “typical laws” (532) to which the processes of heredity are subject. 
The fact that statistical identity obtains in a domain as simple as that of pellets provides, in my 
view, additional support for Galton’s hypothesis, at least insofar as it shows that appeals to 
divine providence or of systematic faults in the data collection process are neither sensible nor 
necessary to explain the surprising appearance of statistical identity outcomes, thereby 
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undermining some of the considerations supporting some of the main rival accounts.23 Thus, I 
stand by my claim that the quincunx analogy is not inductively inert. 
A second, empiricist objection concedes that Galton intended to support an interesting set of 
hypotheses about trait distribution in biological populations, but insists the main source of 
evidence that Galton invokes is the data collected from the sweet pea measurements, not the 
analogy. In response, I am once again happy to admit that the experiments with sweet peas 
played some evidential role. However, inferring from the sweet pea data that trait distributions in 
populations of plants and animals obey the laws that Galton proposes is quite an inductive leap. 
The quincunx analogy provides, in my view, independent support in favor of this generalization, 
by suggesting that the observed statistical identity outcomes may have much less to do with 
some proprietary feature of those biological populations in which they obtain, and rather more to 
do with the broadly statistical features of those cases, features that may be replicated by a 
mechanical apparatus where nothing even remotely like a process of heredity is occurring. 
Hence, while conceding that the sweet pea experiments played an evidential role, their relation to 
the evidential role of the quincunx analogy seems to me one of partnership. 
A final, historicist objection concedes that Galton’s argument is inductively significant, but 
denies that it is an example of a non-causal argument from analogy. It may be pointed out that in 
1877, when “Typical Laws of Heredity” was published, Galton took himself to have singled out 
a ‘causal’ law of reversion towards mediocrity. Key witnesses are those passages in the article 
where Galton speaks of reversion as a tendency of the average offspring trait distribution “to 
depart from the parent type, ‘reverting’ towards what may be roughly and perhaps fairly 
described as the average ancestral type” (513). According to Stigler (2016), Galton realized that 
                                                          
23 Arbuthnot had used the birth-sex ratio equality in an argument for divine providence; cf. Kitcher (2001).  
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the reversion law does not describe a real ‘pull’ towards the ancestral type, but is rather a purely 
statistical effect owing to the normality of the distribution curve of the parent generation, only 
when he was able to compare (a few years after 1877) the data concerning the heights of children 
in relation to their parents with the data about the height of brothers in the same family.24  
In response to this objection, I would be ready to admit that the circumstances in the 1877 
article are not as favorable to my case as they could have been, if only Galton had considered the 
matter further. But, first, it doesn’t follow from the law of reversion being understood as a causal 
law that Galton’s analogy satisfies Hesse’s conditions on inductive significance, since the law of 
deviation, which is also needed for the derivation of statistical identity, was by Galton’s own 
lights in 1877 “purely numerical” (495). At most, then, the analogy is a hybrid: partly causal, 
partly non-causal. Second, it seems to me disingenuous for a defender of the causal theory to rely 
so much on these historical contingencies. Regardless of Galton’s possible oversights in 1877, 
the argument made in the previous section makes a strong case for thinking that there can be 
inductively significant analogies that project relations and laws other than causal ones. As will be 
discussed in section six, Galton’s analogy is far from being an isolated case in history. My 
proposal for encompassing non-causal analogies into an account of relevance is outlined below. 
 
5.   A Unificationist Account 
I propose to replace Hesse’s causal condition with a more permissive solution to the problem of 
relevance that remains in many respects faithful to her approach. On Hesse’s view, if a is an 
                                                          
24 Stigler (2016): “The results were extraordinarily similar: the pattern of association was the same (tallness ran 
in families), but most striking was that here, too, he found “regression”.[…] This was extraordinary for the 
simple reason that… there was no directionality – neither brother inherited his height from the other.[…] It 
must have been clear to Galton that the explanation must be statistical, not biological” (126). 
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argument from the premise that a model has properties P, Q, R and Z, to the conclusion that a 
target, which has the properties Q and R but not P, also possesses property Z, then: 
CAUSAL CONDITION a can be inductively significant only if (i) some justification 
exists for believing that there are causal relations (“in some 
scientifically acceptable sense”) between P, Q, R and Z in 
the model; and (ii) it is an open epistemic possibility, whose 
actual occurrence may be further supported by the observed 
similarities and dissimilarities, that causal relations of the 
same kind as the model’s obtain in the target. 
As a replacement to Hesse’s condition, I propose the following: 
UNIFICATIONIST CONDITION a can be inductively significant only if (i) some justification 
exists for believing that there are acceptable derivation 
patterns holding between P, Q, R and Z in the model; and (ii) 
it is an open epistemic possibility, whose actual occurrence 
may be further supported by the observed similarities and 
dissimilarities, that acceptable derivation patterns of the same 
kind as the model’s hold in the target as well.25 
                                                          
25  This account appears to capture what is right about Bobbio’s (1938) claim that relevance relations in 
analogical arguments are either causal or relations “of sufficient reason”, if the latter are interpreted in a 
broadly explanatory way (thus encompassing cases of mathematical analogies). Bartha’s (2009) “articulation 
model” is another closely related view, but with two important differences. First, I disagree with his argument 
for dropping the material condition (see fn.6). Second, his views about acceptable relevance relations are more 
liberal than mine, since he includes statistical correlations (see quote in fn.4). I find his putative examples in 
favor of this proposition unconvincing. True, when Benjamin Franklin hypothesized that lightning is attracted 
by pointed metal rods, based on the observation that the “electrical fluid” is so attracted and that “electrical 
fluid agrees with lightning in these [other] particulars: Giving light. Color of the light. Crooked direction. 
Swift motion. Being conducted by metals. [etc.]” (1941, 334), he had little knowledge of the causal features of 
either electricity or lightning. However, I don’t think this fact supports the claim that statistical correlations can 
be relevance relations. In my view, the argument is inductively significant only insofar as the correspondences 
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A few comments on this proposal are in order. Clause i) in the unificationist condition is to 
be understood as a generalization of Hesse’s account. That is to say, a particular instance in 
which this clause is satisfied is when scientists expect the properties P, Q, R to be causally 
connected (or be associated with properties that are causally connected) to property Z in the 
model. Thus, the same examples of arguments from causal analogies that motivate Hesse’s 
account are also intended to be instances of my unificationist proposal. The main point of 
departure from Hesse’s view is that, on my proposal, arguments from analogy can possess some 
degree of inductive strength even when the connections between P, Q, R and Z are not causal. 
This is possible, according to the proposed condition, so long as some justification exists for 
believing that the properties P, Q, R in the model may contribute (or be associated to properties 
that contribute) to an argument with conclusion Z via an acceptable derivation.26 This is what I 
mean by the claim that there must be an “acceptable derivation pattern” between P, Q, R and Z in 
the analogy’s model.27  My proposal thus embraces a form of pluralism: while causal 
connections can underwrite acceptable derivation patterns, other kinds of relations (e.g., 
entailment relations mediated by mathematical theorems) may do just as well.  
Clause ii) in the unificationist condition concerns our ground for projecting a source’s 
derivation pattern. According to this clause, in order for an argument from analogy to be 
                                                          
between lightning and the “electrical fluid” gave Franklin some reason to expect a similarity in the underlying 
causal features. The relevance relations are therefore causal relations, not statistical correlations. 
26  I am simplifying slightly here for the sake of exposition, since my unificationist condition also allows for 
cases where it is Z that contributes to an explanatory argument with conclusion P, Q, R; see also fn.5.   
27 This view is inspired to the accounts of scientific explanation by Kitcher (1981) and Lange (2016). I refer 
the reader to Lange’s work (pp. 386-390) regarding what makes a property not only figure in but “contribute 
to” an explanation. Cf. also Hacking (1990) on the quincunx analogy: “[Galton] was regarding the Normal 
distribution of many traits as an autonomous statistical law” (186). By referring to a theorem of statistics as an 
autonomous statistical law, Hacking means to emphasize its potential to engender scientific explanations. 
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inductively significant, there must be no antecedent reason to think that the connections (causal 
or mathematical) present in the model do not obtain in the target. Galton’s analogy provides once 
again a neat illustration. For any given trial in his modified quincunx, the observed statistical 
identity outcome is causally connected to a host of petty events, having to do with the initial 
position and velocity of the individual pellets when dropped, their individual stories of falling 
through the shoots and tumbling upon the spikes, the effect of gravity, etc. None of these causal 
connections would have been a plausible candidate for projection according to clause ii), 
however, since it was overwhelmingly clear to Galton that the causal details of heredity 
processes are very unlike processes of shot-dropping. Conversely, the mathematical connection 
that obtains between the quincunx’s setup and the tendency of that machine to produce statistical 
identity outcomes was, by clause ii), a plausible candidate for projection, insofar as Galton had 
some reason to think that the same connection might obtain in population biology as well. 
One final comment concerns the elements of vagueness in the unificationist condition. There 
are two places where my proposal might seem underspecified: first, with respect to what counts 
as an ‘acceptable’ derivation pattern, and second, with respect to what counts as a connection ‘of 
the same kind’ as the model’s. In both cases, I claim that the vagueness constitutes a nice feature 
of the account. Following Hesse’s approach, I take the success of an account of relevance for 
analogical reasoning to consist at least in part in its capacity to describe scientific disagreement 
about the inductive significance to be assigned to various arguments from analogy. Some 
vagueness is therefore welcome insofar as it helps countenance the fact that a disagreement about 
the evidential contribution of an analogical argument may sometimes come down to a divergence 
about whether the connections projected onto the analogy’s target underwrite ‘acceptable’ 
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derivation patterns, or perhaps whether they are connections ‘of the same kind’ as the model’s. I 
believe that those are matters for practicing scientists, not philosophers, to settle. 
The unificationist condition is so-called because it yields a unified treatment of inductively 
significant arguments from analogy in science: what makes a paradigmatic case of a causal 
analogy (such as mice-to-human extrapolations) and a paradigmatic case of a non-causal analogy 
(such as Galton’s quincunx analogy) both inductively significant is that in each case the relations 
that obtain between the known similarities (Q, R, etc.) and the merely predicted similarities (Z) 
underwrite acceptable derivation patterns; this is so even though, in the former case, the salient 
relations are causal, whereas in the latter they are not. This proposal seems to me to capture what 
lies behind Hesse’s theory that makes it work for causal analogies, while at the same time also 
providing an illuminating account of scientific analogies of the non-causal kind. In next section, I 
will mention a further payoff of this proposal, namely that it may contribute to solving Steiner’s 
(1998) mystery of the success of the ‘Pythagorean’ strategy in the history of physics. 
 
6.   Steiner’s Applicability Problem 
Steiner thinks the success of physics of the past century requires us to abandon naturalism, which 
he understands as the claim that human beings do not occupy a privileged position in the order of 
things. His challenge is based on two claims. First, a historical claim: “How did physicists 
discover successful theories concerning objects remote from perception and from processes 
which could have participated in Natural Selection? My answer: by analogy” (52-3). Second, 
there is his claim that “If we examine the analogies actually used to discover the major laws of 
physics in our century, we find that the analogies used are anthropocentric” (72). To illustrate 
this point, he mentions “(P) Beginning with 1840, the President of the United States elected in a 
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year divisible by 20 dies when in office” (53). While (P) had remained true until 1980, it would 
have been irrational for someone running for President in 1980 to withdraw their candidacy 
based on this information. For Steiner, this is because: “hypothesis (P) is “unprojectible”...[it] is 
not even a candidate for confirmation, because it is covertly anthropocentric: the concept it 
applies presupposes that the human race enjoys a special status” (53). In other words, (P) cannot 
be confirmed because being U.S. President is not a natural kind.  
As Steiner points out, non-natural classifications not only forbid generalizations like (P), but 
also reasoning from analogy: “where the analogy is improper…, guessing by analogy can be just 
as irrational as projecting an unprojectible hypothesis” (59). But what makes the analogies by 
which scientists discovered the major laws of physics anthropocentric? According to Steiner, 
they were “Pythagorean” analogies, “without physical ground”, in that they relied on 
classifications of physical objects and processes by mathematical structures not in turn reducible 
to other physical properties. For Steiner, classifying objects by way of various mathematical 
structures is “anthropocentric” because those structures are picked out by human beings solely 
based on their “beauty and convenience” (7). It follows that for physicists to use Pythagorean 
analogies to support their confidence in various new laws was no better justified than for 
someone to expect the person elected President in 1980 to die when in office based on (P).  
Yet Pythagorean analogies served surprisingly well the aims of physics. One of Steiner’s 
examples is Heisenberg’s hypothesis that protons and neutrons are two states of the same 
particle, the ‘nucleon’, connected with each other by a symmetry mathematically of the same 
kind as the one governing spin-up and spin-down in electrons: “Heisenberg reasoned that the 
nucleus of the atom is invariant under SU(2) transformations, those which describe the spin of 
the electron” (86). For Steiner, the confidence that scientists at the time placed on Heisenberg’s 
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hypothesis is inexplicable in naturalistic terms. The same is true for Maxwell’s “1873 reasoning” 
(77) leading to Hertz’s discovery of electromagnetic radiation. On Steiner’s reconstruction, 
Maxwell began by noting that Ampere’s law: curl B=4πJ (where B is a magnetic field, and J a 
current) “contradicted the conservation of electrical charge” (77). Hence, Maxwell manipulated 
the equation, adding a term on the right-hand side for the “displacement current”: +(1/c2) ΔE/δt. 
The prediction of electromagnetic radiation followed by taking the solution where J is zero to be 
as “physically real” as the known solutions. For Steiner, the fact that radiation turned out to be 
experimentally verified is another example of a successful prediction “without physical ground”.   
Steiner’s critics have been much puzzled by his calling analogies like Heisenberg’s and 
Maxwell’s anthropocentric and without physical ground. For instance, since many features of 
physical processes have been shown to be governed by symmetries, why would Heisenberg’s 
hypothesis that protons and neutrons are invariant under SU(2) transformation be “without 
physical ground”? Similar puzzlement has been expressed for Steiner’s reconstruction of 
Maxwell’s 1873 reasoning.28 There is, however, one way of interpreting Steiner’s arguments 
which has the virtue of not making them hopelessly inconclusive. On this reading, Steiner’s 
contention turns on the idea that, in order for a classification to be considered objective and not 
anthropocentric, it must in some sense track the objective causal structure of the world. 
Importantly, that natural kinds track objective causal structures is not an assumption that Steiner 
alone is making, but one that he takes his opponents, i.e., naturalists, to endorse as well.29 The 
                                                          
28 Cf. Pincock (2012): “Steiner claims that only a mathematical analogy grounded Maxwell’s assumption that a 
displacement current was possible even when this real current was 0. Strangely, though, Steiner also notes one 
motivation that Maxwell had beyond the mathematics”, (187) namely preserving the conservation law. 
29 In addition to Hesse (1963), Steiner might be thinking of Boyd (1991), among others. 
49 
 
history of physics, Steiner claims, confronts these naturalists “with a mystery: the apparent 
confirmation of that which, according to background beliefs, cannot be confirmed” (73). 
This interpretation of Steiner’s argument helps illuminate why, in discussing Heisenberg’s 
example, he would emphasize that “the symmetries in question are abstract symmetries, i.e. not 
spatiotemporal symmetries” (174), since invariance under SU(2) transformations is defined in an 
abstract, fictitious space. Presumably, Steiner’s point is that the projection of SU(2) invariance 
from the domain of electronic spin to the proton/neutron couple is not a projection of spin’s 
causal features. Similarly, Steiner’s claim about Maxwell’s reasoning may be that an argument to 
the effect that a conservation law holds in the domain of electromagnetism based on previous 
successes of an analogous law in other physical domains does not rely on the projection of any 
specific features of the causal processes that obtain in those other domains. Nor can it be said 
that Maxwell’s analogy works by projecting a causal law (as in Priestley’s example), since, as 
Steiner points out, conservation laws are not additional force laws; any analogy that involves 
them must therefore be what Steiner calls a “second-order” analogy, so-called “because they are 
based on properties of laws” (62). 
But are naturalists committed to taking analogies that project features other than the strictly 
causal ones and laws other than the first-order ones as anthropocentric? The unificationist 
account developed in this paper offers an alternative. On this view, non-causal features may 
sometimes constitute a suitable basis for inductively significant analogical arguments. They do 
so in the same way and for the same reason that the projection of causal features sustains 
plausible analogies, namely by underwriting acceptable explanatory connections. Thus, in some 
cases, a scientist might take the observed similarities between two domains as evidence that a 
target system satisfies the conditions of application of some mathematical theorem (as in 
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Galton’s example). In other cases, the available evidence might suggest that the target system 
obeys some “second-order” physical constraint, e.g. that its laws involve some quantity that is 
conserved as the system evolves over time (as in Maxwell’s example). On the unificationist 
account, each of these projections may sustain good inductive arguments so long as the 
underlying relations can be accepted as explanatory.  
If this view is correct, a novel diagnosis of Steiner’s problem suggests itself. The success of 
the Pythagorean strategy in physics is only inexplicable if we assume that responsible use of 
analogical reasoning involves the projection of specifically causal features. But on the 
unificationist account this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for sustaining inductively 
significant analogical arguments. Rather, on this view certain ways of classifying objects or 
domains into kinds may be ‘natural’, and therefore be set apart for use in inductive inferences, 
even when they are not anchored specifically to features of the world’s network of causal 
relations. We need not therefore regard Steiner’s examples of Pythagorean analogies as 
incredibly lucky guesses based on anthropocentric heuristics. We may instead regard them as 















It is a controversial issue whether analogies function in scientific inquiry merely as heuristic 
devices, an aid to discovery, or whether they can sometimes provide inductive support, by 
figuring in defeasible arguments in favor of empirical hypotheses. Challenges to the latter view 
come in many forms. A common one is what I shall refer to as the traditional dilemma: either 
one’s background knowledge already warrants an inference to the conclusion of the analogical 
argument, in which case the latter is redundant, or there is no justification for that conclusion, 
since the analogy by itself is incapable of providing anything but a negligible amount of 
inductive support to it. Either way, there can be no distinctive contribution of analogy to the 
inductive support of empirical hypotheses. Defenses of this argument can be found in Agassi 
(1964, 1980) and Norton (forthcoming). Referring to those analogies that are not backed up by a 
substantial amount of background knowledge as “soft”, Agassi writes that their only role in 
scientific inquiry is to “invoke hidden memories imprisoned in the dark recesses of our mind 
which, once set free, will set our imagination soaring. Heuristic, here we come!” (1980, 404).  
The most debatable part of the traditional dilemma is its second horn, the claim that, in 
situations of sparse and insufficient evidence, arguments from analogy systematically fail to 
yield appreciable inductive support. Agassi (1964) derives this conclusion from an objectionably 
strong premise: he claims that all soft analogical arguments are cases of enumerative induction 
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from a single instance. On this view, when Darwin (1859) proposed his extended comparison 
between natural and artificial selection in Origin of Species, suggesting that large variations are 
produced in nature by a process analogous to the deliberate selection exercised by breeders, his 
argument was no better than: “my team won; therefore, they will win next time, too”. Slightly 
weaker premises than Agassi’s are no less problematic: for instance, Norton’s (forthcoming) 
claim that “analogical inferences frequently yield false conclusions” (5) fails to identify a 
distinctive problem for analogical reasoning compared to other inductive methods. 
As noted by Bartha (2009), a novel argument purports to give just what is needed (and no 
more) to establish the controversial conclusion of the traditional dilemma. Briefly, the idea is to 
appeal to a fully general theory scientific confirmation, such as Bayesian confirmation theory, to 
identify a specific reason why analogies should systematically fail to play a distinctive inductive 
role. One obvious version of this challenge to the confirmatory potential of analogical arguments 
is exactly parallel to the objection that Van Fraassen (1989) levelled against defenders of 
inference to the best explanation. Van Fraassen argued that if IBE is consistent with Bayesian 
updating, then explanatory considerations cannot confirm an empirical hypothesis any more than 
evidence can, but that if IBE is inconsistent with Bayesian updating, it cannot be rational. 
A parallel challenge arises for the confirmatory potential of analogical arguments. On one 
hand, so the reductionist challenge goes, analogical arguments may be said to confirm empirical 
hypotheses merely in the sense (and to the extent) that they introduce new evidence, i.e., some 
fact of similarity or dissimilarity previously unknown to a Bayesian agent.30 In this case, the 
                                                          
30 Here I depart from Bartha’s presentation of the incompatibilist challenge. As he sees it, the problem is that 
the information contained in an analogical argument is often “old evidence”, i.e., already part of the 
background when the argument is proposed: “we have an instance of the familiar problem of ‘old evidence’ 
(Glymour 1980)” (32). This seems to me the wrong way of understanding the problem. Among other things, 
the problem of old evidence is often taken to pose trouble for Bayesianism; dialectically speaking, it is at best 
unclear whether and how it can be used in an argument against the confirmatory potential of scientific 
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suggestion that an analogical argument may provide confirmation to an empirical hypothesis 
simply comes down to the triviality that the evidence of similarity or dissimilarity it introduces 
needs to be taken into account in the calculation of probabilities. This may seem too thin a sense 
for analogy to play a distinctive role in confirmation. The upshot in this case is a form of 
‘reductionism’: reasoning from analogy is simply an instance of Bayesian updating. 
On the other hand, an analogical argument’s contribution to confirmation can be intended in 
the more robust sense of raising the probability of an empirical hypothesis over and above the 
credence that a Bayesian agent would assign in accordance with the rule: 
CONDITIONALIZATION     prt+1(h|k)= prt(h|e&k)= prt(h|k)prt(e|h&k)/prt(e|k) 
In this case, the role of analogical arguments in scientific confirmation would not be redundant, 
but would constitute a violation of the Bayesian account. In addition to the fact that the Bayesian 
framework offers an independently motivated theory of scientific confirmation, there are also 
prima facie compelling arguments in favor of taking CONDITIONALIZATION as the only rational 
updating rule. According to the so-called ‘Dutch book’ argument, in particular, by declaring 
allegiance to a policy of updating different from CONDITIONALIZATION one can be guaranteed to 
lose money to a Bayesian player who is smart enough to exploit the favorable circumstances. 
Although the status of the Dutch book objection is highly controversial (cf. Vineberg 2016), it is 
fair to say that, insofar as one takes being wrong in matters of science to be like losing bets in 
relevant respects, one would be better off avoiding violations of CONDITIONALIZATION.31   
                                                          
analogies. In my view, the real problem that Bayesianism poses is a form of reductionism: even if all the 
evidence is assumed to be new, the question would still remain whether some analogical arguments can make a 
distinctive contribution to confirmation, one that is not accounted for by the standard Bayesian apparatus. 
31 Although the charge of Dutch Book vulnerability is often understood as pragmatic, some philosophers take 
it to be a symptom of a more serious, ‘epistemic’ kind of irrationality (cf. Skyrms 1987). There is also a 
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In section two, Bartha’s (2009) own response to the reductionist challenge will be discussed. 
It consists in recognizing that analogical arguments do not contribute to confirmation in the usual 
Bayesian sense, while simultaneously attempting to recover a non-Dutch-bookable notion of 
probabilistic support from analogy that affects a rational agent’s prior probabilities. To this 
effect, Bartha invokes a pair of substantive constraints of rationality to be defended on mostly a 
priori grounds, namely a ‘reflection’ principle constraining an agent’s present opinions based on 
those that she envisions to have in the future, and a ‘symmetry’ principle mandating that one 
treat alike two domains that differ in no relevant respects. While granting its invulnerability to 
Dutch books, I will argue that Bartha’s proposal leads to an undesirable trade-off between wide 
applicability and the plausibility of the constraints on rationality it invokes.  
Starting from section three, I will outline a novel strategy of response to the reductionist. It 
consists in laying out two distinct but complementary proposals. First, a probabilistic account 
will be offered of what I call ‘reasoning from similarities and dissimilarities’, whose aim is to 
isolate the effect that discovering a similarity or dissimilarity between two domains might have 
on the credence assigned to an empirical hypothesis. Two kinds of cases will be distinguished, 
namely analogical reasoning ‘from effects to causes’ and ‘from causes to effects’. Special 
emphasis will be put on the fact that, whenever some assumptions are met, the discovery of a 
similarity or dissimilarity between two domains yields a more significant degree of confirmation 
than the corresponding facts about the two domains considered in isolation. This analysis is 
carried out within a standard Bayesian framework and is therefore compatible with a reductionist 
view according to which analogical reasoning is nothing over and above Bayesian updating. 
                                                          
growing literature about so-called de-pragmatized defenses of CONDITIONALIZATION from an ‘accuracy-first’ 
epistemological perspective (e.g., Joyce 1998; Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010). 
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Sections five and six complete my response with the defense of a form of anti-reductionism. I 
do so by identifying a notion of plausibility by ‘analogy proper’ that plays a separate and non-
trivial role in confirmation. This is a notion of plausibility that may attach to a hypothesis on 
grounds of its potential to connect two or more domains of scientific interest before (logically 
speaking) any new similarities between those domains are taken into account.32 This proposal 
nicely complements the account of reasoning from similarities and dissimilarities provided in 
section four and has two payoffs. First, it shows that a preference for hypotheses that are 
analogous to well-confirmed theories can be built in an agent’s priors and vindicated in a broadly 
a posteriori fashion, on grounds of simplicity. Second, it shows that a rational agent may find 
herself assigning, on the basis of a consideration of analogy, a degree of credence to an empirical 
hypothesis over and above the one she would have otherwise assigned, without being subject to 
the charge of Dutch book irrationality. The reductionist challenge is thus solved: arguments from 
analogy in science can make a distinctive contribution to confirmation after all. 
 
2. Bartha’s Proposal 
Suppose that a rational agent finds that some hypothesis h, whose credence value is either 
undefined in her credence function or is ‘negligible’ (more on this below), is supported by a 
plausible argument from analogy with hypothesis j, to which she assigns some ‘appreciable’ 
credence (say, over .5). Then, according to Bartha (2009), such an agent is rationally required to 
adjust her priors before considering any new evidence, by assigning some ‘non-negligible’ 
                                                          
32 Despite the brevity of his remarks, I read Salmon (1990) as advancing a related view: “I suspect the use of 
arguments by analogy in science is almost always aimed at establishing prior probabilities. […] Analogy helps 
us to assess the degree to which a given hypothesis fits inductively with what else we know” (1990, 186). 
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credence to h more in line with j’s. The intuitive idea is that there is something incoherent about 
assigning so much credence to hypothesis j in one domain, without even giving a shot to an 
analogous hypothesis h in another domain, absent decisive evidence against it. Bartha’s argues 
for his proposed constraint on prior credences from two alleged principles of rationality: 
REFLECTION If, so far as my current opinion at t0 is concerned, I may come to assign to 
j appreciable credence at later time t1, then I should assign to j non-
negligible credence at t0. 
SYMMETRY Provided that h and j ascribe the same property to their respective 
domains, and absent any relevant difference between those domains, my 
credence in h should be non-negligible if and only if my credence in j is. 
To illustrate Bartha’s idea, suppose that a new mushroom B is, for all I am given to know, 
analogous to a well-known mushroom A in some respects that I find relevant, and that it appears 
to differ from A in mostly irrelevant respects. Let j be some hypothesis about A to which I 
currently (at t1) assign appreciable credence: for instance, that A is poisonous. Let h name the 
equivalent of j for B, i.e., that B is poisonous; my credence in h can be undefined or ‘negligible’. 
By REFLECTION, at some possibly fictional earlier time t0 at which I know just as much about A 
as I currently know about B, j should be assigned ‘non-negligible’ credence. Moreover, since by 
construction there is no relevant difference between A at t0 and B at t1, then by SYMMETRY I 
should assign ‘non-negligible’ credence to h, too. This passage from h’s undefined or 
‘negligible’ to ‘non-negligible’ credence yields a sense in which the analogical argument from j 
to h has contributed to h’s confirmation. At the same time, the proposal avoids Dutch books 
because Bartha is not offering a new rule of credence updating, but “only a constraint on pairs of 
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probability assignments” (300), deriving from independently motivated principles of rationality 
and operative before any new evidence is introduced (hence before any update).  
There are, of course, various issues with the alleged principles of rationality that Bartha 
invokes. As it is well-known from the literature on the principle of indifference, unrestricted 
symmetry constraints on priors are controversial, since they may easily lead to inconsistent 
probability assignments.33 In what follows, however, I will not insist on the problems stemming 
from Bartha’s use of SYMMETRY. My main objection to his proposal is rather that, depending on 
the exact meaning of ‘negligible’ and ‘non-negligible’, it is either too weak or too strong. At 
first, one might draw the distinction in the absolute terms suggested by Jeffreys (1973): a 
hypothesis has ‘negligible’ probability if even a large number of favorable observations would 
not be capable of raising it to an appreciable credence (say, over .5); it has ‘non-negligible’ 
credence otherwise. This ‘absolute’ version Bartha’s proposal is interesting but has narrow 
applicability: it yields a notion of confirmation by analogy only in situations where h, the salient 
hypothesis, begins with some undefined or extremely low credence. This leaves out a host of 
cases where h already enjoys non-negligible credence when the analogy is proposed. An example 
would be evolutionary hypotheses in biology, which, as Bartha recognizes, “had already 
attracted considerable attention” (300) at the time of Darwin’s writing. On the absolute 
interpretation, Bartha’s proposal entails that Darwin’s analogical argument could not contribute 
to supporting the theory of evolution, if the latter was already assigned non-negligible credence. 
This seems suspicious: one would expect that plausible analogical arguments may not only bring 
a hypothesis from very low to low credence, but also (e.g.) from low to moderate credence. 
                                                          
33 Howson and Urbach (1993, 110-112); cf. Jeffreys (1973), Salmon (1990) for a more positive outlook. 
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Presumably, this is why Bartha favors a relative understanding of the ‘negligible’ versus 
‘non-negligible’ distinction: “negligible probability”, he writes, “is defined relative to some other 
‘appreciable’ probability value” (294), namely the value of the analogous hypothesis in the other 
domain. On this ‘relative’ version, Bartha’s proposal entails that Darwin’s analogical argument 
might have contributed to supporting the hypothesis that a process of evolution explains 
variation among living organisms, so long as the latter was taken to possess considerably lower 
probability than the corresponding hypothesis about the cause of variation in domesticated 
animals and plants. However, the broader applicability of Bartha’s proposal comes at a cost: the 
REFLECTION principle has become, on the new interpretation, untenable as a principle of 
rationality. For REFLECTION now demands that I assign non-negligible credence to j at t0 (higher 
than some low value α) in order for me to assign an appreciable credence to j at t1. This seems 
too strong of a requirement: for instance, it seems perfectly rational for my credence in 
mushroom A’s being poisonous to be fairly - though not desperately - low at t0, (in light of the 
testimony of an expert) and at t1, (when I am diagnosed with food poisoning) extremely high.
34  
Bartha attempts to fill the gap in his argument by appealing to the “pragmatic aspects of the 
situation”: thus, he writes, “if we rule out discoveries by ‘mere accident’... that might boost her 
probability for [j], [a rational agent] must either assign a non-negligible probability to that 
hypothesis at t0 or drop it from serious consideration” (295). However, the argument is still 
suspicious. First, it is not clear why a rational agent could not simply assign j some low credence 
and keep entertaining it further. Second, if pragmatic considerations alone can dictate an 
                                                          
34 Compare Van Fraassen’s “General Reflection” principle: “My current opinion about [j] must lie in the range 
spanned by the possible opinions I may come to have about [j] at a later time t, as far as my present opinion is 
concerned” (1995, 16). Unlike Bartha’s, Van Frassen’s principle does not demand that I assign j non-negligible 
credence at t0 if in some possible future I may consider j a serious candidate. Cf. also Bovens (1995). 
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assignment of non-negligible credence for j at t0, then similar considerations should also be able 
to dictate non-negligible credence for h at t1, quite independently of the analogy between j at t0 
and h at t1. Thus, the risk is that the analogical argument from j to h may be rendered irrelevant. 
It follows that Bartha’s proposal faces problems even when we take the controversial principle of 
SYMMETRY for granted. Fortunately, these problems are no objection to the confirmatory 
potential of analogical arguments since, as I aim to show for the remainder of this chapter, a 
more convincing response to the reductionist challenge is possible. Let’s consider it in detail. 
 
3. Towards an Alternative 
Here is a brief overview of my proposal. Like Bartha, I will contend that arguments from 
analogy can make a distinctive contribution to confirmation; eventually, I will also end up 
making claims about what the distribution of priors ought to look like for rational agents. 
However, Bartha associates his constraint on priors with an alleged principle of symmetry, which 
is to be defended on mostly a priori grounds. The account that I will sketch, instead, links 
analogy more closely with a notion of simplicity, whose role in informing prior opinions is 
intended to be sanctioned a posteriori. A quote from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty helps illustrate 
the difference between my approach to the reductionist challenge versus Bartha’s:  
Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or 
its symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. (1969, 92)  
If all we mean by ‘convincing’ is that some consideration invites us to take a hypothesis more 
seriously, we might say that, for Bartha, strong arguments from analogy convince for their 
symmetry; on the view that I will defend below, instead, they convince for their simplicity.   
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My argument for thinking that analogical arguments can contribute distinctively to 
confirmation proceeds in two stages. Since reductionists claim that analogical reasoning reduces 
to Bayesian updating, I am going to first consider a model of reasoning on the basis of 
similarities and dissimilarities that might appear to support their reductionist ambitions. 
Specifically, the model that I will consider offers a representation of how a Bayesian agent 
updates her credence in a salient hypothesis as a result of learning some additional fact of 
similarity or dissimilarity between two domains. Once a clear proposal is in place as to how this 
notion of confirmation by analogy may reduce to Bayesian updating, I will argue that something 
is systematically missing from it: what I call ‘analogy proper’. The burden then falls on my 
opponents to produce an equally perspicuous proposal about confirmation by analogy that is 
consistent with their reductionist ambitions. In my view, any such proposal is likely to fail 
because the plausibility afforded by analogy proper does not derive from any updating on new 
evidence, but rather from a simplicity consideration that is motivated a posteriori. 
 As a way to introduce the Bayesian account of confirmation from similarities and 
dissimilarities, it is helpful to consider an actual example of analogical reasoning in science. In 
his Sidereus Nuncius, Galileo argued that the Moon is a body similar to Earth, in that “is not 
smooth, uniform and precisely spherical” (1610, 53). In support of this conclusion, he notes that: 
on the fourth or fifth day after the new moon, the boundary that divides the dark part from 
the bright does not extend smoothly in an ellipse, as would happen in the case of a perfectly 
spherical body, but it is marked out in an irregular, uneven, and very wavy line. Now we 
have an appearance quite similar on the Earth at sunrise, when we behold the valleys, not 
yet flooded with light, but the mountains surrounding them on the opposite side to the Sun 




             
Fig. 5: Galileo’s drawings of the surface of the Moon, November-December 1609. 
Earth diminish in size as the sun rises higher, so also these spots on the Moon lose their 
blackness as the illuminated part grows larger. (1610, 53).  
Since it is plausible that the similarities between the lunar wavy lines and terrestrial shadows 
constitute a non-negligible part of the evidence that supports Galileo’s hypothesis, it is a 
legitimate question to ask how a Bayesian would go about reconstructing this notion of  
confirmation from the similarities. Note that the exercise consists in explicating the sense in 
which learning a newly introduced similarity or dissimilarity can make a difference to the 
confirmation of a hypothesis. No “problem of old evidence” (Glymour 1980) interferes. The only 
requirement I shall impose on the reconstruction is that it be perspicuous, i.e., it must give a clear 
sense of how the newly introduced similarities or dissimilarities can do confirmatory work. Here 
is an example of a reconstruction that violates this constraint: if o names the observation of the 
wavy lines, h Galileo’s hypothesis, k the background knowledge, then: 
BARE CONFIRMATION  pr(h|o&k)> pr(h|k) 
The reason it is legitimate to ask for more detail is that we need to be able to assess the 
incompatibilist’s claim that reasoning from analogy reduces to Bayesian updating. Any 
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attempted reduction must be able to show precisely how some similarities can do confirmatory 
work beyond a vague appeal to the role of background knowledge, positive priors, etc. 
Elaborating on an approach by Sober (2015), in the next section I will present a more 
perspicuous Bayesian model of confirmation from similarities and dissimilarities on behalf of the 
reductionist. One limitation of this proposal must be noted in advance. It is intended primarily as 
a model for analogical reasoning ‘from effects to causes’. Galileo’s argument is a prime 
example: from the striking similarities between some ‘effects’ (the wavy lines observed through 
the telescope and terrestrial shadows), Galileo reasons that the ‘causes’ may well be the same 
(both the Earth and the Moon are not perfectly spherical). This leaves out cases of analogical 
reasoning ‘from causes to effects’. Paradigmatic examples are extrapolations from mice to 
humans: from the similarities between the ‘causes’ (e.g., the immune system), scientists reason 
that the ‘effects’ may well be the same (humans will respond to a medical treatment in the same 
way as mice do). This limitation poses no special obstacle here. The main question is whether 
reductionists are right to claim that reasoning from analogy reduces to Bayesian updating. Since 
any successful reduction must include a proposal about analogical reasoning from effects to 
causes, there is no loss in narrowing the focus of the investigation to this special case. My 
argument will be that the reductionist proposal fails for arguments from effects to causes, and 
therefore that reductionism about analogical reasoning more generally is untenable. 
 
4. Reasoning from Similarities and Dissimilarities 
The model for confirmation from similarities and dissimilarities developed in this section aims to 
capture the following thought: that the similarities between the observable ‘effects’ in two 
distinct domains can be relevant to confirmation only if, and to the extent that, those similarities 
63 
 
would be a coincidence if they were not backed up by further commonalities in their underlying 
‘causes’. Sober’s (2015, pp. 101-102) example of the two matching essays illustrates this idea. 
Noticing a passage in one of your students’ papers may not be enough to support either the 
hypothesis that the student plagiarized a file on the internet, or that she worked independently; 
but once it turns out that the same passage appears on another student’s paper, your confidence 
in the former hypothesis increases. This is because the observed match is unlikely under the 
hypothesis that the students worked independently, but it is to be expected if each plagiarized a 
file on the internet. Similarly, it is plausible to think that the similarity that Galileo noticed 
between wavy lines on the Moon and terrestrial shadows would be coincidental if the Moon were 
perfectly spherical, but it is to be expected if it had an irregular morphology like the Earth’s. 
In order to formalize this no-coincidence intuition, Sober (2015) proposes to construe the 
relevant similarities in terms of an association between distinct states of affairs and then consider 
two or more hypotheses that disagree about what explains that association. The ‘association’ 
between two (type or token) events A and B concerns their observed frequencies: 
ASSOCIATION        freq(A&B)> freq(A)freq(B)  
In order to apply this definition to Galileo’s example, we consider a description of the transition 
between various temporal stages of the line patterns observed on the surface of the Moon and on 
the Earth over some extended period of time. The association then consists in the fact that lunar 
and terrestrial lines preserve their irregular pattern, and that just as the shadow patterns on Earth 
recede as the Sun rises over the mountains, so also the dark spots on the Moon gradually “lose 
their blackness” (1610, 53). For convenience, I shall denote this association between the 
behavior of terrestrial shadows and lunar wavy lines with the expression ‘wavy-linesM&E’. 
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Accurate descriptions of each transition considered in isolation will be referred to as ‘wavy-
linesM’ and ‘wavy-linesE’, where M and E stand for the Moon and the Earth, respectively. 
Having expressed the similarities in terms of a claim of association, we can represent their 
specific contribution to confirmation by comparing the different likelihoods they give rise to. 
The two hypotheses that are of special interest for this comparison are: 
g: Causal factors of the same kind as the ones that produce terrestrial shadows are also 
responsible for the lunar wavy lines observed through the telescope.35  
f: Lunar wavy lines and terrestrial shadows are due to separate kinds of causes: such 
as, the irregular morphology of the Earth and a defect in Galileo’s telescope.36 
To simplify without sacrificing historical accuracy, g and f can be assumed to be jointly 
exhaustive: given the agent’s background k, more extravagant hypotheses on which the lunar 
wavy lines are caused by the transition of the terrestrial shadows (or vice versa) can be ruled 
out.37 The agent’s credences in g and f are both assumed to have some positive value between 
zero and one. (In section five, I will say more about why this assumption is warranted.) 
                                                          
35 This statement is merely a handy way of summarizing the basic content of the model. Sober (2015) offers a 
more elaborate formal definition as follows: let “+C” be the state of possessing an irregular morphology, “-C” 
the state of being perfectly spherical, and “±C” the state of either possessing an irregular morphology or being 
perfectly spherical; then g is the model defined by the assumptions: a) pr(wavy-linesM&E|±C)=pr(wavy-
linesM|±C)pr(wavy-linesE|±C); b) 0<pr(+C)<1, 0<pr(-C)<1; c) pr(wavy-linesM|+C)>pr(wavy-linesM|-C), 
pr(wavy-linesE|+C)>pr(wavy-linesE|-C). 
36 Again, this is merely a convenient summary. For a formal definition (cf. Sober 2015), let “±S1” be the state 
of Galileo’s telescope working or malfunctioning, “±S2” being the state of the Earth’s possessing an even or 
an irregular morphology; then f is defined by the following assumptions: d) pr(±S1&±S2)=pr(±S1)pr(±S2); e) 
pr(wavy-linesM&E|±S1&±S2)=pr(wavy-linesM|±S1&±S2)pr(wavy-linesE|±S1&±S2); f) pr(wavy-linesM|±S1)= 
pr(wavy-linesM|±S1&±S2), pr(wavy-linesE|±S2)= pr(wavy-linesE|±S1&±S2).  
37 Confirmation from similar effects can still be achieved even if we relaxed this assumption. The proof would 
be more complicated. Such complexities are unnecessary given that the purpose here is to show that, in at least 
some realistic cases, an analogical argument can make a distinctive contribution to confirmation. 
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At this point, the likelihoods of the two hypotheses g and f can be compared. When we 
consider the bearing of the observed association ‘wavy-linesM&E’ on the rival models g and f, the 
similarities between the Moon’s wavy lines and terrestrial shadows come to the fore. For while 
those striking similarities are not impossible under f, they are rather unlikely. It would be a 
striking coincidence if a telescope pointed in the direction of our satellite showed wavy lines 
looking so much like the shadow lines of terrestrial mountains and receding in precisely the same 
way, without there being mountains or valleys on the Moon. Hence the following is plausible:38 
LIKELIHOOD INEQUALITY pr(wavy-linesM&E|g&k)> pr(wavy-linesM&E|f&k) 
Note that the same inequality is not nearly as plausible if we consider the isolated facts instead of 
the association: e.g., pr(wavy-linesM|g&k) may well be equal to pr(wavy-linesM|f&k). Intuitively, 
what is striking about the wavy lines is not that they are irregular (which may be expected even 
under the hypothesis f), but that they resemble terrestrial shadows. The formal framework at our 
disposal allows us to express this idea quite neatly, in terms of a difference in likelihoods.  
If LIKELIHOOD INEQUALITY is accepted, a simple argument can be given to show that h, the 
hypothesis that the Moon is not perfectly spherical, is confirmed incrementally by wavy-
linesM&E. First, since g and f are jointly exhaustive, LIKELIHOOD INEQUALITY entails: 
G-CONFIRMATION  pr(g|wavy-linesM&E&k)> pr(g|k) 
Moreover, by construction of g we know that: 
H-ENTAILMENT  g entails h (i.e., that the Moon has an irregular morphology) 
                                                          
38 It may be objected that it is always possible to cook up some rival to g that entails the observations, thereby 
invalidating LIKELIHOOD INEQUALITY. This objection loses its bite once we note that, in realistic situations, 
there is no reason to assign non-negligible credence to such ad hoc hypotheses; cf. Sober (2015, pp.116-8).  
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A transitivity assumption can then be invoked to show that the g’s confirmation is transmitted to 
the entailed h. A plausible candidate is Kotzen’s (2012): 
DRAGGING  pr(h|k)< pr(g|wavy-linesM&E&k) 
Alternatively, one could use Roche and Shogenyi’s (2014): 
SCREENING-OFF  pr(h|wavy-linesM&E&¬g&k)≥ pr(h|¬g&k) 
Both of these assumptions are plausibly met in Galileo’s example. DRAGGING requires that our 
prior credence in h be lower than our credence in g after the similarities have been taken into 
account; SCREENING-OFF instead requires that the observed association would not bear 
negatively on h if hypothesis g turned out to be false. Either one guarantees the conclusion:39 
CONFIRMATION FROM SIMILAR EFFECTS pr(h|wavy-linesM&E&k)> pr(h|k) 
By a parallel argument, it is possible to show that learning a dissimilarity between the effects in 
two domains can yield some disconfirmation to h. As the discussion of the reductionist challenge 
is unaffected by the consideration of this further case, I shall relegate it to a footnote.40  
It is worth clarifying that CONFIRMATION FROM SIMILAR EFFECTS does not show that h is 
more plausible than any rival hypothesis about the Moon’s morphology; whether that is so 
depends on the agent’s distribution of prior probabilities. The point of the previous result is to 
show that, from the perspective of a Bayesian agent, the similarities between two domains (e.g. 
the irregular line patterns observed on the Moon and on Earth) can make a significant difference 
                                                          
39 Cf. Kotzen (2012); Roche and Shogenyi (2014) for proofs that G-CONFIRMATION and H-ENTAILMENT 
guarantee CONFIRMATION FROM SIMILAR EFFECTS when either transitivity assumption is met. 
40 Let d be a new piece of evidence that disconfirms g: e.g. in a fictional scenario where the wavy lines 
observed on the Moon do not recede like the shadows cast by terrestrial mountains as the Sun gets higher in 
the sky. We have: pr(g|d&k)<pr(g), and pr(g|h)>pr(h). Shogenji (2014) shows that, provided that 
pr(h|¬g&d)≥pr(h|¬g), then (DISCONFIRMATION FROM DISSIMILAR EFFECTS) pr(h|d&k)<pr(h|k). 
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to the degree of confirmation of an empirical hypothesis (in this case, h’s). Not only does this 
framework make clear that the similarities bear in different ways on rival models for the 
evidence at hand, but it also offers a precise sense in which it is a fact about the similarities and 
dissimilarities, as opposed to facts about the two domain considered in isolation, that make for a 
difference to confirmation. This is because, as previously mentioned, the LIKELIHOOD 
INEQUALITY claim is plausible when considering the association wavy-linesM&E, less so when 
replacing that association with the facts (e.g., wavy-linesM) in isolation. Therefore, even if the 
newly observed wavy-linesM may confirm h as it were directly, another route to h’s confirmation, 
the one via g, would have no effect on h unless one took explicitly into account wavy-linesM&E.  
I will not offer a defense of the claim that the approach developed here applies to all other 
instances of confirmation from similar effects to similar causes. Sober’s (2015) discussion 
suggests that that the framework is flexible enough to be adapted to inferences of both the 
ordinary and the scientific kind. A more pressing question, for the present purposes, is the 
following. Let’s suppose that this approach succeeds in identifying a confirmatory role for 
similarities and dissimilarities within a Bayesian framework. What would this show with respect 
to the examination of the reductionist challenge? On the face of it, the model just outlined might 
seem to confirm what reductionists had suspected all along: namely, that reasoning from analogy 
can be captured entirely within a Bayesian framework. The effect of learning some new 
similarities or dissimilarities between two domains may appear to come down to their different 
way of bearing on rival hypotheses that agree on the relevant claims of association but disagree 
on what explains them. However, as the next section shows, the reductionist conclusion does not 




5. Two Notions of Confirmation by Analogy 
The reason any probabilistic model of the kind outlined is unlikely to reduce reasoning from 
analogy to Bayesian updating is that, as I will argue in this section, there is more to reasoning 
from analogy than the consideration of new similarities and dissimilarities. Attempts at reducing 
analogical reasoning to updating on facts of association work only insofar as they manage to 
obscure this fact. To illustrate, it is worth recalling the example of the previous section. The 
Bayesian model of confirmation sketched above tells us that the observed similarities are 
relevant to confirming a salient hypothesis h (e.g., that the Moon has mountains and valleys) by 
way of confirming a ‘connecting hypothesis’ g stating that causal relations of the same kind as 
the ones instantiated in the analogy’s source (e.g., the Earth) are also instantiated in the target 
(e.g., the Moon). However, there is a general question of how much credence it would be rational 
to assign to the connecting hypothesis g before the observed association is considered. This 
question is relevant because it ends up affecting the credence assigned to h after the evidence of 
similarities is taken into account. For if we exclude scenarios where we collect immediate and 
decisive evidence for g, g’s prior credence will influence g’s posterior credence when some ‘less 
decisive’ evidence is introduced. This, in turn, will influence h’s posterior credence after the new 
evidence is taken into account. Hence, the question of what g’s prior should be bears on the 
confirmation of other empirical hypotheses that are connected to it (in h’s case, by entailment). 
There can be no doubt that, in a wide variety of circumstances, our background knowledge 
already offers reasons to assign an ‘appreciable’ credence value to a connecting hypothesis such 
as g. By ‘appreciable’ here I mean a credence value high enough that, with a reasonably limited 
number of observations, a hypothesis can be regarded as a serious candidate for acceptance 
without the verification of all of its instances. A case where our background knowledge plausibly 
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justifies an appreciable credence value to a connecting hypothesis is Sober’s case of the two 
matching papers. Our experience in teaching predisposes us to expect attempts by any two 
students to find their assignments solved on the internet. In an ‘evidentially rich’ context such as 
this, the hypothesis that the papers of any two students might have similar causal stories (i.e., 
being plagiarized from the internet) is already a live possibility, justified by past experience.  
But when we consider evidentially impoverished contexts like Galileo’s, it is not obvious 
what arguments one could have for regarding a connecting hypothesis such as g as a serious 
possibility. Among other things, g implies that the hypothetical presence of mountains on the 
Moon is just as relevant to the observation of the wavy lines on the Moon as the presence of 
mountains on Earth is to the observation of terrestrial shadows.41 This would be reasonable to 
assume if one could somehow rule out the possibility that lunar physics differ significantly from 
terrestrial physics in its basic quantities and laws. But when Galileo gave his argument, there was 
barely any empirical evidence to support this claim – indeed, Galileo’s Aristotelian opponents 
believed precisely that there was an important difference between the physics of the sublunary 
world and that governing the Moon and the superlunary world. Presumably, for some of them, g 
was not even a serious option, let alone a serious candidate in the run for acceptance.  
My view is that a plausibility judgment an entirely different kind can intervene in these 
situations to support a connecting hypothesis such as g. It derives from the fact that g connects an 
unfamiliar domain (lunar physics) to a familiar one (terrestrial physics) by ascribing to the 
former roughly the same causal (or, more generally, explanatory) relations as the latter. My 
claim is that this can be in itself a reason to take g more seriously (when compared to its rivals). 
                                                          
41Referring back to g’s definition in fn.35, the assumption in question is: c) pr(wavy-linesM/+C)> pr(wavy-
linesM/-C). Discussing a similar case, Sober (2015) writes that there is a ‘uniformity assumption’ at play here.  
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In other words, my claim is that it is an understandable and legitimate procedure of scientific 
reasoning in evidentially impoverished circumstances to accord some additional plausibility to a 
connecting hypothesis such as g vis-à-vis its rivals despite the fact that adequate empirical 
evidence is missing to favor g over its rivals. The judgment that may be expressed in these 
contexts – what I call a judgment of plausibility by ‘analogy proper’– is both distinct from and 
logically prior to the ensuing mechanism of updating on similarities and dissimilarities. It 
consists, not in an update on new evidence, but rather in a reassessment of the prior credence one 
ought to assign to a hypothesis. On my account, a judgment of this kind can justify an increase in 
prior credence precisely when an agent realizes that two distinct domains of scientific interest 
may be ‘connected’ in a more significant way than she had previously been able to appreciate. 
The history of science offers many other examples where ‘analogy proper’ judgments of the 
kind I have in mind arguably contributed to making more salient ‘connecting hypotheses’ like g. 
One of the first suggestions that gravitational forces might possess a wave-like behavior similar 
to electromagnetism is in J. C. Maxwell’s “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field”: 
After tracing to the action of the surrounding medium both the magnetic and the electric 
attractions and repulsions… we are naturally led to inquire whether the attraction of 
gravitation, which follows the same law of the distance, is not also traceable to the action of a 
surrounding medium. (1890, I, 550) 
Darwin’s work on cladistics offers another plausible example: 
I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants 
from an equal or lesser number. Analogy would lead me one step further, namely to the belief 
that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. (1853, 303) 
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My claim is that analogy proper judgments such as those expressed in Maxwell’s and Darwin’s 
passages can be understood as aiming to influence a rational agent’s priors regarding the salient 
connecting hypotheses (e.g., the hypothesis that the same kind of wave-like behavior that 
characterizes electromagnetism also applies to gravity) before further evidence is sought. 
It is worth clarifying the difference between the judgment of analogy proper and the process 
of updating on similarities and dissimilarities as I am understanding them. The difference is not 
that in the latter case, but not in the former, some similarities and dissimilarities are taken into 
account: on the contrary, the known facts about the two domains (e.g., that both electromagnetic 
and gravitational forces obey inverse-square laws) can be relevant to judgments of analogy 
proper just as they are in ordinary cases of updating on similarities. Nor is the difference that the 
process of updating may result in confirmation whereas the judgment of analogy proper may not: 
on the contrary, I will argue that a judgment of analogy proper can sometimes justify increasing 
one’s credence in some salient connecting hypothesis (e.g. that the same wave-like behavior 
characteristic of electromagnetic forces applies to gravitational forces as well) vis-à-vis some its 
rivals, despite the absence of adequate empirical evidence to sustain that hypothesis over the 
rivals. The distinguishing feature of this form of confirmation by ‘analogy proper’ is rather that 
such judgments can prompt rational changes in credence despite not involving any update on 
new evidence. Therefore, they do not constitute an exception to the rule that one’s credence 
function after new evidence E is introduced ought to be exactly one’s prior credence function 
conditionalized on E; they only constitute a departure from the view that there can be no rational 
way to revise one’s prior credence function when no new evidence has been introduced.42 
                                                          
42 Cf. also Lange’s (1999) discussion regarding rational revisions of priors in scientific contexts. My picture of 
confirmation from analogy takes inspiration from Lange’s way of interpreting Bayesian confirmation theory. 
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A comparison with De Finetti’s (1937, 1970) conception of inductive reasoning helps 
illustrate the picture that I have in mind. On De Finetti’s view, a rational agent who is learning to 
predict the outcomes of a series of events, such as a series of coin tosses, knowing very little 
about the circumstances (e.g., not knowing whether the coin is fair) starts out with an 
“exchangeability judgment”, reflecting her defeasible perception that “the events considered are 
events of the same type, or which have analogous characteristics” (1937, 120); this results in the 
agent’s issuing an estimate of the probabilities of various outcomes (e.g. heads on all tosses), 
which is then updated as she learns new evidence. This portion of De Finetti’s view is similar to 
my picture, where a judgment of analogy proper functions as a ‘kick-starter’ for the ensuing 
process of updating on new evidence. Despite sharing a similar ‘dynamics’, De Finetti’s picture 
differs from mine with regards to the status of the analogy judgment. On his view, in situations 
of scarce evidence any exchangeability judgment is on a par with any other; the justification of 
the inductive method of learning from experience lies not with its starting point, but with the so-
called ‘convergence theorems’, which (allegedly) ensure that agents with widely divergent 
exchangeability judgments will converge on the truth in the long run. On my account, instead, 
which initial analogy judgments we make matters; sometimes, agents can be criticizable for 
refusing to revise their prior credence function on the basis of a compelling analogy. 
In the next section, I will make a specific proposal about what grounds the capacity of some 
analogy proper judgments to function as a distinctive reason for the rational revision of prior 
opinions. Before that, let me clarify what I take to be the main consequence of the distinction 
between these two notions of confirmation by analogy that I have distinguished for the purpose 
of solving the reductionist challenge. I will use for this purpose Galileo’s example from the 
previous section. Consider a rational agent A who, at time t, had non-zero credence in h (that the 
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Moon is not perfectly spherical) but whose credence in g was either undefined in her credence 
function (because she had never considered this hypothesis) or was relatively low compared to 
its rivals. My claim is that, upon considering Galileo’s analogical argument, A should, in this 
order: i) re-evaluate whether the credence she assigns to g (if any) is appropriate; and ii) update 
on any new evidence that may be contained in Galileo’s argument. If at step i) A determines that 
g deserves some higher credence in light of an analogy proper judgment, then, by the transitivity 
result discussed in the previous section, A’s posterior credence in h (viz. that the Moon is not 
perfectly spherical) after taking into account the similarities between lunar wavy lines and 
terrestrial shadows must be greater than that of any agent B whose opinions matches A’s exactly 
until time t, but who fails to raise her credence in g. Intuitively, any such B fails to take seriously 
the possibility of a  ‘connection’ between terrestrial and lunar physics; consequently, she is 
bound to miss out on the extra confirmation afforded to g (and hence to h) by wavy-lineM&E.  
The upshot, if this argument is correct, is a complete overturn of the reductionist argument 
considered in the previous section. There it appeared as if the reductionist had gone a long way 
towards showing analogical reasoning to be reducible to Bayesian updating, by specifying a 
model of updating on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities. I am suggesting that the result 
of the previous section can be used in an argument in support of a form of anti-reductionism 
instead, viz. that in at least some cases an argument from analogy like Galileo’s can justify 
raising an agent’s credence in a given hypothesis over and above the one she would have 
otherwise assigned by employing CONDITIONALIZATION alone. This is possible if I am right to 
claim that there exists a notion of confirmation by analogy that is not reducible to the 
consideration of new similarities and dissimilarities, and that, at least in situations of sparse and 
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insufficient evidence, a proper response to an argument from analogy may involve re-evaluating 
one’s prior in a connecting hypothesis like g before any new evidence is sought or considered.  
Three clarifications about the proposed resolution of the reductionist challenge are in order. 
First, the two-step procedure just indicated, which involves an evaluation of one’s priors and 
then the consideration of similarities and dissimilarities, is not intended as a realistic 
psychological description of anyone’s reasoning from analogy. That being said, my proposal is 
not detached from what I regard as a plausible psychological story. In treating of analogical 
thinking in the context of the law, Postema (2009) has distinguished between the processes of 
“base-level analogical reasoning” and “analogy assessment”, the former concerned with the 
comparing and contrasting the legally relevant features of two or more scenarios, the latter with 
evaluating the analogy in light of higher-level legal principles. This seems to me a compelling 
account of the psychological processes involved in reasoning from analogy, easily extendable to 
the scientific case, and a nice complement to my distinction between two notions of confirmation 
by analogy. My proposal is an idealization of this picture in that, as Postema notes, the base-level 
and analogy assessment processes are often simultaneous in everyday reasoning, whereas the 
ideal Bayesian agent that I have in mind is described as proceeding sequentially.  
Second, while I claim that analogy proper can justify an assignment of non-negligible 
probability to a connecting hypothesis like g, I do not make any provisions about what justifies 
the further assumption of non-zero credence to h. I do not need to do so because, for the purpose 
of resolving the reductionist challenge, it is sufficient to identify one way for analogy to play a 
distinctive role in confirmation (i.e. a role in confirmation that is not already accounted for by the 
Bayesian kinematics). I do not claim that the route I have suggested is the only possible way. 
Despite identifying a single kind of scenario where an analogical argument contributes 
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distinctively to confirmation, my proposal does not suffer from the problem of narrow 
applicability that I have previously raised against the absolute version of Bartha’s proposal. What 
makes that proposal too narrowly applicable is that the limited variety of cases where an 
analogical argument contributes distinctively to confirmation are also, on that view, the only 
ones where an analogical argument contributes to confirmation simpliciter. On my account, 
instead, analogical arguments may contribute to confirmation quite ordinarily, whenever: i) they 
introduce some additional evidence of similarities and dissimilarities, and ii) credence in the 
‘connecting hypothesis’ is adequate. They do so distinctively only in fewer cases. 
Third, and finally, I do not claim that any judgment of analogy proper mandates an 
assignment of extra credence to a connecting hypothesis like g. This would suggest that I endorse 
a policy of credence updating which says: “upon noticing a potential connection between two 
domains, raise your credence in some salient connecting hypothesis g”. This policy may well be 
vulnerable to a Dutch book, and I do not endorse it. My view is that, at a minimum, a rational 
agent ought to re-evaluate her credence in a connecting hypothesis like g upon noticing an 
analogy between two domains. I also think that in an evidentially impoverished context like 
Galileo’s, and lacking any significant evidence to the contrary, an agent would be justified in 
raising her credence in g from an undefined or negligible level to a non-negligible level. I do not 
make any specific provisions as to what precise credence said agent ought to assign to g, or how 
she would go about re-assessing the rest of her opinions when her credence in g goes up. The 
crucial point is that there can be some justification for assigning some extra credence to g as the 
result of the judgment of analogy, without this raise in credence being the consequence of 
applying some specific rule of updating on new evidence. In the next section, I will outline what 




6. Analogy and Simplicity 
On the proposal that I will develop in this section, judgments of analogy proper can fulfill a 
confirmatory role when they correspond to an agent’s best attempt at embedding an unfamiliar 
domain into a pre-existing structure of knowledge and inferences. For instance, in judging that 
gravitational forces might possess a wave-like behavior, Maxwell (1890) relied upon the 
successes of the previous attempts at unifying electric, magnetic and optic phenomena. Within 
that context, the ‘connecting hypothesis’ that roughly the same kind of explanatory patterns 
successfully employed in the domain of electromagnetism and optics might extend to the domain 
of gravity had the potential to achieve significant unification in the overall picture of physical 
interactions. My claim is that the extra confirmatory role that can be played by the ‘best’ 
judgments of analogy proper in these contexts is to be understood as deriving precisely from 
their promise to achieve a kind of cross-domain simplicity: the connecting hypotheses that those 
judgments support are appraised on grounds of their potential to reveal a significant unity among 
otherwise distinct scientific domains. As I will elaborate below, the form of justification that I 
envision is thus broadly a posteriori: specifically, it is based on an expectation, which can be 
corroborated by past experience, that a ‘simple’ or ‘unified’ set of theories will be discovered. 
Some insight about the picture of scientific rationality that I envision can be gained by 
juxtaposing it to the case of the law. Judiciary decisions often involve identifying a novel case as 
an instance of some given legally recognized pattern. As Postema (2009) has emphasized, those 
decisions require competence and training. When presented with a novel case, judges must 
exercise what Postema calls focus: a capacity to attend to some features at the expense of others. 
Another capacity closely related to focus is contrast: the capacity of seeing a particular case as 
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instantiating one pattern as opposed to another. Context plays an indispensable role in 
determining the correct exercise of these capacities: as Postema writes, the context in which 
judges make their decisions is typically “populated by other relatively determinate and 
contrasting elements” (118), consisting in other judiciary decisions in different cases, as well as 
by the judge’s sense of the body of the law considered as a more or less coherent whole. Often 
legal experts disagree considerably as to which legal pattern some novel case is an instance of. 
Even though there may be no ultimate fact of the matter as to which legal pattern is ‘the’ correct 
one, the training and experience of judges can indicate better and worse ways of interpreting the 
legal profile of a case among competitors and help them select the most promising ones.  
Similarly, on the picture of analogy proper judgments in science that I have in mind, 
scientists refine their capacity to imagine ways of embedding what is not yet understood within 
what is known through training and experience. Several competences need to be developed in 
this process, such as an understanding of which features of a specific domain are relevant to 
various kinds of explanatory or predictive tasks; also, a sense of the history of the discipline and 
the present state of the scientific knowledge at large, which helps determine which kinds of 
embeddings may be worthwhile attempting and which are not. In each case, the existing body of 
scientific knowledge and inferences serves as a common background for determining more and 
less skillful exercises of the capacity for analogy proper judgments. When an empirical 
hypothesis about some yet unknown domain is formulated, the most promising competitors 
among the number of virtually available analogy proper judgments can be called in support of 
that hypothesis. This is so despite the fact that there are several rival hypotheses that are 
compatible with the available evidence about the target domain. The ‘best’ analogy proper 
judgments thus determine an increase in prior credence in some hypotheses vis-à-vis others. 
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I should like to briefly mention here two points that relate to this idea of a ‘competition’ 
among judgments of analogy.43 The first is that it may often be vague which judgments count as 
the ‘best’; in those cases, I believe we should be fairly liberal in countenancing a plurality of 
potential analogues as equally the ‘best’, and thus equally deserving of some confirmatory 
potential. This is not to say, however, that all analogy judgments are on a par. Let me mention 
here two minimal criteria that any candidate judgment must pass: an internal and an external 
one. Internally, the derivation patterns borrowed from the analogy’s source must be able to fit the 
evidence (however slight and sparse) already collected in the analogy’s target. Derivation 
patterns with little or no potential to account for the available observations (or to predict new 
ones) are thus to be excluded from consideration. Externally, the features of the source’s 
derivation patterns that are transferred to the target must possess some significant history of 
success, meaning that they contribute to various explanatory and predictive tasks in other 
domains of scientific inquiry, including (but not limited to) the analogy’s source. The more 
confident scientists are that the patterns identified in the analogy’s source are the right ones to 
employ for that and similar domains, the stronger will be the case for thinking that the same 
patterns might reoccur elsewhere in novel targets of scientific investigation. 
The second point is closely related; it has to do with the capacity of the account on offer to 
capture important aspects of the actual scientific practice. From the claim that only the ‘best’ 
judgments of analogy are capable of doing confirmatory work derives a maxim that Shelley 
(2002) finds to be operative in the context of the historical sciences, but that plausibly applies 
more generally. It can be stated as follows: no analogy can be confirmatory in the presence of a 
                                                          
43 A similar appeal to a competition among judgments of analogy, with specific reference to the field of 
archaeology, can be found in Ascher (1961), who claims that analogies can have evidential value insofar as 
they can be regarded as “best solutions” to an interpretative problem. Cf. also Wylie (1985).  
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better ‘counter-analogy’. By a ‘counter-analogy’, here I mean a model that exploits a different 
model to support different conclusions about a target. The classic example here is the 
counteranalogy that, in Hume’s (1779) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo offers to 
Cleanthes’ attempt at assimilating the universe to a work of art. According to Philo, the life of 
the universe bears more similarities to the life of a plant; its origin is therefore more likely 
ascribed to spontaneous “vegetation” (61) rather than (as Cleanthes had suggested) to the work 
of an intelligent designer. This example illustrates the potential of counter-analogies to diminish 
the prima facie plausibility afforded by judgments of analogy to a hypothesis. The underlying 
norm of inductive reasoning is explicable by the principle that only the all-things-considered 
‘best’ judgments of analogy are capable of fulfilling some actual confirmatory role in science.  
Of course, it may be objected at this point that, in the absence of a more precise, general 
account as to what count as better and worse judgments of analogy, my proposal ends up making 
confirmation of empirical hypotheses dependent upon some mysterious faculty of ‘inductive 
intuition’ (to use Carnap’s 1968 expression): a capacity to judge when some hypothesis displays 
the requisite analogy for which no precise account has been provided. In response, I am happy to 
concede that, because judgments of analogy are evaluated against a complex background of 
knowledge and inferences, any attempt at specifying criteria in disciplines as diverse as physics, 
biology, archaeology, etc., is bound to be either incomplete or uninformative. What can be done 
at this level of generality is to show that the capacities involved in each context are not 
mysterious. What it takes to judge that (say) gravity and electrostatics may be unified is a 
capacity to attend selectively to those features of those domains that are relevant to various 
explanatory and predictive tasks (corresponding roughly to the satisfaction of the ‘internal’ 
criteria above); also, a sense of the history of those sciences, which helps determine which kinds 
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of unifications are worthwhile attempting and which are not (corresponding to the ‘external’ 
criteria). From this perspective, what makes a community of scientists capable of producing and 
sharing judgments of analogy proper is no more mysterious than what makes competent judges 
capable of sharing the reasons for identifying a judiciary case as an instance of a legal pattern or, 
for that matter, what makes different musicians capable of picking on a tune in a piece of jazz. 
As anticipated, my claim is that the rationale for assigning extra credence to connecting 
hypotheses in evidentially impoverished conditions is intended to be broadly a posteriori. Thus, 
within a given branch of science, some attempts at unifying two or more domains may have been 
successful. They may have achieved this success by projecting onto the yet unknown targets 
certain kinds of features of the more familiar domains. These successes may have contributed to 
bringing the discipline in certain kinds of directions rather than others, justifying scientists to 
expect to discover further elements of unification along the same respects they have previously 
identified. Importantly, this form of justification is intended to work at a relatively local level. 
Hence, I do not mean to rule out that, in some of the branches of the vast tree of science, 
scientists do not anticipate finding a relatively unified set of scientific theories; in those contexts, 
I can grant that analogical arguments would not fulfill any distinctive confirmatory role. 
However, I expect that in branches of science where the history of unification is considerable, 
such as in physics as practiced both currently and in the past, judgments of prior plausibility by 
analogy will be taken in higher regard, and connecting hypotheses based on them assigned 
appreciable credence by the scientific community even before undergoing severe testing.44 
                                                          
44 Cf. Dougherty and Callender (forthcoming): “As physics today searches for insights into a theory of quantum 
gravity, another analogy has become so entrenched that it has taken a life of its own: black hole thermodynamics” 
(2). A relatively high prior in black hole thermodynamics by physicists is neither surprising nor unjustified if it 
is true, as I believe, that analogy plays an important plausibility role in physics.  
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There remains the worry that, on my account, past experience not only determines what 
counts as a better or worse judgment of analogy but also (as was just stressed) stands as the 
ultimate justification for assigning extra credence to the ‘best’ of those judgments. This might 
seem to lend itself to an objection often raised against the use of reasoning from analogy in 
science, which Clark (1951) has described as “the real danger of setting up a vicious circle and 
assuming what one is trying to discover” (52). However, even though I agree that the danger of 
such vicious reasoning is real, I do not find this allegation appropriate against my account. 
Plausibly, some degree of circularity is present in the justification of any ampliative method of 
reasoning. My aim is to steer a middle ground between a deductively rigorous but completely 
sterile scientific method, on one hand, and vicious circularity, on the other, which is to advocate 
for a cautious inductive use of analogy in science. This account places special stress on the 
dynamical interaction between analogy judgments and experience: one whereby analogy proper 
judgments influence what kinds of hypotheses scientists will entertain and test; and where, in 
turn, the results of those tests determine what kinds of further hypotheses the same scientists will 
take into consideration in the future. The role assigned to analogy judgments is therefore taken to 
be, not that of settling empirical questions, but that of contributing to a more general effort at 
coordinating our conceptual schemes and imaginative capacities to reality. Some circularity in 
the justification of the method remains, of course; but that circularity is well-balanced by the 
recognition that the conclusions reached by means of analogy possess what we might call 
(following Sklar 2001) a ‘transient’ nature, being potential steps in the right direction.45 
                                                          
45 Cf. Wylie’s (1985) critique of skeptics about the use of analogy in archaeology: “What [their] arguments 
underscore is the creative, interpretive nature of the hypothesis testing process itself. Far from being an 
objective confrontation of ‘ideas’ with ‘facts’, it is a complex, thoroughly inductive process of continual 
adjustment between the theoretical frameworks that allow you to describe or interpret archaeological data as 




In this chapter, I have presented a novel response to the reductionist challenge about analogical 
reasoning. The anti-reductionist account that I have offered seems to me the most promising way 
to represent the role of analogy in confirmation within a probabilistic epistemology. My outline 
is incomplete, as it needs to be supplemented with a proposal about analogical reasoning ‘from 
causes to effects’. However, the distinction that I have drawn between reasoning from 
similarities and dissimilarities and analogy proper judgments seems to me an important and 
necessary step towards a more comprehensive account. While the difficulties involved in my 
attempt at basing the confirmatory role of analogy proper judgment on a principle of simplicity 
are considerable, I believe that the a posteriori justification outlined in section six has some 
decent chance of succeeding: enough to make it a serious philosophical possibility. I take no 
stance as to whether my solution to the reductionist challenge extends to defending inference to 
the best explanation (IBE) from the original dilemma put forward by Van Fraassen (1989). A 
skeptic about IBE may well take this paper to show that considerations of analogy can play a 
distinctive role in confirmation while maintaining that how well a hypothesis explains a given 
body of data does not play any such role. In chapter five, however, I will put forward a picture of 
scientific rationality that makes room for both analogy and IBE to play a role in confirmation. 
Meanwhile, let us be content with the anti-reductionist conclusion that I have defended in this 












James Clerk Maxwell’s “On Faraday’s Lines of Force” (FLF) is a landmark of nineteenth-
century electromagnetism.46 For historians and philosophers interested in scientific methodology, 
FLF is also notable for Maxwell’s first exposition of “the method of physical analogy”, a method 
that he will invoke repeatedly over the remainder of his scientific career. “Physical research”, 
Maxwell explains in his 1870 Address to the British Association, “is continually revealing to us 
new features of natural processes, and we are thus compelled to search for new forms of thought 
appropriate to these features” (II, 227). The solution that Maxwell recommends consists in 
borrowing the notions and methods employed in one scientific domain to use in a less familiar 
domain. Thus, in FLF Maxwell compares Faraday’s ‘lines of force’ to tubes of variable cross-
section carrying an incompressible fluid; in “Illustration of the Dynamical Theory of Gases” 
(DTG), he compares gases to systems of particles “in rapid motion, the velocity increasing with 
the temperature” (I, 377). The method of physical analogy is therefore a “method of cultivating 
physical science, in which each department in turn is regarded, not merely as a collection of 
facts…, but as itself a new mathesis by which new ideas may be developed.” (II, 325).  
                                                          
46 References to Maxwell’s work will be as follows: “I” and “II” refer to, respectively, volume 1 and 2 of The 
Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, W.D. Niven (ed.). “LP” refers to The Scientific Letters and Papers 
of James Clerk Maxwell, P. Harman (ed.) “T” refers to Maxwell’s A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism. 
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Despite the array of remarks Maxwell has left on the subject, the nature and intended purpose 
of his method of physical analogy is a matter of significant disagreement among historians of 
science. In FLF, the method of analogy is claimed to be superior to two other methods frequently 
undertaken at the early stages of physical inquiry. One is the “mathematical method”, which 
consists in guessing some abstract formula from which the experimental results can be deduced; 
its main defect being that, in the attempt to guess the right formula: 
we entirely lose sight of the phenomena to be explained; and though we may trace out the 
consequences of given laws, we can never obtain more extended views of the connexions of 
the subject. (I, 155) 
At the opposite extreme is the method of physical hypothesis, which consists in guessing, not an 
abstract formula, but the concrete mechanism that accounts for the observations. In this case: 
we see the phenomena only through a medium, and are liable to that blindness to facts and 
rashness in assumptions which a partial explanation encourages. (I, 156) 
By approaching a new domain through a physical analogy, Maxwell says in FLF, we eschew 
rash assumptions about the mechanical causes at work; at the same time, by allowing “the mind 
at every step to lay hold of a clear physical conception” (I, 156) drawn from some more familiar 
domain, we maintain some independent grasp on the meaning of our mathematical formulas.  
The main interpretative problem is how to reconcile passages such as the ones just 
mentioned, where the function of analogy seems to reduce to that of an aid in visualization, with 
the audacity of the physical conclusions that Maxwell often draws from them. There is perhaps 
no better example of this audacity than in Maxwell’s “On Physical Lines of Force” (PLF, 1862). 
Drawing an analogy between the electromagnetic field and an imaginary system of molecular 
vortices, Maxwell argues that the interstices between the magnetic vortices must be in some kind 
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of elastic state in between rigid and fluid. Based on this conjecture, he rewrites Ampere’s 
original law by adding a term on its right-hand side for the “displacement current” and presents 
the resulting equation as the correct electromagnetic law. As we now know, the introduction of 
the displacement current was the right move: among other things, the new equation predicted the 
phenomenon of electromagnetic radiation, which was verified experimentally by Hertz in 1887. 
But how could Maxwell maintain, in the introductory section of FLF, that physical analogies are 
simply illustrative devices and a few years later, in PLF, rely so heavily on the vortex model to 
defend his new electromagnetic law? Commentators diverge widely on this episode, some (e.g. 
Duhem 1927; Chalmers 1986) arguing that the model was unnecessary and ultimately a 
distraction, others (e.g. Nersessian 2002) insisting on its essential heuristic role.  
This chapter is driven by the conviction that significant progress in the way of understanding 
Maxwell’s methodology is unlikely to be accomplished solely by an analysis of specific episodes 
in his work, but can only be achieved by way of a comprehensive examination that ties together 
his scientific work to his philosophical views. In section two, I will present the account defended 
by Achinstein (1993, 2003) and developed by Harman (1998).47 Their portrayal of Maxwell’s 
methodology is arguably the most comprehensive one of a tradition of “formalist” interpretations 
which traces back to Duhem (1902). Achinstein and Harman purport to resolve the apparent 
inconsistency between Maxwell’s presentation of the analogical method in FLF and his use of 
the method in his work on electromagnetism and on the kinetic theory of gases by identifying a 
significant shift in Maxwell’s approach as his work progressed. While at the time of FLF 
Maxwell advocated the use of comparison merely for illustrative purposes, as a way to achieve a 
                                                          
47 Though Harman’s (1998) book is richer in historical detail, it systematically refers to Achinstein’s (1993) 
work to back up the proposed interpretation of the role of Maxwell’s physical analogies, which is what 
motivates the choice to consider their interpretations together rather than separately.  
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“simplification and reduction of the results of previous investigation to a form in which the mind 
can grasp them” (I, 155), in his later work Maxwell began to assign a more robust, explanatory 
function to his analogies, by boldly introducing physical hypotheses for which he had no 
independent warrant, with the aim of offering explanations of the phenomena.  
While Achinstein’s and Harman’s interpretation goes in the right direction of attempting to 
offer a comprehensive perspective on Maxwell’s method, I will argue that their attempt is not 
successful. In particular, the distinction between the earlier “illustrative” analogies and the later 
“explanatory” analogies is not supported by the texts and indeed contradicts Maxwell’s remarks. 
Starting with section three, I will begin to outline an alternative interpretation of Maxwell’s 
method of physical analogy. This analysis draws upon the tradition of “materialist” 
interpretations defended most notably by Hesse (1972) and, in turn, inspired by Campbell 
(1920). On the version that I will develop, Maxwell intended his physical analogies to be hybrid 
objects, having a kind of double nature: illustrative and inductive at the same time. They are 
intended to furnish the bare mathematical symbols of a novel theory about an unfamiliar domain 
with a working physical interpretation drawn from a more familiar domain, not only as a way to 
clarify the meaning of the mathematical symbols, but also as a potential route to defeasible 
inferences from features of the more familiar domain to features of the less. I will defend my 
thesis of the double nature by illustrating how it makes sense of the continuity in Maxwell’s 
remarks on the method of physical analogy throughout his work, as well as explaining his quest 
for a “mathematical classification of physical quantities” to put at the service of physical inquiry.  
In section four, I will complete my defense of the materialist interpretation by applying it to 
the contested episode of Maxwell’s introduction of the displacement current in PLF. I will show 
that my reading offers a reasonable middle ground between two opposites. On one hand, it 
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rejects the reading endorsed by many commentators (e.g., Turner 1955, Buchwald 1984, 
Nersessian 2002, Hon and Goldstein 2015), according to which the analogy between molecular 
vortices and the electromagnetic field may suggest novel empirical hypotheses but not give us 
reasons to expect them to obtain. On the other hand, it also avoids the much stronger 
interpretative claim put forward by Siegel (2001), according to which the analogy played an 
important epistemic role, in “demonstrating” (this is his expression) the reduction of optics to 
electromagnetism via the introduction of the displacement current. On my interpretation, 
Maxwell appealed to both theoretical and experimental considerations to provide defeasible 
support to the idea that the assumptions of the molecular vortices model were at least 
approximately instantiated in the domain of electromagnetism. The interpretation of Maxwell’s 
methodological remarks discussed in sections three and the reading of Maxwell’s analogical 
method in his electromagnetic work in section four support one another: they show that 
Maxwell’s epistemological remarks are coherent with his use of the method in practice. 
 
2. Achinstein’s and Harman’s Interpretation 
In this section, I will present and criticize Achinstein’s (1993, 2003) and Harman’s (1998) 
interpretation of Maxwell’s method of physical analogy. Section 2.1 considers their reading of 
FLF. Section 2.2 discusses how they read Maxwell’s later works. Finally, section 2.3 discusses 
some problems for their interpretation. In particular, I will question their claim that there is a 
discontinuity in Maxwell’s approach between his earlier and his later works by appealing to 





2.1  The Early Maxwell 
Achinstein and Harman read the introductory section of FLF as a plea for the use of illustrative 
analogies in physical inquiry. This reading is supported both by various passages in the text as 
well as by philosophical considerations. “By a physical analogy” Maxwell explains, “I mean that 
partial similarity between the laws of one science and those of another, which makes each of 
them illustrate the other” (I, 156). An example that Maxwell gives is the analogy that William 
Thomson uncovered in 1842, between heat and electricity: “the mathematical laws of the 
uniform motion of heat in homogenous media are identical in form with those of attractions 
varying inversely as the square of the distance” (I, 157). Maxwell comments: 
It is by the use of analogies of this kind that I have attempted to bring before the mind, in a 
convenient and manageable form, those mathematical ideas which are necessary to the study 
of the phenomena of electricity. (I, 156) 
On the model that Maxwell proposes in FLF, the direction of an electric or magnetic force is 
represented by what Faraday called a “line of force”. For instance, a line of force is said to pass 
between the north and south pole of a small magnet. In order to represent the intensity of the 
force, we are asked to conceive of lines of force, not as geometrical lines, but rather as “fine 
tubes of variable section carrying an incompressible fluid” (I, 157). As it is well-known in the 
case of fluids, the velocity of the fluid in the tube varies inversely as the width of the tube: the 
velocity is higher in narrower tubes and lower in larger ones. The idea, then, is to represent the 
intensity of a given electric or magnetic force by the section of the tube carrying the imaginary 
fluid, or equivalently, by the velocity of the fluid flow along the direction of its line of force. As 
Maxwell notes, however, we should not attach too much weight to the idea of a “fluid” since: 
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it is not even a hypothetical fluid which is introduced to explain physical phenomena. It is 
merely a collection of imaginary properties which may be employed for establishing certain 
theorems in pure mathematics in a way more intelligible to many minds and more applicable 
to physical problems than that in which algebraic symbols are used. (I, 160) 
The quoted passages would constitute conclusive evidence that Maxwell intended his analogy 
purely illustratively, as an aid to visualizing the behavior of electromagnetic forces, if they were 
not accompanied by short but frequent reminders of the fertility or suggestive power of analogies, 
which make them useful not just to “the student” (I, 155) of electromagnetism but also to 
“experimental philosophers” (I, 159). Commenting on the analogy between “light and the 
vibrations of an elastic medium” (I, 156) giving rise to a wave theory of light, Maxwell writes that: 
by stripping it of its physical dress and reducing it to a theory of ‘transverse alternations’, we 
might obtain a system of truth strictly founded on observation, but probably deficient both in 
the vividness of its conception and the fertility of its method. (I, 156) 
The idea of the fertility of the method comes back in several other passages in FLF. Introducing 
his formalization of Faraday’s laws of the electro-tonic state, Maxwell writes: 
If it should then appear that these laws, originally devised to include one set of phenomena, 
may be generalized so as to extend to phenomena of a different class, these mathematical 
connexions may suggest to physicists the means of establishing physical connexions. (I, 189) 
Ultimately, Maxwell claims in FLF, the truth about electromagnetism will be discovered by 
those who will attend to the “questions that the mathematical theory suggests” (I, 159). 
Philosophical considerations intervene at this point to downplay the significance of these 
remarks. If by the claim that the “mathematical connexions may suggest…the means of 
establishing physical connexions” Maxwell meant that we can draw inferences from one domain 
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to another simply in virtue of some similarity in mathematical form, that borders insanity. For a 
comparison, consider the kind of reasoning from analogy employed, in medical contexts, to infer 
from the effects of a certain medicine on mice to similar effects on humans. In those cases, we 
know that mice resemble humans in various causally relevant features: e.g., that the causal 
processes of assimilation of chemicals are roughly the same. But in drawing his fluid analogy, 
Maxwell claims to be making no “physical hypotheses” about the causal mechanisms underlying 
electromagnetic forces. This would seem to rule out the legitimacy of inferring physical from 
mathematical resemblance. As Achinstein (1964, 328) once put it, if such inferences were 
justified we might just as well start making predictions about the color of swans based on their 
‘analogy’ with line segments; for there is an ‘analogy’ of this purely formal kind between the 
two domains if we take the relation “has the same color as” to correspond to the relation “is 
congruent with”. If it is true that Maxwell meant the fluid analogy to be a purely formal one, 
without any physical similarity, then it seems to be equally obvious that by the mathematical 
similarities “suggesting” physical connections Maxwell meant something psychological: 
something pertaining to the domain of scientific discovery rather than confirmation. 
The claim that the fluid analogy is a purely ‘illustrative’ one sums up well Achinstein and 
Harman’s reading of FLF. Before moving on to assessing whether their reading is correct, let’s 
have a look at what they have to say about Maxwell’s later works, and specifically about DTG.  
 
2.2   The Later Works 
According to Achinstein’s and Harman’s reconstruction, during the four years between the 
publication of FLF and his first paper (DTG) on the kinetic theory of gases, Maxwell must have 
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confronted an important limitation of the method of physical analogy. As Achinstein (1993) puts 
it, the problem is that a physical analogy is of no help explaining the observation: 
Suppose... we were to assume that an electromagnetic field is composed of the 
incompressible fluid flowing through tubes of varying section. Under this assumption could 
we explain why the electromagnetic field satisfies the law F=1/r2 by explaining why the fluid 
that comprises it satisfies the law v=1/r2? Only if we assume either that electric force is the 
same (property) as fluid velocity or that the velocity of the fluid of which the electromagnetic 
field is composed causes the electrical force… But in this analogy Maxwell is unwilling to 
make the assumption that analogous properties are identical or causally related. (1993, 221) 
Because Maxwell is unwilling to claim that the analogous properties in the two domains are 
identical, the analogical method is incapable of yielding scientific explanations. As a response to 
this limitation, Achinstein and Harman see in DTG (and in the later PLF) a change in approach. 
Commenting on Maxwell’s project to “demonstrate the laws of motion of an indefinite number 
of small, hard and perfectly elastic spheres acting on one another only during impact” (I, 377), 
Harman (1998) writes that Maxwell’s aim is to “establish an identity between the properties of 
elastic spheres and those of molecules, and thus to establish the theory of gases” (92). 
What is puzzling about Achinstein’s and Harman’s claim is that Maxwell never signals any 
change in method. Rather, he is very explicit in the opening of DTG regarding the reason for 
investigating the laws of motion of colliding elastic spheres:  
If the properties of such a system of bodies are found to correspond to those of gases, an 
important physical analogy will be established, which may lead to more accurate knowledge 
of the properties of matter. (I, 378) 
On Achinstein’s and Harman’s view, this passage is misleading. For they insist that Maxwell 
aims to provide explanations of gaseous phenomena (e.g., gaseous friction), not merely ‘suggest’ 
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new hypotheses; and in order to do that, he needs “physical hypotheses”, viz., he must identify 
the properties of elastic spheres with those of molecules in a gas. Hence Harman (1998) writes 
that “the reference to a ‘physical analogy’ [in the opening of DTG] recalls his usage in [FLF], 
but his meaning is different in the two papers” (92). Achinstein (1993) adds: “In [FLF] Maxwell 
uses the method of analogy to avoid physical hypotheses… Yet in his kinetic theory paper 
Maxwell seems not to be avoiding physical hypotheses… but to be reveling in them!” (213). 
As textual support for this interpretation, Achinstein (1993) points to those DTG passages 
following equation 24, where Maxwell demonstrates from his assumptions that gases obey the 
law m=1/3plv, where m is the viscosity of a system of particles, p is the density, l is the mean 
free path of the particles and v the mean velocity. He comments on this result: 
A remarkable result… in equation 24 is that if this explanation of gaseous friction be true, the 
coefficient of friction is independent of the density. (I, 391) 
A similar comment appears after deriving another important result, Boyle’s law:  
We have seen that, on the hypothesis of elastic particles moving in straight lines, the pressure 
of a gas can be explained by the assumption that the square of the velocity is proportional 
directly to the absolute temperature and inversely to the specific gravity of the gas at constant 
temperature. (I, 389)  
For Achinstein, these passages provide evidence for three claims. The first is that, despite having 
no decisive evidence for the molecular theory of gases, “his position was not complete epistemic 
neutrality” (1993, 228), meaning that he was at least somewhat partial to the assumptions of the 
molecular theory. The second is that, engaging in a bit of “physical speculation”, Maxwell 
advanced the conjecture that the properties of a gas can be identified with those of elastic 
particles; from this identification, he arrived at an explanation of gaseous friction and pressure. 
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The third is that, by using physical analogies for explanatory purposes, Maxwell departs from the 
original ‘illustrative’ function of the method of physical analogy outlined in the earlier FLF. 
 
2.3  Two Methods? 
Although Achinstein and Harman offer an attractive portrayal of Maxwell’s scientific 
methodology, my overall assessment of their interpretation is negative. First, Achinstein and 
Harman provide prima facie compelling reasons for viewing the fluid analogy in FLF as 
possessing a purely illustrative function. However, the textual evidence is not sufficient to 
establish this reading. As was discussed in section 2.1, the argument for the illustrative function 
must appeal to considerations of a philosophical nature (the argument that resemblances in 
mathematical form cannot offer confirmation) which can be resisted; indeed, in section three I 
will argue that those considerations miss the target. Second, their claim that in DTG Maxwell 
was identifying the properties of gases with those of elastic particles for explanatory purposes is 
not well-supported by the textual evidence. In the passages that Achinstein mentions, Maxwell 
puts his claims in a conditional form: if “the properties of such a system of bodies are found to 
correspond to those of gases” (I, 368), then we would be able to explain why, e.g., the coefficient 
of gaseous friction is independent of the density, or why a gas has a certain pressure.48 There is 
no sign yet of Maxwell’s attempting to go beyond the physical analogy. 
                                                          
48 Moreover, Achinstein and Harman’s interpretation does not explain why in the introduction to DTG (before 
deriving the independence of gaseous friction from density) Maxwell would emphasize that “[instead of 
saying] that the particles are hard, spherical, and elastic, we may if we please say that the particles are centres 
of force, of which the action is insensible except at a certain small distance, when it suddenly appears as a 
repulsive force of very great intensity. It is evident that either assumption will lead to the same results” (I, 
378). It is not evident, however, how the investigation could lead to exactly ‘the same results’ if the aim were 
to establish an identity (as I quoted Harman as alleging above), not an analogy (as Maxwell insists in several 
passages), between the properties of elastic spheres and those of the molecules composing gases. After all, one 
cannot identify the properties of gas molecules both with those of elastic spheres and with those of centers of 
force, but one can note that the three sets of properties stand in a relation of analogy to one another.  
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By far Achinstein’s and Harman’s most doubtful claim, however, concerns the alleged 
change of method from the early to the later works. This ‘two-methods’ interpretation conflicts 
with various passages in the Maxwell’s writings. Perhaps the most significant text in this regard 
is a letter to Stokes, where Maxwell presents his scientific project in DTG as follows:  
I intend to arrange my propositions about the motions of elastic spheres in a manner 
independent of the speculations about gases. (LP, 1, 169) 
This suggests precisely that his mathematical results are intended to be independent from any 
specific physical hypothesis about the nature of gases. Importantly, this passage echoes an earlier 
one in a letter to Thomson from 1855, where Maxwell describes his aim in FLF:  
Now I have been planning and partly executing a system of propositions about lines of force 
&c which may be afterwards applied to Electricity, Heat or Magnetism or Galvanism, but 
which is in itself a collection of purely geometrical truths embodied in geometrical 
conceptions of lines, surfaces &c. (LP, 1, 320)  
The parallels between the two passages constitutes further evidence that Maxwell’s approach in 
DTG is meant to be in line and not in contrast with that adopted in FLF. 
Should we then conclude that both the fluid analogy in FLF and the molecular analogy in 
DTG are purely illustrative? In my view, this would be the wrong conclusion to draw. Rather, I 
believe we should take seriously a point that Hesse (1972) has made in a short but illuminating 
discussion of Maxwell’s methodology. Hesse argued that it is anachronistic to confuse 
Maxwell’s understanding of the role of analogy in physical inquiry with that of “later formalists” 
(93). A “formalist” (or “Duhemian”) in her terminology is someone who recognizes two kinds of 
models as acceptable in physical theory: i) “formal” models, i.e. cases of similarity in 
mathematical form between the laws of two otherwise distinct domains, where, as Hesse puts it, 
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“there are no grounds for… arguing from the known properties of one system to the further 
properties of another system” (93); and ii) “explanatory” models, where the properties of the 
model are posited to stand in a relation of identity with the properties of the target so as to  yield 
explanations. As we have seen, Achinstein and Harman rely precisely on this formalist 
distinction when arguing that the fluid analogy in FLF is purely formal and thus illustrative, 
whereas the molecular analogy in DTG is explanatory. For Hesse, however, it is this dualistic 
view of analogy in scientific inquiry that must be rejected. In the next section, I will present an 
alternative proposal regarding Maxwell’s method of analogy that develops Hesse’s insight. 
 
3. A Materialist Interpretation 
If Maxwell intended his physical analogies to possess neither a purely illustrative function nor an 
explanatory function, what other role did he intend for them? According to the view that I will 
defend in this section, which is a version of the ‘materialist’ interpretation urged by Hesse 
(1972), the role that Maxwell assigns to his physical analogies is that of an organizing principle: 
a cluster of equations borrowed from a more familiar domain that are both sufficiently general 
and sufficiently precise to offer a compact and systematic account of the experimental evidence 
regarding a given target. As such, physical analogies can serve two functions at once in scientific 
inquiry: first, an illustrative function, as an aid to the interpretation of the formal symbols; 
second, an inductive function, as a source of defeasible arguments from the known properties of 
a source to yet unobserved properties of a target. The thesis of the ‘double nature’ of physical 
analogies is distinct from the claim that they possess a purely illustrative function, which 
requires no significant connection between the source and target of an analogy besides formal 
resemblances. It is also distinct from the claim that they possess an explanatory function, which 
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presupposes an identity between the properties of the source and target. According to Hesse 
(1972), as well as on my reading, the focus is instead on the capacity of physical analogies to 
strengthen “inferences leading to identifications” (96, my emphasis).49 
My aim in what follows is to establish a version of the materialist interpretation. Although I 
believe that the conception of analogy in scientific inquiry that I will attribute to Maxwell exists 
at least in nuce in FLF, I will be less concerned with describing its evolution over the course of 
Maxwell’s scientific career and more with the coherence of the overall picture. Among other 
things, my reading vindicates Achinstein’s (1993) insight that Maxwell’s position towards the 
hypotheses suggested by his physical analogies “was not complete epistemic neutrality” (228). 
At the same time, my reading avoids commitment to the further claim that Maxwell’s physical 
analogies are intended as explanatory devices. The evidence for the materialist interpretation that 
I will rely upon includes both Maxwell’s own remarks (discussed in this section) and his use of 
the method of analogy in practice (discussed in the next section). As will become clear in the 
following discussion, the former source is often more ambiguous than the latter, justifying 
Hacking’s description of Maxwell’s attitude as one of keeping “his philosophical cards close to 
his chest” (1996, 62). In 3.1, however, I will offer textual evidence for the claim that Maxwell 
conceived of his physical analogies as possessing a double nature. In 3.2, I will distinguish my 




                                                          
49 This is a stronger claim than the thesis defended by Nersessian (2002), according to which Maxwell’s 
physical analogies possess a heuristic function, as aids to scientific discovery (just like dreaming or taking a 
walking). By defending the materialist interpretation, I mean to reject the weaker reading offered by 
Nersessian. In section four, I will criticize her take on Maxwell’s introduction of the displacement current. 
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3.1  Real Physical Analogies 
One of the main sources of evidence for the materialist interpretation is contained in Maxwell’s 
Address to the British Society, written fourteen years after the publication of FLF. This lecture, 
which addresses the topic of “the Relation of the two branches (Mathematics and Physics), to 
their action and reaction upon one another” (II, 216) is an appraisal of the value of analogies in 
aiding both the diffusion and the progress of science. On the one hand, Maxwell stresses the 
value of physical analogies as scientific illustrations, which are helpful because 
the great majority of mankind are utterly unable, without long training, to retain in their 
minds the unembodied symbols of the pure mathematician (II, 220) 
On the other, Maxwell also praises the fruitfulness of analogies in the “search for new forms of 
thought” (II, 227) to fit the phenomena that experimentalists gradually uncover. As he points out, 
significant progress has been achieved with the help of analogy both in understanding “the 
inscrutable delicacy of the texture of material bodies” (II, 221) and in understanding “what takes 
place beyond our Solar System” (II, 221), fields in which “not many years ago, [the possibility of 
scientific advancement would] have seemed unpromising, if not altogether illusory” (II, 221). 
Having described some of the most notable advances in our understanding of matter and of 
the whole universe accomplished by physicists from Fourier to Clausius, Maxwell goes on to 
mention a contemporary avenue of research where physical analogies make an appearance:   
There are certain electrical phenomena, again, which are connected together by relations of 
the same form as those which connect dynamical phenomena. To apply to these the phrases 
of dynamics with proper distinctions and provisional reservations is an example of a 
metaphor of a bolder kind; but it is a legitimate metaphor if it conveys a true idea of the 
electrical relations to those who have been already trained in dynamics. (II, 227) 
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Maxwell has in mind recent work in electromagnetism by himself and Thomson, among others, 
where notions such as electromotive force, displacement, etc., are borrowed from the familiar 
language of the dynamics of ordinary bodies. At least on one reading of this passage, Maxwell’s 
idea is that there are bolder and less bold uses of scientific ‘metaphors’. They can be used in a 
merely illustrative way, to convey “a true idea of the electrical relations to those who have been 
already trained in dynamics” (III, 227), and in this sense they can be ‘legitimate metaphors’. But, 
in addition to that, Maxwell recognizes a more robust role for them in scientific inquiry. In the 
case of electromagnetism, this occurs when, although “with proper distinctions and provisional 
reservations” (II, 227), one takes the dynamical language and ideas to be capable of offering a 
privileged perspective on electrical and magnetic phenomena. In this case, we are in the presence 
of not only a ‘legitimate metaphor’, but also of a scientific ‘metaphor of a bolder kind’. 
In my view, these passages are best understood as developing the idea that the same physical 
analogy can have two distinct uses in scientific inquiry, namely, the illustrative one of being an 
aid to visualization and the inductive one of underwriting arguments in support of untested 
empirical hypotheses about the target. Another passage in the Address offers further insight into 
the connection between some physical analogy’s being a ‘legitimate metaphor’ and its capacity 
to be used as a metaphor of a ‘bolder kind’ (that is, inductively): 
The characteristic of a truly scientific system of metaphors is that each term in its 
metaphorical use retains all the formal relations to the other terms of the system which it had 
in its original use. The method is then truly scientific- that is, not only a legitimate product of 
science, but capable of generating science in its turn. (II, 227) 
As I read this passage, there is a twofold distinction being made here: first, the distinction 
between merely ‘partial’ formal analogies and ‘truly scientific metaphors’, depending on 
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whether the terms in the analogy retain all, or only some, of the formal relations to the terms 
in the analogy’s source; second, there is at least an indication of a distinction between ‘truly 
scientific metaphors’ that are merely capable of generating science with those that actually 
fulfill what in this chapter I have been referring to as an inductive function. This suggests 
that it is at least a necessary condition for a physical analogy to fulfill an inductive function 
that it is a “truly scientific illustration”, i.e., that each term in the analogy “retains all the 
formal relations to the other terms of the system which it had in its original use.” (II, 227).  
When the condition of complete formal correspondence is fulfilled, the physical analogy 
is not only useful as a ‘truly scientific illustration’, but as Maxwell writes in PLF: 
it becomes an important philosophical question to determine in what degree the applicability 
of the old ideas to the new subject may be taken as evidence that the new phenomena are 
physically similar to the old. (II, 227, my emphasis)  
As I read this passage, Maxwell is suggesting that, for any case of formal correspondence among 
distinct physical domains that constitutes a ‘truly scientific illustration’ and thus a ‘legitimate 
metaphor’, there is an open question as to what extent they indicate that “the new phenomena are 
physically similar to the old” (227). This question is ‘open’ (as Maxwell puts it, it is 
‘philosophical’) at least in the sense that some disagreement among scientific experts is to be 
expected: to put it in the language of FLF, some scientists will take the ‘mathematical 
connections’ (i.e., the formal correspondences) between two scientific domains to be significant 
evidence of their ‘physical connections’ (i.e., that they are similar in the kinds of quantities and 
laws instantiated in each domain); others, instead, will take those mathematical connections less 
seriously. In the former case, I take it, the physical analogy not only functions as a scientific 
illustration, but can also be employed as a source of support for novel hypotheses about the 
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target (i.e., by reasoning from properties of the model to yet unobserved properties of the target); 
in the latter, the arguments one may draw from the model are regarded as less strong. 
Although the passages just quoted offer prima facie support for the view that Maxwell 
endorsed the thesis that physical analogies may possess (under certain conditions) a double 
function, many interpretative issues remain open. One problem is whether the conception of the 
double nature of physical analogies that emerges from the Address represents a change or an 
evolution of the conception is put forward in FLF. As I mentioned earlier, there is a long 
tradition in the historical and philosophical literature on Maxwell of reading the introductory 
section of FLF as a plea for the illustrative use of analogy. In several passages of FLF, however, 
a more complex picture seems to emerge. I have already quoted, for instance, this passage: 
If it should then appear that these laws, originally devised to include one set of phenomena, 
may be generalized so as to extend to phenomena of a different class, these mathematical 
connexions may suggest to physicists the means of establishing physical connexions. (I, 189) 
While for defenders of the formalist interpretation Maxwell’s use of “suggests” refers to a purely 
psychological fact, in light of Maxwell’s remarks in the Address it becomes at least a serious 
possibility that a stronger reading was alluded to: namely, that the resemblance in mathematical 
form with the laws of fluid dynamics may offer some defeasible support to hypotheses 
concerning the actual laws of electric currents. Moreover, since Maxwell often stresses the 
continuity in approach between FLF and his later works DTG and PLF, written much closer to 
the date of the Address, it is not implausible to conjecture that the conception of the double 
nature of physical analogies articulated in the Address exists at least in nuce in FLF.50 
                                                          
50 Hesse (1972) offers further evidence for thinking that the function of the FLF fluid analogy is inductive by 
pointing to Maxwell’s discussion of how the connection between static and current electricity can be 
accommodated naturally within the framework of the fluid analogy (I, 181). In brief, Maxwell’s argument is 
that, just as the quantity of flow of an incompressible fluid depends solely on the pressure and the thickness of 
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Although settling this and similar historical questions about the evolution of Maxwell’s 
methodological ideas is important, there is an even more urgent issue for defenders of the 
materialist interpretation. This is an epistemological problem: if physical analogies mainly 
consist in formal correspondences between distinct physical domains, in what way are the 
inferences Maxwell intends to draw from them any more plausible than inferring the color of 
swans from their formal analogy with line segments? This problem is so serious that, even when 
the textual evidence in favor of the materialist interpretation is clearer, we still find a certain 
resistance to accepting Maxwell’s answer at face value. Indeed, this is precisely the state of 
puzzlement caused by Maxwell’s criterion of ‘correctness’ for physical analogies in the Address: 
The correctness of [a “truly scientific”] illustration depends on whether the two systems of 
ideas which are compared together are really analogous in form, or whether, in other words, 
the corresponding physical quantities really belong to the same mathematical class. When 
this condition is fulfilled, the illustration is not only convenient for teaching science…, but 
the recognition of the formal analogy between the two systems of ideas leads to a knowledge 
of both, more profound than could be obtained by studying each system separately. (II, 219) 
The point that Maxwell appears to be making here is the following: the difference between a 
less bold but legitimate metaphor (a ‘truly scientific illustration’) and a legitimate metaphor ‘of a 
bolder kind’ comes down to whether the respective quantities in the formally analogous physical 
domains “really belong” (II, 219) to the same “mathematical classes”. What causes puzzlement 
is that this ‘real belonging’ of the quantities to the same ‘mathematical classes’ appears to be 
regarded as a sufficient condition for a physical analogy’s inductive role: as Maxwell puts it, 
                                                          
the tube, so the flow of electric current depends solely on the potential and type of insulator: “Thus the analogy 
between statical electricity and fluid motion turns out more perfect than we might have supposed” (I, 181). As 
Hesse notes, Maxwell’s argument has problems and will be retracted in later works.   
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when a physical analogy of this kind is discovered, “it leads to a knowledge of both [systems], 
more profound than could be obtained by studying each system separately” (II, 219). The puzzle 
here is not so much about what Maxwell means by the ‘mathematical classes’ of physical 
quantities – I will discuss this in more detail momentarily. The even more urgent question that 
this passage raises is: if what it is for a physical analogy to fulfill more than a purely illustrative 
function is to be cashed out in terms of ‘real’ membership to alleged ‘mathematical classes’ of 
the respective quantities, in virtue of what sorts of facts can a physical analogy so understood 
support arguments to yet untested hypotheses about a target? In other words, how can these 
arguments be any stronger than the arguments from properties of line segments to the color 
properties of swans based on some (however well-crafted) formal analogy between them? 
While the materialist analysis of Maxwell’s methodology suggested thus far has been in line 
with the conclusions reached by Hesse (1972), our answers to this crucial epistemological issue 
diverge significantly. Hesse’s attempt at providing a plausible epistemological foundation for the 
inductive function of physical analogies is roughly as follows: on her view, Maxwell’s point is 
that we can often gain sufficient experimental evidence for identifying the physical quantities of 
the analogy’s target as belonging to the same mathematical classes as the corresponding 
quantities of the analogy’s source; the reason why real membership to the same mathematical 
classes is relevant to supporting hypotheses about the analogy’s target is that this ‘real 
membership’ carries with it similarities in broadly dynamical features between source and target. 
On the interpretation that I will outline below, instead, the epistemological story that lies in the 
background is different. First, I claim that it is a whole body of experimental and theoretical 
considerations that offers reasons to associate a given physical quantity with a mathematical 
class. Second, whereas Hesse claims that membership to the same mathematical classes carries 
103 
 
with it similarities in dynamical features, I believe that her account underestimates the relevance 
of similarities in topological and dimensional features that Maxwell emphasizes. (This is 
connected to the failure of Hesse’s 1963 account of analogy to recognize non-causal respects of 
resemblance that I have pointed out in chapter two). Let’s have a close look at the textual 
evidence that supports my version of the materialist interpretation over Hesse’s. 
 
3.2  On the Mathematical Classes of Physical Quantities 
Let’s start from the question: what does Maxwell mean by ‘mathematical classes of physical 
quantities’? In a paper from 1862 dedicated to this topic, Maxwell describes the classification as: 
founded on the mathematical…analogy of the different quantities, and not on the matter to 
which they belong. Thus a finite straight line, a force, a velocity of rotation, &c., are 
quantities, differing in their physical nature, but agreeing in their mathematical form. (II, 237) 
Although Maxwell does not provide a complete classification of the physical quantities (a project 
that he takes to be valuable but not finished), he offers three examples of such mathematical 
classes that he thinks can be derived from the study of physics. One is the distinction between 
scalar and vector quantities. A scalar quantity is one that possesses only magnitude. For 
instance, in hydrodynamics, volume may be conceived as a scalar quantity, since it has 
magnitude but no direction; pressure, instead, may be conceived as a vector quantity since it 
possesses both a magnitude and a direction. Among vector quantities, Maxwell suggests that we 
distinguish between forces and fluxes. The difference is that the magnitude of a force is defined 
along a line, whereas the magnitude of a flux is defined in terms of an area. For instance, 
temperature gradient is a force in the theory of heat, whereas heat flow is understood as a flux. 
Yet another distinction is that between vectors possessing a linear character from those that have 
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rotational character. For instance, on Maxwell’s model of electromagnetism, electric currents 
have a linear character, since they produce their specific effect along a straight line, whereas 
magnetic forces are rotatory, since they produce their effect through circular motion. 
As Hesse (1972) recognizes, Maxwell’s interest in this special classification of physical 
quantities lies with the fact that, by identifying a physical quantity with a certain mathematical 
class, one thereby locates its role within a relatively stable and well-understood system of 
relations. These relations are specified by mathematical operations on those classes of quantities. 
When a mathematical operation on a quantity yields an actual physical quantity of a system, 
Maxwell writes that the “operation [on that quantity] has a physical meaning” (261). Among the 
most elementary examples of this kind that Maxwell mentions are:  
The operation of taking the integral of the resolved part of a force in the direction of a line for 
every element of that line, has always a physical meaning. […] The operation of taking the 
integral of the resolved part of a flux perpendicular to a surface for every element of the 
surface has always a physical meaning. (II, 261) 
A more complex example concerns the application of Hamilton’s operator ∇, which, when 
applied to a scalar quantity (e.g. temperature), yields a gradient, but when: 
σ represents a vector function, ∇σ may contain both a scalar and a vector part, which may be 
written S∇σ and V∇σ. I propose to call the scalar part the Convergence of σ […] But ∇σ has, 
in general, also a vector portion, and I propose… to call this vector the Curl or Version of the 
original vector function. It represents the direction and magnitude of the rotation of the 
subject matter carried by the vector σ. (II, 265) 
For instance, if we imagine the vector field σ to represents the flow of a liquid or gas, then S∇σ 
will be scalar quantity standing for the tendency of the fluid to collect at a point (today more 
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commonly measured in terms of its opposite, namely ‘divergence’), and V∇σ will be another 
vector component measuring the tendency of the fluid to rotate around the same point. 
An important distinction that Maxwell draws is that between merely describing a certain 
quantity as belonging to a certain class and that quantity ‘really belonging’ to that class. One 
example that Maxwell gives comes from hydrodynamics. As Maxwell explains, up to a certain 
level of detail, fluid velocity can be treated indifferently (“equally well” ii, 261) as either 
belonging to the class of forces (“with reference to the unit of length” II, 261) or to that of fluxes 
(“with reference to the unity of area” II, 261). However, he immediately adds that: 
if we endeavour to develop a more complete theory of fluids, which shall take into account 
the facts of diffusion, where one fluid has a different velocity from another in the same place; 
or if we accept the doctrine, that the molecules of a fluid, in virtue of the heat of the 
substance, are in a state of agitation; then, though we may give a definition of the velocity of 
a single molecule with reference to unit of length, we cannot do so for the fluid; and the only 
way we have of defining the motion of the fluid is by considering it as a flux. (II, 261) 
The distinction between merely describing a quantity as belonging to a certain class (e.g., 
describing fluid velocity as if it were a ‘force’) and that quantity’s ‘real’ mathematical class (e.g., 
fluid motion belonging to the class of ‘fluxes’) is consistent with the distinction I noted earlier, 
that between physical analogies that are ‘truly scientific illustrations’ and ‘legitimate metaphors, 
on the one hand, and those that possess the extra element of ‘correctness’, where the physical 
quantities of the two domains can not only be put into a one-to-one correspondence but ‘really 
belong’ to the same mathematical classes. On the view that is suggested by Maxwell’s passages, 
then, the analogy between fluids and electric fields would be ‘correct’ if (among other things) the 
motion of the field ‘really belongs’ to the same class of fluxes as fluid velocity. 
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What remains to be settled for defenders of the materialist interpretation are two main issues: 
how do we identify a given physical quantity as ‘really belonging’ to a mathematical class? And 
in virtue of what sorts of facts is this ‘real belonging’ of the respective quantities to the same 
mathematical classes capable of supporting defeasible arguments from the properties of the 
source to the properties of the target? As for the former question, Hesse (1972) argues that we 
can read off the information about the salient mathematical class from the observations: 
Translation and rotation have equally obvious spatial interpretations in all of Maxwell’s 
analogous systems; indeed, in spite of his many disclaimers that the relata of an analogy need 
not themselves be at all physically similar, he assigns ‘rotation’ to magnetic force precisely 
because it causes spatial rotation of the plane of polarized light. (95) 
In a more recent article largely sympathetic to Hesse’s approach, Bokulich (2015) agrees: 
Knowing, for example, whether the rotational component should be identified with electricity 
or magnetism cannot be read off the equations themselves, and instead requires bringing a 
whole body of experimental evidence to bear. (33) 
However, Hesse and Bokulich fail to note that the identification of magnetic behavior with 
rotation represents a special case. The example from fluid dynamics that I have quoted earlier 
presents us a different story. In this passage, Maxwell takes the compatibility with the “doctrine 
that the molecules of a fluid… are in a state of agitation” as a reason to take the mathematical 
class of fluids to be that of fluxes rather than forces. This consideration is both distinct and 
independent from the other reason that Maxwell mentions for the flux categorization, which is a 
consideration of a more empirical kind: viz. to account “for the facts of diffusion” (II, 261).  
That in the general case considerations of a more theoretical nature (such as the coherence 
with other plausible doctrines) must intervene in favor of a given mathematical classification is 
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not only clearly indicated by the textual evidence, but is also urged by the problem of under-
determination. As Maxwell often points out in his writings, in many cases different physical 
analogies may extend equally well to cover the available experimental evidence in a given 
domain. Both in FLF and in PLF, for instance, Maxwell points out that the available evidence is 
insufficient to differentiate between an ‘action-at-a-distance’ picture, in which the behavior of 
electric and magnetic forces is likened to that form of ‘contactless’ physical action along a line, 
and a ‘local action’ picture of the kind endorsed by Michael Faraday, in which electromagnetic 
forces are likened to the disturbances of a homogeneous medium (as in fluids). By Hesse’s and 
Bokulich’s criterion, there would be no sufficient ground to assign mathematical classes to 
electromagnetic interactions. However, Maxwell has a clear preference for the local action 
picture, which he often justifies by appeal to the compatibility with conservation laws:51 
There are… objections to making any ultimate forces in nature depend on the velocity of the 
bodies between which they act [as in the rival, action-at-a-distance picture]… the principle of 
the Conservation of Force requires that these forces should be in the line joining the particles 
and functions of the distance only. (I, 208) 
A similar problem of incompleteness affects Hesse’s answer to the second question, namely, 
in virtue of what sorts of facts can a ‘correct’ truly scientific illustration strengthen arguments 
from properties of a more familiar source to yet unobserved properties of a target. Hesse’s 
answer is that the mathematical classes identify genuine respects of similarities in broadly 
dynamical features between the physical domains being compared: 
                                                          
51 There are interesting parallels between Maxwell’s use of conservation laws in support of mechanical models 
and Einstein’s ideas regarding ‘constructive theories’ versus ‘principled theories’; cf. Lange (2016, ch. 3). 
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The mathematical entities involved – scalars, vectors, forces, fluxes, translations, rotations – 
are not uninterpreted symbols but have at least a spatio-temporal interpretation which is 
identical in all physical systems to which they apply. (1972, 93) 
In a similar vein, Bokulich (2015) argues that the mathematical classes that are assigned to 
different physical quantities carry with them “‘thin’ physical interpretations” (2015, 34), where: 
the emphasis is… on the general dynamical relations and properties, which can be 
instantiated in a number of different systems (30). 
Once again, however, the textual evidence suggests a different story. Maxwell is often very 
explicit that the notions of lines and surfaces, of translation and rotation that are invoked are 
topological and dimensional notions, which reflect the features of a three-dimensional space in 
which (according to Maxwell) any physical system is located. The distinction between scalars 
and vectors is a dimensional one; that between forces and fluxes and between linear and 
rotational vectors are topological. In many occasions, Maxwell remarks upon the importance of 
this distinction. For instance, in defending his coinage of the term “curl” to define the rotational 
character of vectors, he notes that it is preferable to ‘rotation’ or ‘whirl’ which suggest motion:  
I have sought for a word which shall neither, like Rotation, Whirl,… connote motion, nor, 
like Twist, indicate a helical or screw structure which is not of the nature of a vector. (II, 265) 
That the features being classified are often topological and dimensional also brings out an 
important limitation of the mathematical classification as presented by Maxwell: the physical 
quantities being treated often make no reference to time. This is why Maxwell writes that: 
We may imagine another step in the advancement of science to be the invention of a method, 
equally appropriate, of conceiving dynamical quantities. (II, 259) 
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Of course, by suggesting that Maxwell’s classification is often intended to identify 
topological and dimensional features of the domains under investigation, I do not mean to 
suggest that the features being identified are incapable of supporting defeasible arguments to yet 
unobserved properties of a target. My point so far has been the merely negative one that, if we 
ask in virtue of what can a ‘correct’ physical analogy underwrite defeasible arguments in support 
of yet untested hypotheses, the answer that it can do so because ‘real belonging’ to certain 
mathematical classes carries with it similarities in broadly dynamical features is an incomplete 
answer. Maxwell’s idea appears to be, instead, that to identify a given quantity with a 
mathematical class is to locate it within a system of relations among quantities, which can 
sometimes be characterized purely in terms of their dimensional and topological features, i.e., 
features which make no reference to the broadly dynamical profile (the system of forces in 
motion over time) of the domains under investigation. Hence, the version of the inductive view 
defended by Hesse (1972) and endorsed (at least partially) by Bokulich (2015) does not 
adequately represent Maxwell’s views on the method of physical analogy. 
It may still be asked: how is it, then, that the sharing of mathematical classes can underwrite 
a physical analogy’s inductive significance? Although Maxwell is never exactly explicit on this 
point, on my interpretation the answer lies with the fact mathematical classes are associated with 
what we might call ‘constraints’ on what can be the meaningful operations among the quantities 
involved. Such constraints need not be all of the same variety as the ones imposed upon any 
physical system by the adoption of the dynamical language – e.g., the various laws governing the 
evolution of a system of forces in motion. Some of those constraints may result, instead, from the 
recognition of the purely geometrical features of the three-dimensional space in which the 
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classified physical quantities presumably inhabit. Those are features that hold quite irregardless 
of the specific dynamical profiles of the quantities involved in the domains under investigation. 
In one sense, then, mathematical classes function like biological ones: once we have reasons 
for identifying a given individual as belonging to some class or other (e.g., a winged animal with 
the category of ‘bird’), those reasons often translate into defeasible evidence that the individual 
being classified possesses some other trait that is typical of those in the same class (e.g., 
‘flying’). In another sense, however, mathematical classes function differently from biological 
classes. The argument from (e.g.) the appearance of wings to capacity to fly invokes the 
reasonable expectation of a similarity in broadly causal features between the individual being 
classified and known birds: e.g., similarities with respect to the kinds of ancestors from which 
said individual descends. Conversely, on my interpretation defeasible arguments from 
mathematical classes can sometimes invoke similarities in broadly geometrical features of the 
domains under investigation. For instance, by identifying a given quantity with the class of (say) 
vectors with curl equal to zero (so-called ‘irrotational vectors’) we may be led to postulate an 
accompanying quantity in a larger vector field belonging to the class of vectors with divergence 
equal to zero (so-called ‘soleinodal vectors’). An argument of this kind would be exploiting the 
fact (what is essentially a mathematical theorem) that, modulo certain smoothness and decaying 
conditions, a vector field can be decomposed into the sum of an irrotational and a soleinodal 
component. Importantly, even though the latter theorem is a mathematical truth, the argument 
from the evidence of an irrotational vector to the postulation of an accompanying solenoidal 
vector is still an inductive one, based on the reasonable expectation that the same conditions 




3.3   Overview and Moving Forward 
To sum up the interpretative hypothesis that I have advanced in 3.1 and 3.2, the methodological 
remarks contained in Maxwell’s Address to the British Society indicate a commitment to the idea 
that physical analogies possess a double nature: they can be useful illustratively and inductively 
at the same time. It is precisely their having this double function that makes them such valuable 
instruments in scientific inquiry. I have argued that the conception of physical analogy that 
Maxwell offers in the address is consistent with, and indeed plausibly a continuation of, the ideas 
stated in Maxwell’s earlier works, including FLF. By a careful analysis of the textual evidence, I 
have identified plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for a physical analogy to possess the 
much desired double function: first, it must be a ‘truly scientific illustration’, a case of formal 
resemblance between the laws of two domains such that physical quantities of a source domain 
have corresponding physical quantities in the target; second, it must be ‘correct’, i.e., the 
corresponding physical quantities must ‘really belong’ to the same mathematical classes. 
Although Maxwell’s list of mathematical classes is incomplete, I have suggested that (pace 
Hesse and Bokulich) they can identify respects of similarity in dimensional and topological 
features as well as dynamical ones. Moreover, I have argued (again in disagreement with Hesse 
and Bokulich) that our reasons for assigning physical quantities to given mathematical classes 
(and thus our reasons for being ‘epistemically partial’ to some physical analogies over others) 
include both experimental and theoretical considerations, not just experimental ones.  
I will offer further support for my version of the materialist interpretation in the next section, 
where I will argue that my reading illuminates important aspects of Maxwell’s use of the method 
of analogy in practice. Before that, I should like to briefly note that, if the version of the 
materialist interpretation that I have presented is correct, the physical analogies that Maxwell 
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employs are doubly interesting for the purposes of philosophical analysis. Indeed, they are not 
only instances of the inductive use of analogy in science (a function stressed by Hesse 1963, 
Shelley 2002, Bartha 2009, among others), but also show that analogical argument from known 
properties of a model to yet unobserved properties of a target can be justified even when model 
and target do not resemble each other in their dynamical features. This conclusion is compatible 
with the unificationist account of analogical reasoning in science that I have developed 
elsewhere (in chapter two), but is arguably inconsistent with more restrictive accounts such as 
Hesse’s (1963), according to which an analogical argument from the properties of a model to the 
yet unobserved properties of a target can be justified only if the known similarities indicate a 
resemblance with respect to the causal features of the two domains. Hence, to adopt the same 
terminology as chapter two, Maxwell’s physical analogies offer further support to the claim that 
there can be ‘non-causal’ yet inductively significant arguments from analogy in science. 
 
4. The Application of the Method of Analogy 
Assuming that the materialist interpretation outlined earlier is at least a serious candidate for 
representing Maxwell’s methodological views, what does the method of analogy look like when 
applied in the concrete practice of Maxwell’s scientific work? The answer that I will defend in 
this section is that, in practice, the method works exactly as we would expect if my materialist 
interpretation were true. To give an idea of the argument that I will pursue, let’s consider a 
passage from Maxwell’s “On the Mathematical Classification of Physical Quantities”:  
Helmholtz… has shown how to construct an analogy between electromagnetic and hydro-
kinetic phenomena, in which magnetic force is represented by the velocity of the fluid, a 
species of translation, while electric current is represented by the rotation of electro-
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magnetism […] According to Ampère and all his followers, however, electric currents are 
regarded as a species of translation, and magnetic force as depending on rotation. I am 
constrained to agree with this view, because the electric current is associated with 
electrolysis, and other undoubted instances of translation, while magnetism is associated with 
the rotation of the plane of polarization of light, which... involves actual…rotation. (II, 263) 
In this passage, Maxwell is offering a criticism of Helmoltz, who had used the same physical 
analogy between fluids and electromagnetic fields of Maxwell’s FLF but ‘in reverse’: arguing 
from the properties of electric currents to those of ordinary fluids. The objection is that Helmoltz 
assigns linear character to magnetic forces and rotatory character to electric ones, but the 
evidence suggests that the opposite mathematical classification is more apt. Hence, Maxwell 
cared about getting the analogy right, and the question is to explain why he should.  
This puzzle is especially pressing if we take it that Helmoltz’s analogy functioned as a 
heuristic or illustrative device, serving the purpose of arriving at some novel hypothesis to test. If 
the heuristic or illustrative function is all there is to a physical analogy, however, why would 
Maxwell find Helmoltz’s use of the analogy objectionable? After all, Helmoltz’s work was by 
Maxwell’s own lights fruitful and relevant, having led to clear advances in hydrodynamics. In 
light of this, why would Maxwell care about the correct mathematical classification? According 
to the materialist interpretation, the passage presents no puzzle. Maxwell cared because ‘correct’ 
physical analogies have a special epistemic role to play, which I cashed out in terms of their 
possessing an inductive function in addition to an illustrative one. Although it is possible to make 
fruitful work by describing electric currents as possessing rotational character and magnets as 
possessing linear character, the opposite classification is the ‘correct’ one, i.e., the one on which 
we can rely to produce novel and inductively strong arguments from the known properties of 
hydrodynamics to the unobserved properties of electromagnetism (or vice versa). 
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It is the capacity of the materialist interpretation of offering a rational reconstruction of 
Maxwell’s work that will be emphasized in the following discussion. Partly for reasons of space 
and partly because it is a much contested episode, in what follows I will focus on a more central 
episode of Maxwell’s scientific career, his introduction of the displacement current in PLF. As 
will be discussed in 4.1, this episode has been the cause of one of the longest controversies 
among historians of science. Although Maxwell presents the introduction of a displacement 
current in the electromagnetic equations as being necessitated by the mechanical characteristics 
of his model of the electromagnetic field, many interpreters find this hard to believe, leading to 
the allegation that the mechanical model is simply a cover for a result that Maxwell had achieved 
by means of mathematical manipulation. My aim in 4.2 will be to argue that there is no need to 
postulate any clash between Maxwell’s methodological statements and his use of the mechanical 
model in practice. Although I will (consistently with my approach so far) refrain from entering 
the jungle of technical details surrounding Maxwell’s statement of his equations, I hope that the 
interpretation offered below will be regarded as both sufficiently detailed and sufficiently 
plausible to stimulate further research by specialists in this area of the history of physics.52  
 
4.1 The Debate over the Displacement Current  
Here is a brief overview of the episode that has caused so much debate. In the attempt to “form 
an exact mathematical expression for all that is known about electromagnetism without the aid of 
hypotheses” (LP, 1, 703), Maxwell begins in part I of PLF by developing a model where rotating 
                                                          
52 To be clear, I do not mean to diminish in any way the value of more historically- or technically-oriented 
contributions in the Maxwell literature; I have already praised, for instance, Siegel’s excellent discussion, 
which is one of the more historical variety. My aim here is to offer another perspective on the interpretative 
issues in the spirit of a pluralist approach to the history and philosophy of science.  
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vortices stand for magnetic forces (fig. 6). This was meant to account for Faraday’s discovery of 
the magneto-optic effect, which suggested that “some phenomenon of rotation is going on in the 
magnetic field” (LP, xyz). In part II, Maxwell faces the problem of accounting for electricity, 
which led him to imagine a thin layer of particles sliding in the interstices between the vortices, 
where the particles “play the part of electricity” (I, 486). For purely mechanical reasons, the 
physical state of the interstices could not be conceived as either fluid or solid in order to produce 
the desired harmony in the motion of vortices and particles. The only mechanical solution that 
Maxwell could conceive was for the state of the interstices to be some elastic medium 
intermediate between solid and fluid, effectively making the rotation of two nearby magnetic 
fields analogous to the motion of two rotation wheels with an intermediate “idle wheel” (I, 468).  
 
Fig. 6: Maxwell’s model of the electromagnetic field in PLF. 
It is in order to account for the action and reaction of the interstices with the rotatory motion 
of the vortices that (at least if we are to trust what Maxwell says) the ‘displacement current’ was 
introduced in the electromagnetic equations. Although the name misleadingly suggests that a real 
current was being postulated, from the expression that Maxwell used it is apparent that he 
intended the displacement current as a measure of the rate of change of an electric field over 
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time. In effect, Maxwell started out with Ampere’s law (which holds for all closed circuits): curl 
B= 4πJ, where B stands for a magnetic field and J for an electric current; the extra term he added 
was a +(1/c2) ΔE/δt on the right side of Ampere’s equation, where c stands for the velocity of 
light and ΔE/δt represents the rate of change of electric field E over time t. Among other things, 
as Maxwell later noted in the Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism, the resulting 
electromagnetic equation (which essentially linked the behavior of magnetic fields with the 
generation of electric currents) was consistent with the principle of conservation of energy 
(Ampere’s original law was not). The most striking consequence of the new equation was, 
however, another one. As Maxwell noted in part III of PLF, the velocity of propagation of the 
waves through the elastic medium as calculated from the assumptions of the molecular vortices 
model showed a remarkable similarity with the measured value of the speed of light. He added: 
we can scarcely avoid the inference that light consists in the transverse undulations of the 
same medium which is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena (I, 500) 
The swiftness with which Maxwell reaches the conclusion that light was an electromagnetic 
phenomenon continues to amaze scholars. In an influential essay on Maxwell’s electromagnetic 
theory, Duhem (1927) criticized the “incredible rashness” that Maxwell had used in arriving at 
the electromagnetic theory of light. Among other things, Duhem conjectured that Maxwell had 
worked out the electromagnetic equations already with an eye to reducing optics to 
electromagnetism; only afterwards did he construct a mechanical model in the attempt to satisfy 
the methodological expectations of his Victorian contemporaries: 
it does not appear that the model of electrostatic and electromagnetic actions aided Maxwell 
to create the electromagnetic theory of light. No doubt he tried to obtain from his model the... 
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essential formulae…; the very manner in which he directed his attempts shows, however, that 
the results he obtained were known to him through some other means. (1927, 98) 
One of Duhem’s most important arguments for this interpretation was that Maxwell had 
consciously manipulated the mathematical results so as to yield the desired result of the 
electromagnetic theory of light. In a later essay, Chalmers (1986) further substantiated this 
charge by identifying mathematical errors in the derivations that Maxwell had offered. 
In more recent years, the interpretative tradition that Duhem had initiated through his well-
known essay has been called into question. Siegel’s (2001) discussion, in particular, shows that 
the close agreement between the velocity of propagation of elastic waves and the measured 
velocity of light was not the result of voluntary slips or ad hoc adjustments, as Duhem and 
Chalmers had suggested, but was rather motivated mainly by approximations of the values of 
some of the parameters in those equations to what Maxwell considered a probable value. These 
approximations concerned in particular the supposition of the shape of the molecular vortices, as 
Maxwell himself clarified in Part III before laying out the contested equations: 
The actual form of the [molecular vortices] probably does not differ from that of a sphere 
sufficiently to make much difference in the numerical result. (II, 492) 
Siegel admits that Maxwell had made one error in the calculations of the velocity of the elastic 
medium, but that he had probably been misled by expecting a simple relation between the two 
main quantities of the medium he was describing (its density and its torsion modulus) and not by 
an attempt to adjust the calculation of the velocity of the transverse waves in the elastic medium 
to the measured velocity of light. According to Siegel, then, we have all the reasons to trust 
Maxwell when he claimed to have “worked out the formulae in the country [the family estate in 
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Scotland] before seeing Weber’s number [the measured speed of light]” (LP, 1, 685). Nersessian 
(2002) reaches a similar conclusion that dispenses Maxwell from the accusation of cheating. 
But while recent scholarship has departed from Duhem’s unforgiving reconstruction, there 
remains the question of what role the mechanical model in PLF was supposed to fulfill in the 
argument for the displacement current. Recent interpreters disagree considerably on this issue. 
On one side of the interpretative spectrum, there are the readings of those who, like Nersessian 
(2001), take the molecular vortices model to possess a merely heuristic function (cf. also Turner 
1955, Buchwald 1984, Hon and Goldstein 2015). On Nersessian’s view, which will be taken as 
representative of this interpretative family, Maxwell was using the analogy to show that all the 
known facts about electromagnetism could be arranged in a unitary mechanical representation: 
Maxwell’s results… show that a field formulation of electromagnetic phenomena is possible 
and that this formulation is consistent with known experiments (2001, 80) 
However, Nersessian denies any further role to the vortex model beyond: 
the heuristic value of his method. In his attempt to extend the analogy beyond his original 
intentions, i.e., beyond the attempt to represent magnetism, currents, and electromagnetic 
induction, he was led to hope for – what he himself called “surprising”- results. (2002, 80) 
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the interpretation put forward by Siegel (2001), 
according to which the mechanical model was supposed to demonstrate the reduction of light to 
electromagnetism. Like Nersessian, Siegel (2001) agrees that the molecular vortices model and 
the subsequent introduction of the displacement current were dictated mostly by the need to 
accommodate all of the known facts about electromagnetism. In particular, Siegel writes:  
A primary reason for the introduction of the displacement current was to facilitate the 
extension of the theory of molecular vortices to embrace electrostatics. (2001, 112) 
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Siegel has in mind, in particular, Maxwell’s aim to define the accumulation of electrostatic 
charge by means of the mechanical model vortices, which he effectively accomplishes by taking 
charge as equivalent to the excess density of the ‘idle-wheel’ flux in the interstices of the 
magnetic vortices. The ‘accommodative’ function of the displacement current is, however, 
according to Siegel, compatible with the molecular vortices model being ‘demonstrative’ with 
respect to the reduction of optical phenomena to electromagnetic ones. As he puts it: 
Maxwell showed that a model adequate to account for electromagnetic phenomena would, 
without further adjustments, account for optical phenomena as well… [On this view,] the 
model is seen as determining or demonstrating the scientific result. (2001, 124) 
For Siegel, it is the fact that the mechanical model needed no further adjustments to account for 
optical phenomena that persuaded Maxwell that light must be an electromagnetic phenomenon. 
Both of these interpretations face serious problems. The main problem for Nersessian’s view 
is to explain the confidence with which Maxwell reasons from the coincidence of the velocity of 
light as calculated from the model and as measured experimentally to the electromagnetic theory 
of light. Maxwell’s confidence in his assertions is surprising if, as Nersessian claims, the 
molecular vortices model had no further role than organizing the known phenomena. Yet, 
announcing his results in a letter to Faraday, Maxwell states very clearly that: 
This coincidence is not merely numerical… I think we have now strong reason to believe, 
whether my theory is a fact or not, that the luminiferous and electromagnetic medium are 
one. (LP, 1, 686) 
On the other hand, Siegel’s view that Maxwell took his molecular vortices model to demonstrate 
the reduction of optics to electromagnetism raises an epistemological puzzle. After all, Maxwell 
often emphasizes in his writings that mechanical models are highly under-determined: 
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the problem of determining the mechanism required to establish a given species of connexion 
between the motion of the parts of a system always admits on an infinite number of solutions 
(T, 470) 
It follows that the mere possibility of a model that accommodates the facts of electromagnetism 
and extends, without adjustments, to optical phenomena is insufficient to establish the 
electromagnetic theory of light. Either there is something special about Maxwell’s model that 
sets it apart from all sorts of arbitrary mechanical models purporting to achieve the same result, 
or Maxwell’s inference to the electromagnetic theory of light is epistemically irresponsible.53 
In accordance with the materialist interpretation that I have laid out in section three, below I 
will argue that Maxwell’s molecular vortices model was indeed special. That is to say, in my 
view the model did not merely provide a useful mechanical illustration of electromagnetic 
phenomena, one that was capable of furnishing a unitary mathematical representation of all the 
known facts about electromagnetism. At the same time, the function of his model was not purely 
‘accomodative’, as Nersessian and Siegel claim. As I will argue, once the special status of his 
molecular vortices model is recognized, Maxwell’s inference to the electromagnetic theory of 
light turns out to be neither rash nor irresponsible, but an application of his analogical method.  
 
4.2  Arguing for the Double Function 
That Maxwell’s main project in PLF is to offer an organizing principle for all the known facts of 
electromagnetism is clear from its setup. As he writes in the introduction, the aim is: 
                                                          
53 Another position is Achinstein’s (1993) and Harman’s (1998), according to which the model served the 
function of offering potential explanations of physical phenomena, by invoking physical hypotheses for which 
Maxwell had no independent empirical support (despite Maxwell’s own claim to wanting to avoid them). As I 
have already criticized this interpretation, I will set it aside in the following discussion. 
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to examine magnetic phenomena from a mechanical point of view, and to determine what 
tensions in, or motions of, a medium are capable of producing the mechanical phenomena 
observed. If, by the same hypothesis, we can connect the phenomena of magnetic attraction 
with electromagnetic phenomena and with those of induced currents, we shall have found a 
theory which, if not true, can only be proved to be erroneous by experiments which will 
greatly enlarge our knowledge of this part of physics. (I, 452) 
The molecular vortices model offers precisely this compact mechanical representation that 
Maxwell had sought. As both Nersessian and Siegel remind us, however, accommodating all the 
known facts about electromagnetism is not sufficient to assign the model any special 
epistemological status, since empirically equivalent rivals are available. That this was a live issue 
for Maxwell is confirmed by the ending of part II of PLF, where Maxwell notes: 
The facts of electro-magnetism are so complicated and various, that the explanation of any 
number of them by several different hypotheses must be interesting, not only to physicists, 
but to all who desire to understand how much evidence the explanation of phenomena 
lends to the credibility of a theory, or how far we ought to regard a coincidence in the 
mathematical expression of two sets of phenomena as an indication that these phenomena 
are of the same kind. (I, 488) 
But while these passages are evidence that Maxwell took seriously the methodological 
lesson of under-determination, they should not be read as establishing that the molecular 
vortices model had a purely heuristic function. Both in PLF and elsewhere, we find Maxwell 
offering several arguments for his molecular vortices model of electromagnetism. The 
strongest one of these arguments, which Maxwell mentions in the same ending of part II, has 
to do with its compatibility with the principle of conservation of energy, whereas 
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Those who look in a different direction for the explanation of the facts, may be able to 
compare this theory with that of the existence of currents flowing freely through bodies, and 
with that which supposes electricity to act at a distance with a force depending on its 
velocity, and therefore not subject to the law of conservation of energy. (I, 488) 
The same appeal to conservation principles had already appeared at the end of FLF as an 
objection to the alternative picture of electromagnetism by German physicist M. Weber: 
There are also objections to making any ultimate forces in nature depend on the velocity of 
the bodies between which they act. If the forces in nature are to be reduced to forces acting 
between particles, the principle of the Conservation of Force requires that these forces should 
be in the line joining the particles and functions of the distance only. (I, 208) 
Some other arguments for the molecular vortices picture are only briefly touched upon in 
PLF, but they make a more prominent appearance in other writings. One has to do with the 
plausibility of the molecular vortices picture as a general theory of matter. Maxwell describes 
this theory favorably in the Address to the British Society, attributing it to William Thomson: 
A theory, which Sir W. Thomson has founded on Helmholtz's splendid hydrodynamical 
theorems, seeks for the properties of molecules in the ring-vortices of a uniform, frictionless, 
incompressible fluid. (II, 223) 
As Maxwell explains, the hypothesis of the “ring-vortices” possesses some plausibility as a 
theory of matter insofar as each vortex “once generated, ...has the properties of individuality, 
permanence in quantity, and indestructibility” (II, 223). This is why Maxwell writes: 
If a theory [of matter] of this kind should be found… to represent in any degree the actual 
properties of molecules, it will stand in a very different scientific position from those theories 
of molecular action which are formed by investing the molecule with an arbitrary system of 
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central forces invented expressly to account for the observed phenomena. In the vortex theory 
we have nothing arbitrary, no central forces or occult properties of any other kind. (II, 223) 
Even when it comes to justifying some of the more specific assumptions of his molecular 
vortices model, Maxwell does not lose an occasion to show that there is nothing ad hoc or 
arbitrary about them. We find an example of this in Maxwell’s attempt to justify his way of 
representing the action of magnetism as rotatory and that of electricity in terms of particles “in 
rolling contact” with molecular vortices. While Maxwell admits that the resulting physical 
picture is somewhat “awkward” (I, 480), he mentions that it had the virtue of showing the 
relation between magnetic and electric forces to be of the same kind as between other pairs of 
physical phenomena, one of which has rotatory and the other linear character. Thus, having 
expressed the main equations connecting electric currents with magnetic attractions in part III of 
PLF, Maxwell notes favorably that “the same mathematical connections is found between other 
sets of phenomena in physical science” (I, 502), such as the relation between “rotatory 
displacements in a uniform and continuous substance” (I, 502) and “relative linear displacement 
of a particle [in the medium] with respect to those in the immediate neighbourhood” (I, 502).  
The same lack of ‘arbitrariness’ is emphasized with respect to the contested introduction of 
the displacement current. In the introduction to Part III of PLD, Maxwell first justifies it on 
broadly mechanical grounds, based on the argument that the only mechanically conceivable way 
for the particles of electricity to remain “in rolling contact” with the magnetic vortices without 
loss of energy is for the interstices between the vortices to be in an elastic state: 
it is necessary to suppose, in order to account for the transmission of rotation from the 
exterior to the interior parts of each cell, that the substance in the cells possesses elasticity of 
figure, similar in kind, though different in degree, to that observed in solid bodies. (I, 489) 
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He then immediately adds a further argument for this supposition:  
The undulatory theory of light requires us to admit this kind of elasticity in the luminiferous 
medium… We need not then be surprised if the magneto-electric medium possesses the same 
property. (I, 489) 
Indeed, as Maxwell himself notes, again emphasizing the lack of ‘adhocness’ of his model: 
the whole theory of molecular vortices developed in this paper has been suggested to me by 
observing the direction [indicated by] those investigators who study the action of 
[continuous] media. (I, 505) 54 
In sum, the textual evidence offers compelling reasons for thinking that, instead of saying, as 
Siegel (2001) does, that in PLF 
Maxwell showed that a model adequate to account for electromagnetic phenomena would, 
without further adjustments, account for optical phenomena as well (2001, 124) 
we should rather say that in PLF Maxwell showed that a model adequate to account for states of 
stress or tension in a continuous medium (of any kind) would, without further adjustments, 
account for all known electromagnetic phenomena. The theoretical considerations invoked by 
Maxwell are not reasons to thereby identify electromagnetic properties with those of the 
molecular vortices. They are rather reasons to think that electromagnetic phenomena are due to a 
‘kind’ of stress or tension in a continuous medium and therefore that, whatever actual physical 
                                                          
54 The appeal to the mathematical analogy with light waves has potential to address Zapolski’s (1986) question 
of why Maxwell would include both a curl-free and a divergence-free component in the definition of the 
displacement current rather than just the curl-free component (which would have alone sufficed to restore 
charge conservation in Ampere’s law). For Zapolski, this move was Maxwell’s “true stroke of genius”. 
Zapolski’s question assumes that Maxwell’s justification of the displacement current in PLF derived from the 
need to restore charge conservation, which I believe is not entirely correct. Setting that aside, I find it plausible 
to think of Maxwell’s choice as partly dictated by the methodology of physical analogy (specifically, the 
comparison with domains having mathematically ‘similar’ quantities) that I have discussed in section 3.2. 
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mechanism underlies the motion of electromagnetic forces, that mechanism will be describable 
by the same ‘mathematical kinds of physical quantities’ (to use Maxwell’s own terminology) as 
the ones that we find instantiated in the molecular vortices model. It is in this specific sense that 
Maxwell says of the molecular vortices model that 
The nature of this mechanism is to the true mechanism what an orrery is to the Solar system. 
(LP, 2, 367; an orrery is an apparatus used to represent the relative position and motions of 
the planets and satellites of the Solar system) 
That the molecular vortices model was set apart from all sorts of conceivable rivals “with an 
arbitrary system of central forces invented expressly to account for the phenomena” (II, 223) 
explains why, when Maxwell realized that the velocity of propagation of waves in the elastic 
medium is the same as the measured velocity of light, he could “scarcely avoid the inference” (I, 
500) that light and electromagnetism consist in the undulations of the same medium. In my view, 
this is because the derivations of the molecular vortices model come already equipped with a 
form of credibility that the empirical predictions of rival ‘ad hoc’ models do not possess. Such 
credibility derives from the fact that the molecular vortices model employs a picture of physical 
interactions that is ‘in line with’ what we know about other branches of physics (in particular, the 
picture of physical interactions as stresses and tensions in a continuous medium). This notion of 
being ‘in line’ with other domains of physical inquiry is understood by Maxwell in terms of the 
physical quantities hypothesized in the target ‘really belonging’ to the same mathematical classes 
as the ones found in more familiar physical domains. This is why, if an ‘arbitrary’ rival model 
that accommodates the facts of electromagnetism had returned a number for one of its 
parameters which was close to the measured velocity of light, we would have had all the reasons 
to think that the coincidence was “purely numerical” (LP, 1, 686). However, when a derivation 
from the ‘non-arbitrary’ molecular vortices model returns such a surprisingly close number, the 
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numerical coincidence plausibly becomes evidence that there is a real connection between the 
medium postulated to account for electromagnetic phenomena and the aetheral one that Maxwell 
thought to be necessary in order to account for phenomena of light.55 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have advanced a novel interpretative hypothesis about Maxwell’s methodology 
of physical analogy. I have argued that my reading is superior to the formalist interpretation put 
forward by two authoritative sources in Maxwell’s scholarship, namely Achinstein (1993, 2001) 
and Harman (1998). I have also offered reasons to prefer my version of the materialist 
interpretation over Hesse’s (1972). As a way of summarizing this interpretation, I would like to 
conclude with a passage from Feynman’s acceptance speech for the Nobel prize: 
Theories of the known, which are described by different physical ideas may be equivalent in 
all their predictions and are hence scientifically indistinguishable. However, they are not 
psychologically identical when trying to move from that base into the unknown. For 
different views suggest different kinds of modifications which might be made and hence are 
not equivalent in the hypotheses one generates from them in one’s attempt to understand 
what is not yet understood. (1965, 1) 
The materialist interpretation of Maxwell’s methodology that I have proposed above suggests 
that Maxwell would have disagreed with Feynman on one point: different theories are not only 
psychologically distinct when trying to move from the known to the unknown, but they are also 
                                                          
55 The Bayesian anti-reductionist framework developed in chapter three can be used to reformulate this claim 
more precisely, roughly along the lines suggested for Galileo’s example of the wavy lines on the Moon. 
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inductively distinct: as the result of a various body of empirical and theoretical considerations, 


















The current environmental crisis and the difficulties for countries to restrain their own 
consumeristic economy to prevent ecological breakdown make the problem of scientific 
expertise and its role in globalized societies more salient than perhaps ever before in history. 
Philosophers and historians of science have an important role to play in shaping the vocabulary 
and the common images that are invoked in public discussions of this topic. Since what picture 
of science we offer matters, there is a special responsibility that comes with pursuing our studies. 
The public’s proper appreciation for scientific expertise may be threatened not merely by those 
provinces of the discipline that purposefully and systematically attempt to diminish its value –  
the success of the scientific enterprise can, in most cases, speak for itself against those attacks. 
The danger may also come from studies which, though in complete good faith, represent the 
methods of science as procedures of unassailable epistemic authority (thus making their close 
understanding and assessment unworthy of the general public’s limited attention). In such 
delicate times, I believe that the best service that we can do in reflecting on the scientific activity 
is to adhere to the maxim “to tell the truth, nothing but the truth”.   
The spirit of faithfulness to practice is the one that drives Kuhn’s discussion of the scientific 
enterprise almost sixty years ago, in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. “History,” we read in 
the Preface to this highly popular work, “if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or 
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chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are 
now possessed” (1962, 1). Kuhn’s critical target was, in particular, the stereotypical version of 
scientific methodology that one could gather from popular science textbooks and that, in his 
view, had also misled many epistemologists of the twentieth century. From those textbooks, 
Kuhn says, one gathers the impression “that scientific methods are simply the ones illustrated by 
the manipulative techniques used in gathering textbook data, together with the logical operations 
employed when relating those data to the textbook’s theoretical generalizations” (1962, 2). This 
view of the scientific method(s), Kuhn argues persuasively in the Structure, is at odds with the 
actual practice of science (as is illustrated in various episodes of the history of science). Instead, 
Kuhn proposed that the logic of scientific activity should be understood in terms of the 
establishment, development and occasional overthrow of various ‘paradigms’: a combination of 
texts and practices that have gained sufficient success in some area of empirical investigation to 
stand out among the rivals and fulfill the function of an exemplar for future research in that area. 
The initial reception of Kuhn’s Structure illustrates the importance of a careful use of the 
vocabulary and images by which we describe the scientific activity. Although the historiographic 
categories introduced by the Structure carried a great deal of novelty and fruitfulness, Kuhn’s 
discussion of paradigm-shifts (and the assimilation of the latter with duck-rabbit-type illusions in 
Gestalt psychology) gave the perception in many readers that he was advocating a form of 
irrationalism. Since paradigms come equipped with proprietary criteria of evaluation with 
regards to fit with empirical data, the Structure was read as implying that no rational choice can 
be made among scientific theories at different times and under different paradigms. Perhaps even 
more importantly, some of Kuhn’s remarks seemed to imply that in periods of ‘normal science’, 
i.e., when existing paradigms are not called into question, scientists proceed in their testing 
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business already knowing what the outcome of those tests is going to be: “Normal science,” 
Kuhn writes “is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the 
world is like” (1962, 5). Kuhn rejected the apparent irrationalist implications of his claims in 
various subsequent occasions (e.g., Kuhn 1975) but the suggestive imagery of paradigm-shifts 
and Kuhn’s philosophical discomfort with the notions of truth and scientific progress made it 
difficult to prevent more readers from embracing that interpretation. 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to use the previous chapters to offer a reformulation 
and partial revision of the picture of scientific activity that I take to emerge from Structure based 
on the arguments of the previous chapters. This will serve a two-fold purpose. First, it will be 
useful as a way to summarize the results of the previous investigations from a higher vantage 
point. Second, the discussion will be helpful to bring out some of my proposal’s limitations and 
some of the relevant philosophical issues that I have left unsolved. Thus, I will start in section 
two by offering an overview of the account of analogy in science that I favor. For this purpose, I 
will employ a slightly more suggestive philosophical vocabulary and imagery than I have 
previously allowed myself. On this basis, I will then turn (in sections three and four) to sketch a 
picture of scientific activity that I take to be naturally suggested by the arguments of the previous 
chapters. This picture endorses Kuhn’s idea of the necessity of scientific revolutions without 
embracing the claims of epistemic incommensurability under different paradigms. In section 
five, I will then discuss some of the ways in which the picture just sketched is incomplete and 






2. What Has Been Done 
Let me start by giving a brief overview of the account defended in the previous chapters. The 
notion that I would like to introduce for this purpose is that of an ‘inductive connection’. This is 
one of the notions that Hempel (1958) introduced in his discussion of the ‘theoretician’s 
dilemma’: given that any scientific theory that postulates unobservables for predictive and 
explanatory purposes can be reformulated in terms of a set of statements having the same 
empirical content but without appeal to unobservables, what are scientific theories for? Hempel’s 
answer is roughly that a scientific theory achieves a form of inductive “systematization” (45), 
something that its empirically equivalent, unobservable-free rivals cannot achieve. In particular, 
Hempel has in mind the capacity of a scientific theory to establish inductive connections between 
observations and predictions – in other words, its capacity to bring some observations to bear on 
the credence assigned to as yet unobserved events. For instance, by replacing the (unobservable-
free) empirical generalization “wood floats in water; iron sinks in it” with the law “a solid body 
floats on a liquid if its specific gravity is less than that of a liquid”, which appeals to 
unobservables (e.g., the property of a body’s specific gravity), the observations that sustains the 
initial generalization about the behavior of wood and iron in water are made to bear on a yet 
untested hypotheses about bodies that float on any liquid and that are not made of wood or iron. 
It is this notion of an inductive connection, whereby the evidence that one possesses for a 
proposition in a given domain is made to bear on (i.e., becomes evidence for) another proposition 
about another domain, that I propose to adopt in this discussion. A very brief way to state the 
guiding idea developed in the previous chapters is that, sometimes, something less than a theory 
– a mere analogy – is capable of establishing inductive connections among previously unrelated 
domains. By ‘something less’ than a theory, I mean to indicate the fact that we are not in the 
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presence of a full-fledged account of a given domain that yields scientific explanations of the 
facts about that system. Rather, the terms employed in an analogy apply to the target system only 
metaphorically and need to be replaced by more specific vocabulary in order to turn the 
metaphor into a more literal description of the target system of interest. The arguments of the 
previous chapters can be understood as proposing a series of conditions for establishing what 
might be called ‘inductive connections by analogy’, i.e., when the evidence that confirms some 
hypothesis about a well-established domain of scientific inquiry can by means of analogy be 
brought to bear on hypotheses about a less familiar domain. This phenomenon is distinct, in my 
view, from a scientific theory’s capacity to establish ‘inductive connections by law’: when some 
unobservable entity or mechanism is postulated that links the observations made in one domain 
to yet unobserved events in another domain (as in the example of the law about the behavior of 
floating bodies). The idea that I am trying to convey is that an analogy can achieve a similar 
effect – establishing inductive connections – without requiring any significant degree of credence 
in some as yet unobserved common explainer (e.g., some underlying common mechanism). 
What are the conditions under which an analogy can establish inductive connections? In 
chapter two, I argued that one condition that must be fulfilled is that there be some reasonable 
expectation, which may be further supported by the known similarities between the source and 
the target, that acceptable derivation patterns of the same kind as the ones that are employed in 
the analogy’s source may hold for the target as well. By an ‘acceptable derivation pattern’ I 
mean arguments that appeal to modally robust connections among properties of either the causal 
or the non-causal (e.g., mathematical) kind, meaning that those connections are mediated either 
by causal or by non-causal laws. An accompanying condition, which I have declared sympathy 
for but have not articulated in any detail in this work, is that the resemblances being identified 
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between source and target (e.g., their known similarities in either causal or mathematical 
respects) are recognized as genuine respects of similarity before any further argument is derived 
from the analogy. As discussed in chapter two, Hesse (1963) has proposed a formulation of this 
requirement, the ‘material condition’, demanding that the respects of similarity that are identified 
between source and target can be expressed by means of the available vocabulary that the 
scientific community accepts at a given time – before any analogical inference is made. 
Although I believe that Hesse’s condition is on the right track, I have purposefully avoided 
committing myself to any specific formulation of the material condition.   
In chapter three, I have offered a proposal as to how the idea of an analogy’s establishing 
inductive connection meshes with a probabilistic theory of confirmation, taking Bayesian 
confirmation theory as my main target. The two-stage account that I have proposed, whereby a 
judgment of analogy is first issued and then new evidence is taken into consideration, offers a 
precise sense in which an analogy can fulfill a distinctive role in confirmation. The main lesson 
of that discussion is that the capacity of an analogy to establish ‘inductive connections’ cannot be 
reduced entirely to the application of a fully general rule for updating credences on new 
evidence. On my anti-reductionist account, the judgment of analogy can sometimes make a 
distinctive contribution to confirmation by raising the probability of some ‘connecting 
hypothesis’ (the hypothesis that the same kinds of acceptable derivation patterns that hold for the 
source also hold for the target) vis-à-vis its rivals despite the absence of empirical evidence that 
can selectively tell in favor of that hypothesis over its rivals. I have argued that the justification 
for this practice does not rely upon any result that follows directly from embracing a Bayesian 
framework for confirmation, but rather from a posteriori consideration of simplicity that can 
attach to a hypothesis merely in virtue of its promise to achieve a significant kind of unification.  
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What philosophical purpose is served by my defense of the inductive function of analogies in 
science (i.e., their capacity to establish distinctive inductive connections)? The main payoff of 
my account is that it allows us to interpret various aspects of scientific practice at face value. As 
mentioned in chapter one, there are many situations in actual scientific investigation which 
would seem to indicate that a newly proposed analogy is being regarded as possessing a 
distinctive inductive role, i.e., as being capable of justifying defeasible arguments from the 
known properties of one domain to the yet unknown properties of another domain. The doctrines 
laid out in chapters two and three can be understood as offering a vindication of this important 
but often neglected aspect of scientific practice. They do so by linking the inductive use of 
analogy in science with the epistemic aim of achieving a more ‘unified’ account of natural and 
social reality. In chapter four, I discussed what seems to me a particularly neat example where 
the postulation of an inductive function of analogies helps illuminate the rationale behind 
scientific inferences as they arise in their specific historical contexts, namely Maxwell’s work in 
electromagnetism and the kinetic theory of gases. The ‘materialist interpretation’ of Maxwell’s 
method that I presented there serves as an illustration of the work that the supposition of an 
induction function an analogy can accomplish towards the rational reconstruction of science. 
As I have already stressed at various points in the course of this dissertation, my defense of 
the inductive function of analogy is not intended to rule out that, in some contexts of scientific 
investigation, an analogy may be employed in a purely heuristic fashion, as a means to formulate 
new scientific hypotheses to be put to empirical test. My claim is only that, in some contexts of 
scientific investigation, we have reasons to attribute a more robust, inductive function to 
analogies. In advancing this claim, I am of course fully aware that a ‘simpler’ reconstruction of 
scientific practice would do away with the inductive function and assign a single, heuristic 
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function to all analogies employed in the course of investigation. I therefore sense a similar 
objection to my view as the one that Maxwell countenanced against the postulation of the so-
called ‘electro-tonic state’ (now more commonly known as the ‘vector potential’) in his first and 
groundbreaking electromagnetic paper, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force”: “What is the use then”, 
Maxwell asks, “of imagining an electro-tonic state of which we have no distinct physical 
conception, instead of a formula of attraction that we can readily understand?” (I, 208). My 
response to the parallel objection to the inductive function of analogy is the same that Maxwell 
gives: “I would answer, that it is a good thing to have two ways of looking at the subject, and to 
admit that there are two ways of looking at it” (I, 208). In my view, the greatest service that an 
account of the kind I have provided can do is to offer a coherent, and I think often more 
plausible, alternative to the ‘heuristic’ interpretation of the use of analogy in science. 
The readers who find the arguments offered so far at least to some degree compelling are 
now invited on a brief journey through some of the more speculative parts of this work. My aim 
in what follows will not be so much to persuade them of some new doctrine, but rather to stretch 
their imagination in some measure. I will start in section three by presenting what I take to be a 
straight-out conjecture, which will then be used in section four for the purpose of sketching the 
quasi-Kuhnian picture of scientific activity that I advance as a tentative hypothesis.  
 
3. A Conjecture 
The conjecture that I want to put forward in this section is that analogy is the weakest bond that 
is capable of establishing inductive connections. That is to say, my claim is that the combination 
of the unificationist and the material conditions defined in the previous discussion represent the 
least demanding conditions (from the standpoint of an agent’s available evidence) under which 
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new inductive connections can be established. If correct, this conjecture would shed new light on 
the use of analogy in science: if one of the aims of scientific theorizing is to achieve inductive 
systematization among disparate domains, then the fact that analogy is the least evidentially 
demanding bond capable of establishing inductive connections makes it an obvious target of 
scientific interest in conditions of sparse and insufficient data. If the analogy is on the right track 
and more evidence accumulates in its favor, that analogy may eventually be replaced by a 
scientific theory, one that is capable of a great deal more inductive systematization. But the 
analogical origins of the scientific theory will remain and will often still be useful to interpret the 
vocabulary employed by the new theory. In this sense, an analogy can function as a ‘proto-
theory’: a temporary instrument for inductive systematization that can pave the way for a mature 
theory, where the facts about the target system will be finally systematized and explained. 
I refer to my claim as a conjecture because I could find no general argument that supports it. 
I believe, however, that the conjecture is plausible when we consider individual instances. In 
particular, let me take an occasion to discuss here how the method of establishing new inductive 
connections by developing an analogy with some other, more well-established domain of 
scientific inquiry differs, and is evidentially less demanding than, another means by which (at 
least according to some philosophers) scientists establish new inductive connection, namely by 
inference to the best explanation (IBE). As it is well-known from the abundant literature on the 
topic (cf. Lipton 2001 for a thorough discussion), there are many ways of formulating the 
methodological thesis of IBE. In what follows, I will concentrate on one way of understanding 
the content of this doctrine. On this formulation, IBE is the method whereby new inductive 
connections are established among two domains by virtue of a hypothesis’ potential to offer the 
best (or ‘loveliest’) explanation for a given set of data. In other words, when an epistemic agent 
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discovers that a given hypothesis would, if true, provide an especially lovely explanation for the 
facts about a target system, she is justified in assigning extra credence to that hypothesis vis-à-vis 
its rivals, thereby making the past observations (the ones that rival theories can also account for) 
more capable of confirming the predictions of the loveliest hypothesis vis-à-vis the rivals’. 
For the purpose of the following discussion, it is really crucial that the IBE doctrine is 
understood as making a claim about the loveliest explanatory hypothesis relative to a given set of 
data. Of course, our evaluation of the ‘loveliest’ hypothesis might partly depend on what other 
hypotheses we might happen to accept at any given time. However, defenders of IBE are not 
committed to thinking that a hypothesis that bears a significant analogy with some other 
scientific theory deserves extra credence just in virtue of the analogy; all their doctrine says is 
that the explanatory quality of a given hypothesis relative to a given set of data can afford extra 
credence. Thus, at least on the formulation that I am considering here, defenders of IBE need not 
endorse what in this work has been referred to as the ‘inductive view’ about analogy. 
Why do I say that the method of analogy is ‘less demanding’ than IBE? Although a full 
discussion of this issue would lead us too far from the scope of this discussion, let me propose 
what I consider a plausible two-stage argument. The first part of the argument expresses a 
tenuous form of skepticism about IBE in evidentially impoverished situations. Specifically, my 
point is that, in conditions of scarce and insufficient evidence, there is significant pressure on 
IBE theorists to justify assigning extra credence to an empirical hypothesis merely in virtue of its 
potential to provide a lovely explanation. Importantly, this is not to say that such extra credence 
would not be justified in other, evidentially richer, conditions. The point is only that, the less 
information about the target system is known, the more compelling will (typically) be the worry 
that loveliness is not a reliable indicator of truth. For one thing, in evidentially impoverished 
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situations it is often unclear which sets of data relative to a given domain ought to be considered 
relevant for the purpose of building an explanatory theory. Moreover, even if we somehow 
restrict ourselves to a fixed set of data, if we have nothing else to work with except whatever 
hypothesis we believe achieves, relative to that set of data, the best combination of simplicity, fit 
with the data, fruitfulness, etc., there is a genuine question as to why we ought to assign extra 
credence to the loveliest hypothesis. After all, in those circumstances the loveliest hypothesis has 
a significant chance of being ‘the best of a bad lot’ (as Van Fraassen 1980 once put it).  
Conversely, and this is the second part of my argument, the method of analogy appears to be 
especially suited to overcome an impasse of scientific investigation in evidentially impoverished 
situations. Searching for insights about some novel, unfamiliar domain, scientists should look for 
whatever interpretation of the new phenomena best ‘fits inductively’ (to borrow Salmon’s 
expression) with the rest of what they know. Thus, more than the capacity to provide lovely 
explanations of the facts about the target system, it is the ‘coherence’ with the set of accepted 
scientific hypotheses that informs the application of the method. The emphasis should therefore 
be put not so much on a presumed relation between loveliness and truth, but rather on the 
assumption, which is often justified by past experience, that natural or social reality is in some 
sense ‘uniform’: it consists in a few, stable and recurrent patterns. Thus, rather than attempting to 
land immediately on a literally true description of the phenomena of the target system, in 
evidentially impoverished conditions scientists first consider descriptions of the target system 
that cohere (in a special, metaphorical way) with the rest of the hypotheses that they accept.  
Of course, more work needs to be done to back up these brief remarks with the help of 
examples of IBE and analogy at work in scientific investigation. Readers who recall Maxwell’s 
praise of the method of analogy (and his argument for favoring it over the ‘mathematical 
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method’ and the ‘method of physical hypothesis’ at the early stages of inquiry) in the 
introduction of FLF may have already noted some similarities with the argument that I have just 
sketched. The main conclusion that I want to draw from it is that there is at least a prima facie 
case for the main conjecture of this section. If it is true that IBE is not a reliable procedure for 
establishing new inductive connections in evidentially impoverished conditions, the analogical 
method is more likely to stand out as the least evidentially demanding method capable of 
establishing new inductive connections in science. In the next section, I will put forward a quasi-
Kuhnian picture of scientific activity that I take to be naturally suggested by the proposed 
conjecture regarding the uniqueness of analogy as the ‘weakest’ of all scientific bonds.  
 
4. The Necessity of Scientific Revolutions 
The picture of scientific activity that I want to draw in this section starts from the fact of 
‘scientific consensus’: a (by and large) coherent body of hypotheses about a given domain that 
scientists accept as the result of their explanatory and predictive success. We can liken it to an 
Empire, whose infrastructure and military strategies help control a vast part of the surrounding 
territory (which stand for the various domains of the scientific discipline). Like the stability of 
the scientific consensus, the political stability of the Empire is subject to significant pressures, 
both internal and external. In particular, the Empire is engaged in a series of ‘local battles’ both 
inside and outside of its borders: fights for the possession of one or another town hall. They are 
analogous to the ‘empirical battles’ that the scientific consensus has to face to account for the 
observations. To prepare for those battles, the Empire trains its generals and military personnel to 
a precise and well-established set of strategies and military tactics, which have obtained 
considerable success in previous circumstances. A well-worked out system of rewards is in place 
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to ensure that those servers of the Empire who distinguish themselves in the local battles and 
help conquer more territory obtain higher positions of command. Conversely, the local 
populations with which the Empire engages in battle often lack equivalent military experience 
and are disorganized. In periods of prosperity, the Empire has an easy way imposing itself on 
those deniers of the ‘consensus’ through their superior organization and tactics. 
But despite its impressive organization, the life of the Empire (like that of the scientific 
consensus) is also subject to a vast of degree of arbitrariness. To preserve the favor of the 
populations over which it exercises control, the Empire needs to constantly renew its power 
establishment. However, even among its leaders, there is considerable disagreement over the 
path that the Empire needs to pursue. The process whereby the Empire selects its leaders is 
inevitably faulty, with the result that not always the candidates with the best capacities and vision 
are chosen. Moreover, the system of reward that is in place leads many generals at the Empire’s 
borders to get involved in increasingly bold actions in yet unexplored territories, where the 
conditions may not be as favorable to the establishment of the Empire’s organizational structure. 
When the Empire starts losing some of those local battles, the survival of the Empire starts 
depending more and more on the vision of its leaders. They are the ones in charge of renovating 
the infrastructural and military strategies that the Empire employs at the borders while preserving 
the basic internal organization that hangs the controlled territories together. 
The arbitrariness that surrounds the life of the Empire (the scientific consensus) is what 
makes it possible for revolutions to occur. The danger does not come from isolated rebellions of 
this or that town hall – the Empire, as we said, is well-equipped for resisting those. Rather, it 
arises from the initiative of those populations who manage to imitate the political organization of 
the Empire. When the Empire faces a well-organized enemy in a borderline territory, the risk of 
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losing is higher. With a few local victories, the enemy might gain enough momentum to impose 
its own infrastructures and military tactics at the local level and to develop its own reward 
system. Other territories might join the enemy’s cause by adhering to their same organization 
and military strategies. Of course, whether those alternative organization and strategies are likely 
to succeed on a broader scale is a largely unsettled question at that point. But when the Empire’s 
power begins to tremble, whether because of internal discord or because of the incapacity of its 
leaders to adequately respond to the enemy’s strategies, many things can happen amidst the 
prevalent confusion. Those who were the least happy under the Empire’s rule might welcome the 
enemy’s leaders as liberators. Some of the Empire’s least rewarded generals might even start 
flipping sides in the hope of gaining a better position under a new rule. If put under enough 
pressure, the old Empire might eventually collapse and a new one might take place. 
As readers of the Structure may have noticed, this way of describing the passage from 
scientific consensus to crisis and revolution echoes the picture drawn by Kuhn in various 
respects. Perhaps the most important one is the role that arbitrariness plays in bringing about the 
conditions for scientific revolutions. In the picture that I have sketched, arbitrariness comes in at 
two different points. First, there is some amount of arbitrariness in the starting point. The 
Empire’s structure and military strategies (i.e., the explanatory and predictive strategies of the 
scientific consensus) have developed with reference to a particular area of the habitable territory 
(i.e., a particular domain of scientific investigation – say, hydrodynamics). As successful as they 
can be in winning various local battles, there is no guarantee that those strategies will work in 
every case. The same arbitrariness affects the organization and military strategies of the enemy 
who eventually takes over: those strategies, too, carry with them an indelible sign of their local 
origins. Second, arbitrariness also affects the way the various generals (the experts) apply the 
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strategies they have learned in the various local battles and in the way they get rewarded in the 
case of success. Although the generals are trained under a very rigorous military discipline, there 
is always a certain degree of arbitrariness with respect to how they apply that discipline in a real-
world battlefield. In this sense, there is a parallel with Kuhn’s idea of “the insufficiency of the 
methodological directives… to dictate a unique substantive conclusion” (1962, 4) given the data. 
Another respect of similarity with Kuhn’s picture, in addition to the arbitrariness which 
inevitably produces tension, is the difficulty with which scientific revolutions are realized. There 
is no science, on this picture, without some degree of scientific consensus – on both what we 
know and what we still ignore. Isolated rebellions by unexperienced individuals do not get too 
far, on this view, because of their unsystematic attempt at subverting the consensus. It is only 
when the opponents are well-organized that trouble can arise. If the conjecture that I have put 
forward in the previous section is correct, the most cost efficient (the least evidentially 
demanding) way for any power aspiring to the control of large territories (the ‘lands’, as it were, 
of empirical observations) is by making sure that a well-worked out set of organizational 
structures and military strategies is applied throughout their campaigns (out of the metaphor, by 
using analogies inductively). Without the rigorous training that generals receive on successful 
military strategies (i.e., the successful theory patterns in science), the Empire is bound to retreat 
to either of two options: first, they could decide for generals to be free adopt a new approach for 
every new battle, simply rewarding those who win and discharging those who lose (this is 
analogous to endorsing the ‘heuristic view’ of analogy in science); second, they could decide to 
select each general so carefully that they could be at least somewhat confident that whatever 
strategy a general picks for a battle is the ‘best’ of the available ones (this is analogous to 
endorsing a stronger method such as IBE). Neither of these is going to bring the Empire very far: 
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the former, because of the inevitable arbitrariness with the outcomes of local battles; the latter, 
because of the inevitable elements of arbitrariness with the selection process for generals.  
If the metaphor for scientific activity that I have proposed is at least roughly on the right 
track, it would vindicate one of Kuhn’s most striking claims in the Structure: that scientific 
revolutions are in some sense necessary. By a ‘scientific revolution’ here I mean a subversion of 
the kind of consensus that guides the activity of science in one or another domain: a change in 
the overall organization of the explanatory and predictive strategies that scientists undertake in 
the search for knowledge. The ineludible elements of arbitrariness in research and the incentive 
to investigate yet unexplored territories of scientific interest generate the conditions for 
‘empirical anomalies’ to arise and shake the consensus. Just as when an Empire sometimes fails 
to impose itself in one or more of the local battles, so, as Kuhn writes, “sometimes a normal 
problem, one that ought to be solvable by known rules and procedures, resists the reiterated 
onslaught of the ablest members of the group […] On other occasions a piece of equipment 
designed and constructed for the purpose of normal science fails to perform in the anticipated 
matter, revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional 
expectations” (1962, 6). These reoccurring episodes in the history of science ensure the 
conditions for the scientific consensus to be threatened and, in some cases, overthrown.  
Even though scientific revolutions sometimes occur that alter the consensus, there is little 
room in this picture for ‘incommensurability’. The superiority of a new scientific worldview over 
an old one can often be traced back to the prevalence of the new worldview in some of the 
various ‘local battles’ for the control of this or the other portion of the discipline. While 
acknowledging that some arbitrariness remains in the winning or losing of those battles, on the 
picture that I have sketched the establishment of a new scientific consensus is ultimately a matter 
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of imposing on a broader scale the explanatory and predictive strategies that have been 
successful in winning one or another of the various ‘territories’ of empirical observations over 
which the previous consensus exercised control. Hence, while scientific revolutions are to be 
expected on this picture, the very process by which they originate ensures that theories under 
successive paradigm will always possess some degree of commensurability among one another. 
In the next section, I will indicate some limitations of the picture just outlined and some issues 
that I believe are worth further philosophical considerations in the future. 
 
5. Unfinished Business 
Since I have introduced this chapter with a note of warning about irresponsible descriptions of 
scientific activity, it is worth qualifying the proposal just made in various ways. First of all, there 
should be no doubt that the consensus in the scientific community is, in many important respects, 
different from an Empire: e.g., scientists are not ‘generals’ whose aim is gaining power, the 
battles being fought are not violent, there is no such thing as an Emperor in science, etc. The 
metaphor of scientists as generals serving for an Empire has been useful to represent what we 
might call the conservative aspect of scientific activity: the fact that, in order for scientific 
activity to proceed, scientists must be more or less in agreement on a series of basic claims and 
practices that they must consider as at least approximately correct. As Kuhn writes, “Normal 
science… is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is 
like. Much of the success of the enterprise derives from the community’s willingness to defend 
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that assumption, if necessary at a considerable cost” (1962, 5). This is what makes scientists in 
times of normal science analogous to generals serving for an invisible Empire.56  
In connection with the issue of scientific consensus, it is worth emphasizing that, although 
the metaphor that I have adopted appears to give no role to the notions of truth and scientific 
progress, the picture I mean to suggest is an intransigently realist one. Granted, on my view 
changes to the scientific consensus are made almost inevitable by the conditions of scientific 
research. However, the consensus would certainly not be so lasting and powerful if it didn’t ‘get 
things right’ to at least some extent. In this sense, then, my picture embraces the realist idea that 
our current best theories are at least approximately correct. Scientific revolutions (intended in the 
specific sense of a change in the explanatory and predictive strategies that constitute the 
‘common basis’ of scientific activity in a given discipline) can still occur that replace one 
approximately true system of scientific theories with an even more approximately true one. 
There remains, of course, the further question here as to how to spell out this commitment of the 
realist position more precisely. This is not, however, a problem that I can possibly hope to 
address in any detail here. If the arguments provided in the previous chapters are correct, some 
(possibly selective) realist commitment of the kind that I have just hinted at must be indeed a 
presupposition of the practice of employing analogies inductively.  
Some serious limitations with my picture of scientific activity are also worth briefly 
signaling. First, I have intended this picture to apply primarily to a particular branch of science, 
such as physics, biology or economics. But clearly there is more to be said about how each of the 
                                                          
56 Weil (1940) adopts the same metaphor to describe the work of mathematicians. Cf. also his remarks on the 
role of analogy at the early stages of the solution of a difficult mathematical problem (one that has defied the 
effort of some prominent mathematicians): “Since the opening is well defended…, it is necessary to inspect the 
available artillery and the means of tunneling under the fort […]. And here is where the analogy that has been 
referred to since the beginning finally makes its entrance, like Tartuffe appearing only in the third act.” (338) 
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individual disciplines interact with the others. Sometimes, the explanatory and predictive 
strategies employed in one branch of science are used to alter the scientific consensus in another 
branch. An especially notable example, in my view, is the field of economics, where many of the 
theoretical tools employed in research are drawn from various branches of physics – micro-
economics being often modelled to classical mechanics, macro-economics being instead more 
akin with statistical mechanics.57 If there is a plausible case to be made that those practices of 
borrowing from one domain to the other possess an inductive function, the lack of an account for 
cross-disciplinary exchanges of theoretical tools constitutes a limitation of the current proposal. 
Another way in which the picture just drawn distorts the scientific activity is that it does not 
bring out clearly the roles that technology and the market play in influencing scientific research. 
I have proposed an analogy between the explanatory and predictive strategies of scientists with 
the organizational and military strategies of the Empire’s generals. However, technological 
developments and the interests of the economic markets are no less relevant to the history of 
scientific advancement as they are to military history. Thus, the account that I have proposed 
must be complemented by some precise proposal as to how factors besides the strictly epistemic 
ones can affect the establishment or crisis of scientific consensus. I expect, however, any such 
proposal to add extra dimensions to my account of scientific activity rather than demolish it.  
In the spirit of concluding this discussion of the dissertation’s unfinished business, let me 
mention two closely related issues that emerge from the discussion of the previous chapters. The 
first is the problem of scientific language. A recurrent tendency in the literature on analogical 
reasoning in science has been to separate issues about the logic of analogical inference from 
issues about the workings of language, especially metaphorical one. This tendency was 
                                                          
57 See also Majorana’s article “The Value of Statistical Laws in Physics and in the Social Sciences” (1942) for 
a discussion of the influence of quantum physics on the social sciences. 
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forcefully resisted by Mary Hesse in many of her works, beginning with her 1963 Models and 
Analogies in Science. As was discussed in chapter two, Hesse argued that reasoning from 
analogy does not merely require a capacity to identify structural relations between the properties 
of a familiar source and to map them onto novel target systems (as in Gentner’s 1983 ‘structure-
mapping approach’ and Bartha’s 2009 recent ‘articulation model’). On her view, another crucial 
capacity is the evaluation of what she called ‘pre-theoretic’ or ‘material’ similarities between 
source and target, by which she meant similarities that our linguistic frame already predisposes 
us to accept. Among other things, Hesse’s claim implied that one cannot completely separate 
issues about the nature of analogical inferences from what in Scholastic theology and philosophy 
of language (e.g., Aquinas, Cajetan, etc.) is known as the problem of analogical predication, 
intended as a form in between the univocal and the equivocal use of predicates (such as when 
‘healthy’ is used for both a kind of food and for people). Even though the present work does not 
address the problem of formulating a plausible candidate for the material condition, I believe 
more philosophical work needs to be done to vindicate this important insight from Hesse.  
The second issue emerging from the discussion concerns the formulation of simplicity as a 
theoretical virtue. On my account, the principle of simplicity that is required in order for analogy 
to fulfill an inductive function has to do with the ‘fit’ among the kinds of derivation patterns that 
different branches of science employ. On a standard view, however, simplicity is understood not, 
as I have suggested, inter-theoretically, but intra-theoretically: as a matter of the number of 
fundamental predicates (Quine 1981), or the number of entities (Lewis 1973), or the number of 
“argument schemata” (Kitcher 1993) that a particular scientific theory employs. None of these 
proposals defend the form of cross-domain simplicity that I have in mind here: the reappearance 
of the explanatory schemes of one domain in one or more domains of scientific interest. In my 
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view, however, not only does analogical unity constitute an additional kind of simplicity to the 
ones that have been traditionally countenanced, but it sometimes trumps those other kinds: that 
is, a theory with more predicates (or more entities, or schemata) may be considered simpler, 
overall, than an otherwise equivalent theory with less predicates (or less entities, or schemata), so 
long as keeping the extra predicates serves the purpose of retaining an analogy with another 
well-confirmed theory. I believe that Maxwell’s postulation of the displacement current provides 
an excellent example of how sometimes adding an extra term into an equation can result in a 
superior kind of simplicity. However, making this case remains material for future work. 
The last two issues that I have mentioned, that of scientific language and that of cross-
domain simplicity, point towards a common direction, which can be described as the social 
foundations of the scientific means of knowledge-production. If the arguments of the previous 
chapters are correct, in other words, an especially privileged perspective from which to 
understand the inductive use of analogy in scientific argumentation is the perspective of a social 
epistemology: a philosophical account of scientific advancement that takes at its fundamental 
unit of knowledge-production communities (with their languages and practices) rather than 
individuals. In future work, I aim to bring this consequence of the picture defended in this 
dissertation more clearly into view. The time has come now to draw some conclusions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This dissertation has been an attempt at considering the scientific enterprise not merely as a sum 
of well-confirmed theories, as it is too frequently done in contemporary philosophy of science, 
but from the perspective of its origin or genesis. I believe that this perspective throws new light 
on the scientific activity as a whole. In particular, from an analysis of the early stages of the 
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process of scientific inquiry it emerges that analogies often fulfill more than a merely heuristic 
function in empirical investigation: they are actually one of the principal means to sustain 
empirical hypotheses about the yet unknown in conditions of sparse and insufficient evidence. 
One of the central aims of this work has been to offer a form of vindication of this practice. The 
idea is not to insist that analogies are epistemically ‘magic’, i.e., that they are capable of 
producing certain and indubitable knowledge, but rather to advocate for a cautious, though still 
confident, use of them in scientific practice. On the picture of scientific activity that I have 
drawn, analogies play a crucial role in the process of coordinating the evidence we obtain from 
observation with our historically-shaped conceptual schemes and imaginative capacities. It is for 
this reason that they constitute such precious elements for researchers as they prepare the ground 
for future theory. In this concluding chapter, I have attempted to connect the elements of 
arbitrariness that stem from the proposal and evaluation of analogical arguments in scientific 
investigation with an account of scientific advancement that, though realist in spirit, leaves room 
for occasional ‘revolutions’: chains of events whereby the main explanatory and predictive 
strategies employed at some stage of history are overthrown and replaced by new ones. 
I would like to conclude by briefly attempting to trace the roots of this discussion back to the 
work of one of my favorite philosophers, Giambattista Vico. His influence may perhaps already 
be noticed from the picture of scientific activity that I have drawn: the idea of the history of 
science in terms of the establishment, development and overthrown of various ‘Empires’ of 
scientific consensus not only resonates with Kuhn’s view of scientific activity in the Structure, 
but echoes in many ways Vico’s idea of the evolution of human civilization. The comparison that 
Vico (1725) suggests between historical development the motion of the tides, with its ‘courses’ 
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and ‘recourses’, suits the picture of the advancement of scientific history offered here, with the 
alternation of various ‘Empires’ aiming to control vaster and vaster territories. 
Although the similarity in the conception of history is perhaps the most striking, an even 
more important respect of similarity with Vico’s philosophy concerns more specifically the 
epistemological arena. Our common antagonist in this arena is the very same ‘hypothetico-
deductive’ picture of scientific rationality which, initiated by the Cartesians, has returned to 
predominance after its revival in twentieth-century logical empiricism. This is a view that 
reduces the scientific activity to a quasi-mechanical procedure of guessing and testing, seemingly 
dispensing with science’s inductive element. Against this view, I have proposed a picture that, in 
the wake of Vico, makes scientific rationality more dependent upon our capacities to interpret 
creatively the available data – e.g., by drawing connections and noticing similarities. This is the 
capacity that Vico called ingenium and placed at the heart of his ‘imaginative metaphysics’, to be 
contrasted with the understanding that is prominent in ‘rational metaphysics’: 
As rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them (homo 
intelligendo fit omnia), this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by 
not understanding them (homo non intelligendo fit omnia); and perhaps the latter proposition 
is truer than the former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in the 
things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes 
them by transforming himself into them. (1725, 405) 
Producing a comparison is one way in which we ‘make the things out of ourselves’ as we 
aim for knowledge. My advice is therefore not to avoid but to make a sapient use of reasoning 




Così parlar conviensi al vostro ingegno,        [Such signs are suited to your mind,  
però che solo da sensato apprende          since from the senses only it apprehends  
ciò che fa poscia d’intelletto degno. what it then makes fit for the intellect] 
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